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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION AND
OVERVIEW
1.1 Introduction
This dissertation comprises three essays on default risk in capital markets. The
three essays investigate major issues surrounding default risk in capital markets
and the relationship with the 2008 financial crisis by focusing on important seg-
ments of capital markets including investments portfolio (hedge funds), derivatives
(equity options market), fixed income (credit default swaps), and equity market.
The first essay “The role of Leverage in Hedge Funds Failure” investigates the
role of financial leverage, including the use of margins and derivative products, in
the hedge funds failure during the 2008 financial crisis. Motivated by failure of
the two Bear Stearns hedge funds at the beginning of the financial crisis in 2007,
1
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this paper examines why some hedge funds failed during and after the recent fi-
nancial crisis, and why some also survived. Leverage is defined in three ways,
as (a) debt/equity ratio, (b) the use of margins, and (c) the use of derivative
products. The research uses a 15-year panel dataset of 17,202 failed and survived
hedge funds from the Lipper TASS Hedge Fund database. The empirical analy-
sis, using probit regression to estimate the likelihood of failure, shows that during
the financial crisis period, financial leverage is more significant in increasing the
probability of failure, whereas financial leverage becomes insignificant in explain-
ing the probability of hedge fund failure during non-crisis periods after controlling
for fund structure, size, incentive fees, prior performance, and off-shore registra-
tion. The results are consistent with Ang et al. (2011) who analyze the cyclical
leverage for financial institutions and hedge funds and find that financial lever-
age decreases during a financial crisis period because the funds sell some assets
to meet their margin requirements and that forces some funds into liquidation.
Further analysis shows that some hedge funds which follow specific styles such as
“Emerging Markets”, “Equity Market Neutral”, “Long/Short Equity Hedge”, and
“Multi-strategy”, which have higher than average betas, are also more likely to
fail during the financial crisis.
The second essay, “Does default risk impact Equity Options?”, explores the
impact of default risk on equity option pricing. The impact is studied in detail
by empirically examining to what extent the firm-specific default risk matters in
pricing individual equity options. Since credit default swaps (CDS) are similar to
put options in that both offer a low cost and effective protection against downside
risk, we use CDS spreads as a credit risk proxy to investigate the effects of default
risk on put pricing. The recent financial crisis showed that, for many financial
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firms, equity options experienced high implied volatility (IV) when the underlying
CDS spreads went up. By examining an exhaustive sample of US-listed firms with
both CDS and put option data available over the period from 2002 to 2010, and
studying the primary determinants of option IVs cross-sectionally and over time,
the findings show that default risk is a significant factor in the prices of equity
options. Moreover, the impact of default risk remains significant after controlling
for firm-specific and macroeconomic factors. This study relates to recent literature
that explains how default risk can get injected from the fixed income market to the
equity options market and why default risk is important in the pricing of equity
options and implied volatility.
The third essay, “Forecasting Option-implied Volatility using credit risk”, ad-
dresses the issue of forecasting option implied volatility which is of interest to
option market participants, who routinely formulate volatility and option price
forecasts for trading and hedging purposes. As shown in essay two, credit risk
matters for option pricing since options are valued on firms with significant trading
liquidity, yet subject to default risk, similar to liquidity risk. If credit risk mat-
ters for option prices, this essay particularly explores whether better out-of-sample
forecasts for option implied volatility (IV) can be developed using lagged credit
risk measures. Various time-series forecasts of daily, weekly, and monthly option
implied volatilities show that inclusion of default risk as measured by credit de-
fault swap (CDS) can significantly improve out-of-sample performance, measured
through a decreased mean squared error (MSE) as well as a smaller root mean
squared error (RMSE).
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1.2 Dissertation Overview
The dissertation is organized in five chapters. Following the introduction, chapter
two discusses the risk of failure in hedge funds (as one of the important segments
impacted during financial crisis), focusing on the role of excess leverage and its
impact on increasing the default risk and consequently failure of hedge funds.
Chapters three and four relate to the issues surrounding credit risk and options
market. In Chapter Three by measuring default risk stemmed from credit default
swap, and investigating its overlap with options markets, it is discussed to what
extent default risk can flow into equity options pricing. In Chapter Four the inter-
relationship between implied volatility and the credit default swap, is studied in
time-series details and the forecasting power of CDS is identified as well as its role
in improving out-of-sample performance of predicting implied volatility.
The reader can consider these three chapters as three independent academic
essays. There is no need to read Chapter Two first in order to understand Chap-
ters Three and Four. In each chapter I provide an introduction, an overview of
the related literature, a discussion of hypotheses and empirical tests, results and
conclusions. In what follows I provide the complete findings in each chapter.
Chapter 2
THE ROLE OF LEVERAGE IN
HEDGE FUNDS FAILURE
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Abstract
This research investigates the role of financial leverage, including the use of
margins and derivative products, in the hedge funds failure during the 2008 finan-
cial crisis. Motivated by failure of the two Bear Stearns hedge funds at the begin-
ning of the financial crisis in 2007, this paper examines why some hedge funds failed
during and after the recent financial crisis, and why some also survived. Leverage
is defined in three ways, as (a) debt/equity ratio, (b) the use of margins, and (c)
the use of derivative products. The research uses a 15-year panel dataset of 17,202
failed and survived hedge funds from the Lipper TASS Hedge Fund database. The
empirical analysis, using probit regression to estimate the likelihood of failure,
shows that during the financial crisis period, financial leverage is more significant
in increasing the probability of failure, whereas financial leverage becomes insignif-
icant in explaining the probability of hedge fund failure during non-crisis periods
after controlling for fund structure, size, incentive fees, prior performance, and
off-shore registration. The results are consistent with Ang, Gorovyy and Inwegen
(2011) who analyze the cyclical leverage for financial institutions and hedge funds
and find that financial leverage decreases during financial crisis period because
the funds sell some assets to meet their margin requirements and that forces some
funds into liquidation. Further analysis shows that some hedge funds which are
registered under specific styles such as “Emerging Markets”, “Equity Market Neu-
tral”, “Long/Short Equity Hedge”, and “Multi-strategy”, which have higher than
average betas, are also more likely to fail during the financial crisis.
Keywords: Financial Leverage, Hedge Fund Failure, Financial Crisis, Hazard
Model
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2.1 Introduction
Hedge funds have increasingly become important investment portfolios in recent
years for both rich individuals and institutional investors. Total assets under
management for the hedge fund industry grew rapidly from $39 billion in 1990
to $2.3 trillion at the peak of 2007.1 Jickling and Raab (2006) state that hedge
funds account for about 30% of trading volume in US securities markets. Fol-
lowing the global financial crisis in 2008, the hedge fund industry also suffered
significant losses. Though hedge funds are huge portfolios which are managed by
well-informed and sophisticated managers, they are also vulnerable during the fi-
nancial crisis. The total assets under management for the industry was cut into
half to approximately $1.3 trillion in the first quarter of 2009 when a large number
of hedge funds were forced to liquidate or go bankrupt. This research is designed
to empirically test the role that financial leverage including margins played in
causing some hedge funds to fail while others survived during the recent global
financial crisis.
It is known that financial leverage magnifies returns in bull markets and also
magnifies losses in bear markets. However, Ang, Gorovyy and Inwegen (2011) in
comparing the cyclical behavior of financial leverage of banks and hedge funds,
found that in the case of hedge funds, during bear markets, financial leverage ra-
tios drop significantly because the hedge funds liquidate some of their portfolio
of assets to meet their margin requirement. In contrast, it is also known that in
1998, Long Term Capital Management failed because of massive financial leverage
during adverse market conditions in Russia. With this opposing effect of leverage
1 Titman and Tiu (2011)
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on hedge funds, I empirically evaluate the role of financial leverage in hedge fund
failure prior to and after the 2008 financial crisis.
It is argued that the financial crisis period started from the filing of bankruptcy
by two Bear Stearns hedge funds in August 2007, and ended in March 20092.The
objective of this study is to empirically investigate the role of leverage in influenc-
ing a hedge fund risk of failure during financial crisis and severe distress times.
The linkage between the failure of hedge funds and systemic risk is also of great
importance. Systemic risk was greatly observed during the recent financial cri-
sis period. It is also important to note that the correlations between stocks and
aggregate market are much larger for downside moves, especially for extreme un-
expected downside moves, than for upside moves. This is in-line with findings of
Ang and Chen (2002) on “Asymmetric correlation”. This fact was also empirically
evident during the recent financial crisis. In this paper, we split the sample data
with a perceived regime switch and run stability tests to identify the difference
in the performance and magnitude of hedge funds’ failure drivers among these
sub-samples.
I attempt to study the relationship between hedge fund leverage and risk of
failure before and during/after the 2008 financial crisis after controlling for struc-
ture, and management fees and off-shore location. Leverage magnifies the returns
in up markets, as well as magnifying the losses in the down markets. This re-
search will shed light on some key questions about hedge funds’ failure, the role of
leverage, and its drivers during the financial crisis. The results will help provide
2Though these two funds were registered in Cayman Islands, for bankruptcy protection, the
New York bankruptcy court ruled against them for credit protection under Chapter 15.
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reasons why hedge funds being huge portfolios fail frequently.
With the large number of bankrupt hedge funds during and after the recent
financial crisis, the remaining unclear connection is why did many hedge funds fail
in the course of the financial crisis and why did many survive? What factors drive
the propensity of failure for a hedge fund during financial distress times (and may
not necessarily remain a driver during non-crisis periods)? Focusing on 15 years
of data, that as well captures the crisis period, this paper’s main contribution to
the hedge fund literature is to identify factors that increased the risk of failure
of hedge funds during the recent financial crisis. Defining financial leverage as
debt/equity ratio, margins, and the use of derivative products in the hedge fund
investment style, the results indicate that prior to the crisis, financial leverage was
not significant in predicting the probability of failure of hedge funds. However,
during and after the financial crisis, financial leverage was statistically significant
in predicting hedge fund failure. This means the liquidation of investment assets
to meet margin requirement forced some hedge funds into liquidation because of
the systemic risk of the crisis. This paper adds to the literature by providing em-
pirical analysis of the significance of financial leverage in the failure of hedge funds
during the recent financial crisis. By exploring this, it complements the existing
literature on hedge funds and makes additional contributions through testing hy-
potheses to follow.
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2.2 Literature Review
There is a large literature on hedge funds which compares their performances with
mutual funds, analyzes their investment styles, reviews their risk taking factors
and studies their role in systemic risk3and bubbles. We will review some of them
in this section. However, not much is known about the effect of financial leverage
on the failure of hedge funds during the recent market crisis.
Titman and Tiu (2011) record that the size of the hedge fund industry includes
more than 11,000 active funds that managed about $2.3 trillion at its peak in 2007,
with management fees averaging 1.5% and with 20% of returns in incentive fees.
Bali, Brown, and Caglayan (2011) record a total AUM of $2.09 trillion in 2007
which dropped to $1.31 by the end of 2010. Figure 3 shows the total AUM from
1994 to 2010. Such a huge growth in hedge funds has also been accompanied by
a growth in the number and severity of failures including forced liquidation and
bankruptcy. After the failure of Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998,
investors recognized that hedge funds may provide high expected returns but many
of them may be doing so by taking a huge downside risk that is not easily verifiable
by merely monitoring traditional risk measures such as standard deviation. Hedge
funds usually generate nonlinear and non-normal payoffs due to various factors
such as actively trading derivative securities, implementing option-like dynamic
trading strategies, having investment styles that experience severe losses during
market downturns, and charging an incentive fee that has the same effect to the
3 The possibility that the failure of a single institution could set off cascading failures through-
out the financial system is known as systemic risk. The classic case is a banking crisis, where
trouble in one bank can trigger runs on others, including financially sound institutions, if enough
cautious depositors decide to withdraw their funds. Source: CRS report for Congress; Dec 4,
2006
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investors as shorting a call option on the value of the fund portfolio (Agarwal and
Naik (2004), Mitchell and Pulvino (2001), Taleb (2004) and Goetzmann, Ingersoll
and Ross (2003).
Many empirical studies provide evidence for nonlinearity and non-normality of
hedge funds’ returns. Hedge funds on average have negative skewness and excess
kurtosis, and the rejection rate of the Jarque-Bera (JB) test for normality is 40.5%
to 85.9% depending on the test period and the database used (Cremers, Kritzman
and Page (2005), Alexiev (2005), Bali, Gokcan and Liang (2006), Liang and Park
(2007)).
There have been recent efforts on analyzing hedge funds’ exposures to various
financial and macroeconomic risk factors. Bali, Brown, and Caglayan (2011) use
univariate, bivariate, and multivariate estimates and investigate performance of
these factor loadings (betas) in predicting the cross-sectional variation in hedge
fund returns. They find significantly positive (negative) link between default pre-
mium beta (inflation beta) and future hedge fund returns.
Christory, Daul, and Giraud (2006) distinguish between three reasons for hedge
fund failure. First, financial issues, or losses stemming from unfavorable market
moves; second, operational issues, such as errors in trade processing or mispricing
complex, opaque financial instruments; and third, fraud, or misbehavior by fund
management. The authors state that the most common cause is undoubtedly the
first or financial reasons. When hedge funds fail to earn the expected returns,
redemptions may exceed inflows so they are subsequently unable to attract new
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investors, and managers find it unprofitable to continue. As such, the next reso-
lution is to dissolve the fund, in accordance with the partnership agreement, and
return remaining assets to the investors.
In line with the relationship between financial leverage and failure during cri-
sis and non-crisis periods, we should also refer to literature on systemic risk and
comovement of the financial markets during such distress periods.4Ang and Chen
(2002) show that correlations between stocks and aggregate market are much larger
for downside moves, especially for extreme unexpected downside moves, than for
upside moves. This fact was also empirically evident during the recent financial
crisis. In their paper they suggest the use of regime switching models which provide
greater flexibility in capturing these sudden moves. Figure 4 shows the timeline
and perceived regime switch which is used for the analysis of before and after the
financial crisis period.
In a more recent paper, Titman and Tiu (2011) show that better-informed
hedge funds choose to have less exposure to significant risk factors. They find that
hedge funds that exhibit lower R-squared with respect to systematic factors have
higher Sharpe ratios, higher information ratios, and higher alphas with higher
manipulation-proof performance measures and higher fees.
The question that remains unanswered is why did many hedge funds survive
during the financial crisis while many failed? Is there a difference in the role of
financial leverage in the failure of hedge funds during distress times? What factors
4Systemic Risk is defined as the possibility of a series of correlated defaults among financial
institutions, typically banks, that occurs over a short period of time and is often caused by a
single major event. (A. W. Lo, 2010)
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increase the probability of failure for a hedge fund during financial distress times
(and may not necessarily be drivers during non-crisis periods)? This paper’s main
contribution to the hedge fund literature is to explore the significance of financial
leverage in the failure of hedge funds during the recent financial crisis.
2.3 Hedge Funds Background
A hedge fund is an investment portfolio which can use any technique with the pri-
mary objective of earning a higher return. Often hedge funds do not benchmark
their performance against any index. Unlike mutual funds, hedge funds are not
regulated by SEC. The size of the hedge funds industry has almost doubled every
two years since 1994 with more than 11,000 active funds that managed more than
$2.5 trillion at its peak in 2008.5Hedge funds are often registered as a partnership
and then opened to a few rich accredited outside investors. The investment capi-
tal from each investor could be large; however, retail investors can invest in hedge
funds through fund of funds (FoFs). For example, some mutual funds and Pension
Funds invest in hedge funds on behalf of their clients. Because hedge funds are
not strictly regulated as compared to mutual funds, the disclosure of information
to both the investors and the public is sketchy.6
5 Hedge funds were started in 1949 by Alfred Winslow Jones, a sociologist who was on the
editorial staff of Fortune Magazine. Jones used short selling to hedge the risk of his fund and used
leverage to increase his returns. These techniques have become a common practice among modern
hedge funds. Today, not all hedge funds necessarily hedge. They can be identified by their
exemption from the Investment Company Act of 1940 and the unique incentive compensation
technique.
6 A failure example of fraud detection is Bernard Madoff’s Ponzi or pyramid scheme whose
investors lost more than $65 billion in US in 2009. Madoff’s fund was considered a hedge fund
and regulators did not find out about his scheme for over 15 years.
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Given the enormous growth of this industry and limited information available
on the hedge funds (and the events of the financial crisis), a need for research has
emerged which benefits both investors and regulators. Regulators need to iden-
tify whether there is a need for regulation to protect investors’ interests and what
impact hedge funds may have on the stability of the financial systems. Moreover,
after the events of the recent financial crisis, there aa re many unanswered ques-
tions about the reasons behind hedge funds’ failure. In this research we would like
to answer some key questions about a hedge funds’ failure and its drivers.
2.3.1 Return Generating Process of Hedge Funds
Liang (1999) compares hedge funds with mutual funds and finds that hedge funds
have higher returns but also higher risk. So, one should use a risk-adjusted perfor-
mance measure such as the Sharpe Ratio to compare the two. On average, hedge
funds have a 0.47 Sharpe ratio compared to 0.26 for mutual funds, about 0.21
more than mutual funds (Ackerman (1999)).7
A number of studies show that hedge funds payoffs are nonlinear due to their
use of dynamic option-like trading strategies. Goetzmann, Ingersoll, Ross (2002)
show that the Sharpe ratio can be manipulated by use of option-like strategies
that can alter the shape of the probability distribution of returns.8
7 Sharpe ratio for hedge funds should use an international risk-free rate, such as LIBOR,
because most of the funds invest abroad during opportune times. Also, an international market
index should be used for the Rm
8Finding a suitable market portfolio for comparing hedge funds performance analysis against
has also been discussed in the literature (Liang 1999, Fung and Hsieh 2000, 2008).
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2.3.2 Manager’s Skill in Hedge Funds
A linear multifactor model can determine two components of hedge funds return,
mainly α and β. Beta is the return of the fund related to exposure to different
asset classes (a number of factors), and alpha is the return above what can be
explained by asset classes (intercept of the model).
Since alpha as explained above is the return of the hedge fund that cannot be
explained by exposure to the systematic risk factors, it is normally interpreted as
return attributed to manager’s skills.
Fung and Hsieh (2001) use data from HFR, TASS and MSCI (Morgan Stan-
ley Capital International) to show empirically that Equity long/short hedge funds
have significant positive alphas. Another explanation for alpha can be that models
simply are missing a significant risk factor. Some suggestions have been provided
in the literature, such as market price of variance risk (Bondarenko 2004), share
restrictions of private investment funds (Aragon 2007).
2.3.3 Hedge Fund Management Expense Ratio (MER) and
Incentive Fees
The fee structure of a hedge fund in general consists of a management fee based
on total assets under management (AUM) and a performance fee on any profits
earned beyond a benchmark. This benchmark is typically called high-water mark,
which is the highest year end net asset value. The MER is usually a percentage of
the asset under management. The hedge fund manager’s overall compensation is
based on his relative performance compared to the high-water mark. Some hedge
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funds may charge performance fees only. Aragon (2007) show that 68% of hedge
funds in TASS database use the high-water mark.
The performance fee is an important component of the hedge fund manager’s
compensation which may also be called incentive fee. The aim of the incentive
fee is to align the interests of manager and investors by encouraging better per-
formance. On the other hand, it is an incentive for taking higher (and sometimes
excessive) risk.
One key difference between mutual funds and hedge funds is in the manage-
ment’s compensation. While mutual funds charge just Management Expense Ratio
(MER) of about 1%-5%, hedge funds share in the returns by taking 10%-50% of
the annual returns in addition to the MER that they charge to manage the funds.
2.3.4 Failure of Long-Term Capital Management
The 1998 failure of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM), an American hedge
fund which managed more than $100 billion in assets at its peak, is an important
historical case.9 Between 1994 and 1998 the fund showed a return on investment of
more than 40% per annum. However, in one month, LTCM lost $1.9 billion. Prior
to the bailout, the fund was down in value to $2.9 billion. Perceived as a financial
disaster, the fund’s collapse had significant international monetary implications,
jeopardizing the financial system itself. Prompted by deep concerns about LTCM’s
numerous derivative contracts, in order to avoid a panic by banks and investors
9 Among LTCM’s principals were former distinguished finance professors, including two Nobel
Prize-winning researchers.
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worldwide, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York stepped in to organize a bailout
with the various major banks at risk. There are several articles that studied the
case of LTCM.10
These studies highlight the risks associated with high leverage in the hedge fund
industry by the failure of LTCM. Unanimously, it is shown that for a hedge fund,
if the leverage is too high, the potential losses can seriously exhaust and even wipe
out the hedge funds net worth once the creditors call in their loans. Therefore,
high leverage increases the risk of forced liquidation. LTCM had $125 billion of
assets on a base of $4 billion of investors’ money shortly before its collapse. This
translates into a leverage ratio of about 31.25 debt-to-equity.11
2.3.5 Hedge Funds Strategies
Hedge funds employ many different trading strategies, which are classified in many
different ways. There is no standard system but there are key categories. A hedge
fund will typically commit itself to a particular strategy, particular investment
types and leverage limits via statements in its offering documentation, thereby
giving investors some indication of the nature of the particular fund. Each strat-
egy can be said to be built from a number of different elements such as Style,
Market, Instrument, Exposure, Sector, Method and Diversification. The main
strategy groups are based on the investment style and have their own risk and
return characteristics.
10 Jorion (2000) investigates the red flags in the risk management at LTCM, Kabir and Kabir
(2005) study the “too-big-to-fall” hypothesis for LTCM and the bailout decision at the time,
while Dungey, Fry, Gonzalez, and Martin (2006) study the contagion impact of bond market
in the LTCM Failure. Edwards and Franklin (2006) also study the governance and regulations
implications for hedge funds based on lessons learned from LTCM case.
11 Source: http://riskinstitute.ch
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In this research, we perform the study on each group of the strategies. As
such, we group the hedge funds into 12 main strategy groups. This will be further
explained in the methodology section.
2.4 A Hazard Model of Hedge Fund Failure
In order to perform a survival study we need to model hazard rate. In their paper,
Liang and Park (2010) distinguish attrition rate from real failure rate of hedge
funds by implementing a survival analysis for each of the two definitions of failure.
Attrition is used for the traditional definition (i.e. the fund simply doesn’t exist in
the live database) and real failure, the new definition.12We use the same method
for identifying real failure. The hazard function follows the same specification as
in Shumway (2001) and He, Chong, Li, and Zhang (2010).
Suppose that Fund i can either fail or survive. The time to leave the live
database t and the status j are observed, where j = 1 corresponds to the case of
failure, and j = 0 corresponds to the case of survival. Define hazard rate by λi(t)
which specifies the instantaneous rate of failure of Fund i at time t conditional
upon the fund’s survival up to t. For each state j, there is a latent duration Tj
, which is the time that elapses before the fund chooses route j in the absence of
any other risks. Thus, the actual exit time from solvent to insolvent state can be
interpreted as the realizations of random variable T which is defined as follows:
T = min(Tj, j = 0, 1)
12 Liang and Park (2010) suggest new criteria to define “real failure” of hedge funds as: i)
those included in a database but stopped reporting, ii) negative average rate of return for the
last six months , and iii) decreased AUM for the last twelve months
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At each point in time, the hazard function for failure is defined as:
λi(t) =
lim∆t→0Pr(t ≤ T ≤ t+ ∆t|T ≥ t)
∆t
(2.1)
In the risk-specific hazard function with the proportional hazard (PH) Cox
(1972) model, a vector of fund characteristics is introduced to explain the hazard
rate. Vector z’s components are called “covariates”.
λ(t | zi(t)) = λ0exp(ztiβ) (2.2)
where zT denotes the transpose of the vector z (a vector of time-dependent
covariates for fund i), and λ0(t) is the baseline hazard function. The vector β is
assumed to be the same for all funds. To estimate β, Cox (1972, 1975) introduced
the partial likelihood function, which eliminates the unspecified baseline hazard
λ0(t) and accounts for censored survival times. The partial likelihood function,
Li(βj) can then be calculated with the following specification:
Lj(β) =
k∏
i=1
exp(Zi(ti)β)∑
t∈R(ti) exp(ZI(ti)β)
(2.3)
where k refers to the number of funds in specific hazard group j (i.e. failed
since here j = 1), and t1 < ... < tk denotes the k ordered failures of hazard
group. R(ti) = I | tI ≥ ti is the set of funds that have not failed at time ti (See
He, Chong, Li, and Zhang (2010) and Kalbeisch and Prentice (2002) for further
details.) Brown, Goetzmann and Park (2001) use the Cox model for the first time
to analyze hedge fund failure. They find that performance, risk and fund age are
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significant in the fund failure. Their measure of the “fund risk” is the standard de-
viation of the fund return over twelve months before the termination. The higher
the standard deviation, the higher the hazard rate of the fund. In a following
paper Gregoriou (2002) uses a similar model and argues that performance, size
and leverage can be used to predict the survival of hedge funds.
2.5 Hypotheses
In order to determine the factors that drive the probability of hedge fund failure,
we define some characteristics (or attributes) for every hedge fund. Some poten-
tial factors deemed to be significant include Financial Leverage as measured by
the Debt/Equity Ratio, Portfolio Composition Type (whether the fund invested
in primitive financial assets as opposed to derivatives and structured products),
Use of margins (whether the hedge fund is leveraged through margins), Owner-
ship (whether the hedge fund is independent or owned/backed by larger banks or
financial institutions), Registered off-shore head office (or on-shore), Incentive fees
and Management skills, Reputation and credibility (to capture management fraud
or misbehavior).
In this section, we present the hypotheses on the four key factors that are
expected to increase probability of failure during financial distress times.
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2.5.1 Hedge Fund Failure and Leverage
The risk associated with high leverage in the hedge fund industry has been ex-
pected to be significant, mainly after the high financial leverage of the failed
LTCM. For a hedge fund, if the leverage is too high, the potential losses can
seriously exhaust and even wipe out the hedge fund’s assets. Therefore, a high
leverage is expected to increase the risk of forced liquidation or bankruptcy. Mea-
suring financial leverage, however, is not a direct task. A fund can utilize leverage
through different venues. There are three main sources of financial leverage: (a)
First, the direct financial leverage ratio, measured as debt/equity is one source of
financial leverage. (b) Second, a hedge fund can employ leverage by using margins.
(c) Third, a hedge fund indirectly uses leverage by holding investment positions
such as derivative products, futures, or short sales. 13
In this research, using TASS hedge fund database, the average leverage ratio
as measured by Debt/Equity is observed for each fund. We also observe binary
variables for the derivatives, futures, and margins which to some extent provide
the information needed. Additionally, we like to focus on the “excess leverage”
employed by hedge funds and as such, at each point in time we can also define a
demeaned measure of leverage as below:
ExcessLeveragei,t = FinLeveragei,t − Σ
N
n=1(Leveragen,t)
N
(2.4)
Evaluating a comprehensive leverage value for a fund as explained above, can
be more precise when access to rich private databases such as proprietary hedge
13Note that (b) and (c) can be related in many cases.
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fund holdings is available.14
H1: Hedge funds with higher financial leverage ratio are more likely to fail dur-
ing financial distress times.
This hypothesis is very well-backed by the case example of LTCM. We like to
see whether leverage ratio has a direct effect on the risk of failure or not. In other
words what we expect is that the higher the leverage ratio, the more probable the
hedge fund will fail in distress times.15
2.5.2 Hedge Fund Failure and Asset Types
This hypothesis looks into the relationship between financial asset types owned by
hedge funds and the risk of failure.
H2: Hedge funds with larger investment portion in derivatives positions and
futures (as opposed to primary financial asset ownership such as stocks, bonds and
private assets) are more likely to fail during financial distress times.
Apart from being one source of leverage, another rationale for this expectation
is related to the fact that a primary financial asset has higher collateral value
compared to derivative products, most of which are time-decaying contracts with
14For example, Ang, Gorovyy and Inwegen (2011) use a private database on a limited HFs
and measure the comprehensive leverage precisely for each fund based on detailed confidential
data provided by managers.
15We later include a binary variable as an indicator to isolate the impact of distress.
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expiration dates.16 For example, consider options as opposed to stocks. In cases
of financial distress products like options or futures cannot retain their original
value; however, a stock or a bond ownership is still valuable though with signifi-
cantly reduced asset value. Derivative products also tend to be a decaying security
with expiration period. As such, we expect to see higher ownership in derivatives
compared to pure assets among distressed hedge funds that fail.
It is noteworthy to mention that since derivative securities tend to have huge
implied leverage, we expect to find a relation between hypothesis 1 and 2. As such
an interaction term will also be tested for the mutual impact of leverage and use
of derivatives and structured products.
2.5.3 Hedge Fund Failure and Margins
This hypothesis explains the role of margins on failure by relating failure of the
hedge funds to financial leverage through use of margins.
H3: Hedge funds which employ margins as a source of leverage are more likely
to fail during financial distress times.17
The logic behind this hypothesis is that normally hedge funds which use mar-
gins will be provided with additional leverage which is also more volatile during
distress times. This may interrupt the fund managers’ risk management and imply
16Forwards and futures (and other linear instruments) do not exhibit time decay.
17Margins at first glance may be perceived as simply another form of leverage. However,
during distress periods margins have the tendency to increase, making them a more risky form
of leverage.
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forced liquidation of the investments to meet the required (increased) margins in
the distress time. The result of this hypothesis will shed light on this point.
Comparing Hypotheses 1 and 3, we should also test for the potential interaction
between these two factors. As such, an interaction term must be added to the
model. This allows for nonlinearities in our econometric model which uses the
product of explanatory variables. We test for the presence of these nonlinearities
by examining the significance of the interaction term’s estimated coefficient. If it
is significant, the interaction term is needed to capture the relationship.
2.5.4 Hedge Fund Failure and Incentive Fees
A large number of hedge funds charge incentive fees on top of MER or management
fees. The incentive fee (also called performance fees) encourages the manager to
take on more risky investments in order to improve his share of the payoff.18
The hypothesis below will investigate this question.
H4: The hedge funds with higher incentive fees, are more likely to fail in finan-
cial distress times.
Higher incentive fees will induce management to invest in risky investments.
Such funds are more likely to fail during financial crisis.
18In this sense, incentive fees act like executive stock options.
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2.5.5 Hedge Fund Failure and Off-shore Head Office
A large number of hedge funds that are active in United States register their head
offices off-shore in order to save on taxes. This protection however, can have a
two-sided effect on the failure of hedge funds. Off-shore registered funds can save
on income taxes (for the manager(s)) and hence have additional value that can be
used in distress times. Moreover, off-shore registration might result in relatively
larger risk-taking and aggressive borrowing (that is perceived to increase the risk
of failure). Hedge funds register off-shore mainly due to regulations differences. In
2009, about 60% of all US hedge funds were registered off-shore (according to TASS
database). Using the same database, we show that this number was risen to 63%
at the end of 2011. Brown, Goetzmann, and Ibbotson (1999) perform a study on
off-shore vs. on-shore funds and find that off-shore funds as a group have positive
risk-adjusted performance when measured by Sharpe ratios and by Jensen’s alpha.
Moreover, Liang and Park (2008) examine the liquidity premium in the hedge
fund industry for off-shore vs. onshore hedge funds and record that the illiquidity
premium is higher for off-shore than onshore funds because of a higher correlation
between share restrictions and asset illiquidity.
The two cases of Bear Stearn hedge funds failure, Bear Stearns High-Grade
Structured Credit Strategies Master Fund, Ltd., and Bear Stearns High-Grade
Structured Credit Strategies Enhanced Leverage Master Fund, Ltd., registered in
the Cayman Islands are examples of hedge funds that were registered off-shore
and requested bankruptcy protection in U.S. These two Bear Stearn funds began
to fail in early 2007 due, in part, to volatility in the subprime mortgage market
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and by May 2007, the Funds had begun to suffer significant devaluations of their
asset portfolios, leading to margin calls, which the Funds were not able to meet. 19
To shed light on the above mentioned relationship, the hypothesis below can
explain the relation between off-shore vs. on-shore registration of the fund and
probability of failure by relating failure to the registration of the hedge fund’s head
office.
H5: The hedge funds registered off-shore are more likely to survive in financial
distress times because of the management tax savings added to the fund’s value to
provide a cushion.
2.6 Methodology
The goal of this paper is to find the role of financial leverage in increasing the
risk of hedge fund failure during financial crisis. The definition and estimation
procedure of various forms of leverage will be described later. There are three
main stages in order to perform the analysis. First, we need to identify signifi-
cant factors that drive failure. This is done using the hazard model specification.
Second, we need to compare these factors for two samples of failed hedge funds
and survived hedge funds. This is done using a dichotomous dependent variable
regression model such as probit model. Finally, we need to identify the crisis pe-
riods from non-crisis periods and set up matching groups of hedge funds for each
period. Robustness checks by using the Heckman model as well as propensity
19See article “U.S. court denies federal bankruptcy protection to hedge funds for liquidation
proceedings in Cayman Islands”, Sep 2007 for more details.
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score matching are performed in the final stage.
Using a panel data of failed hedge funds matched with survived hedge funds,
the data comprises 3156 survived funds and 7076 defunct funds, and will cover the
1996 to 2011 period. (TASS database reports failed funds from 1996). The esti-
mation period will be broken into two sub-periods. The pre-crisis period (1996 to
June 2006) and the crisis period (July 2006 to December 2011) which is displayed
in Figure 4 and will be further explained.
Hedge fund studies are usually subject to certain potential data biases such as
the survivorship bias which should be fixed for. Survivorship bias is the result of
exclusion of the returns of non-surviving hedge funds, which causes the reported
hedge fund performance in that database to look better than the true actual
hedge fund performance. However, since in this study we have both defunct funds
database and live funds database eliminates the possibility of survivorship bias in
our analyses.
2.6.1 Probit Model Specifications
The dichotomous dependant variable regression specifications will be utilized to
test the various hypotheses in this paper. Since the observed data points are large
enough, we can assume a normal distribution and select a probit regression model.
A probit model is specified with the dependent variable “Failure” equal to 0 or 1,
and the continuous independent variables Xi(t)’s are estimated in:
Prob(Failurei,t = 1) = Φ(Xi(t)
Tβ) (2.5)
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Here, xi is a vector of the explanatory variables, β is the (vector of) param-
eter(s) to be estimated, and Φ is the normal cumulative density function. The
following equation will be estimated in order to test hypotheses 1, 2, and 3.
Prob(Failurei,t = 1) = α0,t + α1,t(FINLEV )i,t + α2,t(DERIV )i,t (2.6)
+α3,t(MARGN)i,t + α4,t(INFEES)i,t
+α5,t(OFFSHR)i,t + α6,t(FINLEV )i,t(DERIV )i,t
+α7,t(FINLEV )i,t(MARGN)i,t)
+
n∑
j=1
γi,j(ControlV ar
′s)i,t +
5∑
k=1
βi,kDi,k + i,t
where Failurei,t is a binary variable equal to 0 if fund i failed by the time t
and equal to 1 if fund i is in the live database at time t. Time t refers to time
series observations (i.e. at different months) and Di,k is the dummy variable for
hedge fund strategies. (Note that a hedge fund can be registered for more than
one investment style).
In equation (2.6) above, FINLEV is the measure of financial leverage of the
fund and the probability of failure is expected to be positively related to leverage;
FINLEV can be obtained in three ways, including direct Debt/Equity ratio, use
of margins, and derivatives. DERIV is the portfolio composition (or asset types)
of the fund in the form of derivatives or futures; and we expect to find a positive
relationship between portfolio composition and probability of failure. MARGN is
the margin indicator (whether uses margin as a source of leverage or not), INFEES
is the % incentive fees and OFFSHR is a dummy variable that shows whether the
fund is registered off-shore or not. A set of control variables are also used as well
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as dummy variables for the strategy of the hedge fund. The control variables in-
clude a vector of cross-sectional factors such as fund size, fund age, volatility, prior
performance, high water mark, MER, and risk.
Currently we use regression models with dichotomous dependent variables,
probit model due to large number of observations. In the literature, logit, probit
and Cox models have also been widely used.20 The choice of probit model is a
result of dealing with a large panel dataset since the underlying distribution tends
to converge to normal (law of large numbers), and as such the dependent variable
will be best tested with the probit model. For robustness we repeat the tests with
logit and the results are consistent.21
2.6.2 Propensity Score Matching, Choice of Time Periods
and Stability Tests
We would like to study the hedge funds failure during financial crisis, compared
to non-crisis periods. In order to identify the role of leverage into why some hedge
funds failed and why some of them survived the financial crisis period, we need to
build matching samples of failed funds and survivors across the crisis and non-crisis
periods. The observed data is a panel data set that includes monthly observations
of the hedge funds characteristics and financial attributes. Our study examines
a comprehensive sample of hedge funds, (databases will be discussed in the next
20Liang (2000) and Malkiel and Saha (2005) use the probit model, while Chan, Getmansky,
Haas and Lo (2005) use the logit model. Lunde, Timmermann and Blake (1999) argue that
since the probit model requires strong parametric as well as distributional assumptions, the Cox
model adopts a more flexible approach. Based on a large data points assumption, we use the
probit model.
21In robustness checks, the same regressions were performed using the logit model and the
results stay the same. For the Cox model, it is expected that the findings are robust irrespective
of the statistical method used.
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section) over the January 2000 to December 2011 time period.
Figure 2 shows the level of S&P 500 Composite Index during this period. As
we can see, the period starting from Oct 2007 until March 2009 shows sharp fall
of the price level. But the crisis period that we like to study does not terminate
in 2009. The reason is that comparing this figure with figure 1 we can see that
failure of the hedge funds continues well after 2009 and prolongs into 2010. Hence,
a rational conclusion is that the effect of the financial crisis on the failure rate of
the hedge funds can be more prominent than the effect observed during normal
periods.
As such, we split our time period into two sub-periods of Jan 2000 to Jul
2007 and Jul 2007 to Dec 2010. (The set up of these sub-periods may vary based
on stability tests in other areas of financial crises studies, but our indicator is
bankruptcy of Bear Stearn hedge funds.) Figure 4 displays this timeline. The
two sub-periods will form the test of stability to see whether the impact of the
determinants changed during the crisis period. After identifying the crisis period
from non-crisis period we need to focus on the matching procedure. The matching
procedure will be based on many characteristics. A matching sample is utilized
because we are examining the effects of different structures of hedge funds on risk
of failure (i.e. two different groups of failed hedge funds and survivors).
The propensity score matching (PSM) technique enables us to reduce large
biases as much as possible by using a wide range of matching variables. The al-
gorithm for PSM includes three main steps: First, run logistic regression on the
dependent variable with appropriate conditioning (instrumental) variables and
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obtain the propensity score. Second, match each participant to one or more
non-participants on propensity score by using techniques such as “Nearest neigh-
bor matching”, “Caliper matching”, “Stratification matching” or Difference- in-
differences matching (kernel and local linear weights). Finally, we run the multi-
variate analysis based on new sample using appropriate analysis for non-independent
matched samples.22
The matching characteristics include a range of variables such as Strategies
Effect (We use dummy variables Di to adjust for the investment strategy effect.),
Average Size (Average AUM during the previous year is used to measure the size
of a fund), Size volatility (Standard deviation of the funds AUM is used to measure
the size volatility of a fund), Age (Months of fund’s age); We also include dummy
variables to specify funds with high water mark (HWM), and a lockup provision.23
Finally, we need to run stability tests to compare the difference in results across
different time periods. As such, we divide the full period into two sub-samples and
use a Chow test to test for stability of regression coefficients between two periods.
The value of the Chow statistic as well as the associated F-value are calculated.
The null hypothesis, that there is no structural change over the full period, is
rejected when the Chow statistic is greater than the associated F-value.
22For more details please see: Dehejia, R. and S. Wahba (2002).
23It is noteworthy to discuss the cons of using propensity score matching algorithm as well:
(a) Data shrinkage - the process reduces the dataset since we eliminate the non-matched firms.
(b) The resulting dataset is vulnerable to choice of variables/parameters for matching. - For
robustness, I perform the regressions both before and after the PSM.
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2.7 Data
Various database searches have been performed to identify the most comprehen-
sive data sources for this research. For this research we need both the live database
and the defunct (or graveyard) database. TASS Hedge Fund database provides
such data.
As an example, Bali, Brown, and Caglayan (2011) employ data on hedge funds
to evaluate different measures of systematic risk that can affect hedge funds re-
turns. The hedge fund data for their study is provided by Lipper TASS database,
and it contains information on a total of 14,228 defunct and live hedge funds. The
TASS database, in addition to reporting monthly returns (net of fees) and monthly
assets under management, also provides information on certain fund characteris-
tics including returns, size, age, management fees, and incentive fees. Their paper
uses only one hedge fund database and this will be the primary source of data for
my study as well. Obtaining all the required data from one source eliminates most
of the biases associated with overlaps and back-fills.
2.7.1 TASS Hedge Funds database
A total of 17,202 hedge funds reported monthly returns to TASS for the years
between Jan 1996 and Dec 2011 in this database. From this number, 10,455 are
defunct funds and 6,747 are live funds. Hedge funds in this database report their
monthly AUMs in their primary currency value. As such, I eliminate any funds
that report their AUMs in a different currency than USD. For the specific tests
in this paper that involves AUMs analysis, the data is limited to USD-reported
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funds. A total of 47% of the Live Funds (3,156) report their AUM in USD cur-
rency, while 69% of the Failed Funds (7,076) report in USD currency.
This means by removing non-USD-currency funds our total sample consists
of 7076 Failed and 3156 Survived firms. The question that comes to mind next
is whether this removal will create any bias in our sample, especially for tests of
off-shore (i.e. HFs registered in other than United States). However, based on
Appendix B, it can be seen that even after focusing only on USD funds, there is a
consistent variation in the distribution of HFs among different registered domicile
countries. Another important observation, as seen in Appendix C, is that about
46.5% of all the hedge funds in the sample are registered in either Cayman Is-
lands or British Virgin Islands which supports testing the hypothesis on off-shore
registered funds.
2.7.2 Potential Data Biases and Mitigation
Hedge fund studies are usually subject to certain potential data biases such as
the survivorship bias which should be addressed. Survivorship bias is the result of
exclusion of the returns of non-surviving hedge funds, which causes the reported
hedge fund performance in that database to look better than the true actual hedge
fund performance. However, since in this study we have both defunct funds and
live funds in our database, the possibility of survivorship bias in our analysis is
eliminated.
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Moreover, TASS database reports the reason why the fund is dropped. As
such, we can distinguish between failure and attrition.24 The reasons for failure or
exit from the live database are recorded in Lipper TASS database by assigning a
status code to the funds in defunct (or graveyard) database. These codes include
liquidation, no longer reporting, unable to contact, closed to new investment, and
merged into other equity.
Another common data bias while working with hedge fund databases is the
back-filling bias. Back-filling bias exists since once a hedge fund is included in the
database, previous returns are automatically added. This increases the chance that
only successful hedge funds may report the true previous returns to the database.
To overcome this, we use the advantage that TASS database reports both “when
added” and “first reported performance date”. The first reported performance
date is usually about 1 year later than first return. As such, there are two mitiga-
tion plans for correcting back-filling biases. We can either delete the first year of
returns or employ the return bias that has been empirically studied into account.25
The other source of bias is the self selection bias. This is due to the fact that
reporting is voluntary, so a bad fund has less or no incentive to report. At the
same time, a fund that is very successful may close quickly and there is no further
incentive to attract new investors by reporting (perceived advertising26). In their
work, Fung and Hsieh (1997b) however, claim that these effects offset each other,
and should not create a bias in the empirical tests. Nevertheless, this bias can be
studied later in our study.
24See Fung and Hsieh (2009) for details on “real” failure.
25For example, empirical studies show that there exists approximately 1.5% bias in the returns
of the back-filled data. See Fung and Hsieh (2009) and Bali, Brown, and Caglayan (2011)
26Titman and Tiu (2011)
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2.8 Empirical Results
2.8.1 Descriptive Statistics
Tables 1 and 2 summarize the data used in this study. There are two types of
characteristic variables available in TASS database. First are the continuous vari-
ables which vary in value. These variables include but are not limited to “Average
Leverage”, “Management Fees”, and “Incentive Fee”. Second set of characteristics
variables are the binary or dichotomous variables including but not limited to “Per-
sonal Capital” (Do principals have money invested?), “Margin” (Does the fund
leverage using margin borrowing value?), “Derivatives” (Does the fund leverage
using derivatives value?), “Futures” (Does the fund leverage using futures value?),
and “Leveraged” (Does the fund use leverage?). Table 1 shows these variables for
the two subsets of live and defunct databases.
Table 3 and Figures 1 and 3 display the time series features of our data set.
Figure 1 reports the number of hedge funds that failed and the number of hedge
funds that survived over time. Figure 3 displays a bar chart that show the cumu-
lative AUM sustained in this industry over time.
Based on Tables 2 and 4, and Appendices C and D, categorical characteristics
of the hedge funds can be compared across failed funds and survived funds. These
categorical groupings include “Primary Category” of the fund, or investment style
(Table 4), “Domicile Country” or registered headquarter (Appendix C) and “Base
Currency” or primitive investment currency for the fund’s investments (Appendix
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D). It can be seen that comparing to survived funds, a larger ratio of failed hedge
funds were registered in Cayman Islands and Virgin Islands, indicating a higher
probability of failure for such off-shore registered funds.
Table 5 provides pair-wise correlation coefficients between different fund char-
acteristics.
2.8.2 Asymmetric Correlation Results
One key question in this paper is to uncover the relative difference in the drivers
of HFs’ failure during crisis vs. non-crisis times. To give some context to the
hypotheses surrounding the crisis period, Table 6 shows the correlation between
monthly returns of the HFs and monthly returns of the S&P500 index (proxy
for the market) for each Investment Strategy category. Overall, the correlation
increases both in value and significance during the crisis period. This is more
prominent for certain categories.
This phenomenon is known as “asymmetric correlation” in equity portfolios, or
bigger downside correlation during crisis periods. Ang and Chen (2002) show that
correlations between stocks and aggregate market are much larger for downside
moves, especially for extreme unexpected downside moves, than for upside moves
(See Figure 2 for the level of S&P 500 Composite Index). This fact was also em-
pirically evident during the recent financial crisis. In their paper Ang and Chen
suggest use of regime switching models which provide greater flexibility in captur-
ing these sudden moves. In this paper, we split the sample data with a perceived
regime switch and run stability tests to identify the difference in the performance
and magnitude of hedge funds’ failure drivers among these sub-samples. Figure 4
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displays this timeline and the perceived regime switch. Brunnermeier and Peder-
sen (2009) also suggest that the start of the recent crisis period should be identified
as January 2007. They separate the time period into crisis, and recovery periods.
In this study, we are mostly interested in identifying the beginning of the period.
2.8.3 Role of Leverage and Regression Results
The preliminary results indicate that the factors that increase probability of fail-
ure have different significance and impact during the crisis period vs. non-crisis
period, which is consistent with the hypothesis being tested. Table 7 shows the
regression results for average leverage, as well as leverage induced by use of mar-
gins and derivative products, controlling for the rest of the factors, including size,
prior performance, and the fund’s characteristics. This regression is run on three
different models and for before and after the crisis period.
The first test uses a “crisis” dummy variable on all-time sample to test whether
the difference in propensity of failure is statistically significant in crisis and prior
non-crisis periods. As it can be seen, this dummy variable is significant at 1%
across all three regression models being tested which approves the motive to move
on to the two sub-sample tests. Next, is to find the economic difference between
the role of leverage during crisis and non-crisis periods. The two sub-sample tests
both confirm the significance of leverage during the crisis and lack of significance
during non-crisis periods in driving failure of hedge funds. The results are shown
in Table 8.
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For the sub-sample tests, we split the interval into Pre-Crisis and, during and
after-Crisis periods. We find that leverage is only significant during and after
the crisis period and insignificant before. This is after controlling for size, perfor-
mance, incentive fees, and off-shore location. This shows the impact of leverage is
significant regardless of how big or how successful the hedge fund is. The results
are robust after controlling for use of margins and derivatives.
2.8.4 Other Determinants of Failure and Regression Re-
sults
Apart from the results on the role of leverage, Tables 7 and 8 have interesting
observations on other determinants of failure to note. First, the off-shore variable
is significant and positive only during crisis period. It shows that funds that are
registered off-shore are more likely to fail during and after the crisis period, but
there is no difference among domicile country of the fund during non-crisis period.
This can be due to the fact that as a result of difference in regulations and trans-
parency, off-shore hedge funds aggressively invest in more risky portfolios which
increase risk of failure during crisis.
Second, the funds that apply High Water Mark benchmark are consistently
less likely to fail. We expect this is due to the fact that usually smarter funds who
can tease out the market risk better, are also those who use a High Water Mark
performance benchmark (Titman and Tiu, 2011).27
27Note that we do not investigate/show intelligence factor in this paper.
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Third, the management fees are consistently insignificant. Regardless of which
period, the management fee will not increase or decrease the propensity of failure
of the hedge fund. This however, is different for the incentive fee. Incentive fees
are significant and positive which signals that higher incentive fees increase the
risk of failure of the hedge fund.
Last, it is important to note the role of size. Size is significant only during the
pre-crisis period. The results indicate that larger funds are more likely to survive
in pre-crisis period. However, as soon as the crisis period begins and during and
after crisis the size cannot determine the probability of failure and becomes in-
significant. This once again proves that the “too big to fail” notion does not apply
during the crisis period, especially during the systemic risk period.
Prior performance of the fund, as measured by lagged return of the fund, is
consistently significant in the results regardless of the time period. This shows
that failure of the hedge funds consistent with other financial institutes is a de-
caying process which can well be captured and tested by the use of a hazard model.
2.8.5 Hedge Funds Strategies and Regression Results
To find the key hedge fund styles that are more prone to fail, we run the regres-
sion on 12 different Investment Strategy groups. Overall, leverage is significant in
driving probability of failure across indicated Investment strategies. The results
for these strategies are shown in Table 9. The z-values of one or more forms of
leverage models are consistently significant and positive, indicating that higher
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leverage of the fund may not necessarily increase the risk of failure during the
non-crisis periods. These styles include Emerging Markets, Long/Short Equity
Hedge, Equity Market Neutral, and Multi-Strategy hedge funds.
We further investigate the commonality of these four styles with significant
probability of failure due to leverage. To do so, we measure the average beta
across each of the investment styles. We find that since these investment styles
focus mostly on equity market, they have relatively higher betas, and hence larger
exposure to the total equity market. The higher beta risk can be one reason that
makes these specific hedge fund categories vulnerable to the use of leverage during
the financial crisis period.28
We report the regression results for the rest of the styles in Tables10a and
10b. It is interesting to note that some of these hedge fund categories, such as
“Managed Futures” and “Options Strategy” tend to have portfolios that cover
more than equities, for example they invest in currencies, commodities, etc. This
diversification allows them to survive during crisis periods. Note that prior perfor-
mance continues to be an important indicator of all funds’ failure regardless of the
particular style being followed, indicating persistence in hedge funds performance.
We report the results of probit regression, however, we run both logit and
probit regressions for the entire analysis and the results are robust regardless of
which model we use. Because the number of observations is large enough, it is
28To measure beta return, remember that as explained in section 2.3.2, we split return on
each investment style into three components of alpha, beta, and management fees. Following
Ibboston (2006), the average systematic beta return for these four styles is calculated at 6.42,
which is also higher than the average non-significant investment styles.
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recommended to use probit regression since the underlying distribution is close to
a normal distribution.
2.9 Conclusions
We find that during crisis periods the average financial leverage turns out to be
more significant in increasing probability of failure. This is by far the first attempt
to disentangle the impact of hedge funds failure determinants during crisis time
from non-crisis time and the conclusion that hedge funds with less leverage can
survive the crisis period better. This finding is consistent with the literature on
the role of leverage in increasing overall risk of the firm.
Leverage, as defined by the ratio of debt/equity is not the only source of lever-
age for the funds. The use of derivative products also implies the usage of leverage.
Moreover, the use of margins is another indicator of the leverage risk for the funds.
Furthermore, the excess leverage at any point in time can be defined and measured
as the deviation from the average leverage across all funds. We find our findings
robust with respect to the definition of leverage.
The findings of this paper are also in-line with the recent theoretical works
on the role of leverage in systemic risk and the policy implications. Schwarcz
(2011) assesses the progress of identifying and managing systemic risk (through
recent policy advances) and indicates that one way that Dodd-Frank attempts to
avoid the need to make emergency loans caused by financial crisis is by requir-
ing banks and other designated “systemically important” financial firms (such as
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hedge funds) is to enforce a range of capital, leverage, and liquidity requirements
and periodic “stress testing.”
This paper is also another empirical support for the work of Brunnermeier
and Pedersen (2010) on the market liquidity and funding liquidity. The fact that
the role of leverage is highly significant and increases the probability of failure
during the crisis period can also explain how forced liquidation may be triggered
by hedge funds’ margin increase during bear markets. Hedge funds are generally
compensated for investments in illiquid assets and the leverage together with illiq-
uid holdings plays an important role in hedge funds’ risk of failure.
Finally, we also show that after controlling for crisis periods, certain investment
styles prove to show a more prominent and significant impact of leverage on the
fund’s risk of failure. Hedge funds registered under “Emerging Markets”, “Equity
Market Neutral”, “Long/Short Equity Hedge”, and “Multi-strategy” investment
strategies continue to be subject to larger and more significant risk of leverage in
their lifetime both before and after the crisis and distress periods. These funds
have higher than average betas exposing them to significant equity market risk.
In contrary, hedge funds styles that have portfolios including variety of assets in
addition to equities (e.g. currencies, commodities, etc.) tend to survive.
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2.11 Essay I Appendices
2.11.1 Appendix A: Complete Variables Glossary
In this section, the detailed definitions for each of the variables are provided.
• Fund’s Assets Under Management ($M): The total value of a fund’s assets
under management (AUM).
• Return (%): Monthly net-of-fee returns.
• Return Volatility (%): Standard deviation of a fund’s monthly returns over
a calendar year. (This variable is winsorized at 5% and 95% to remove potential
outliers.)
• Crisis: A dummy variable equal to one if the year is in the crisis period, which
includes years 2001 and 2002 (the period when technology bubbles burst) and
years 2008 and 2009 (the most recent financial crisis). This is used in robust check
analysis.
• Financial Leverage: Equals the ratio of “Debt/Equity” for the fund and in-
dicates the average leverage that the fund uses.
• High Water Mark: A dummy variable equal to one if the fund has a high
water mark provision.
• Incentive Fee (%): A fund’s incentive fee as a percent of fund assets.
• Offshore: A dummy variable equal to one if the fund is located offshore (any-
where but United States), and zero if the fund is located in the United States.
• Size: The natural logarithm of the value of the assets under management of a
fund.
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2.11.2 Appendix B: Complete Styles Glossary
The table below shows the list of hedge funds styles in our dataset.
Table 2.1: Hedge Funds Investment Styles
(based on TASS database)
Style Index Style Name
1 Convertible Arbitrage
2 Dedicated Short Bias
3 Emerging Markets
4 Equity Market Neutral
5 Event Driven
6 Fixed Income Arbitrage
7 Fund of Funds
8 Global Macro
9 Long/Short Equity
10 Managed Futures
11 Multi-Strategy
12 Options Strategy
13 Other/Undefined
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Appendix C. Domicile Country Distribution of All Funds with reported USD Currency 
Note that 69% of the funds are registered off-shore. 
Domicile Country Count of Funds %Total 
(10076) 
Domicile Country Count of 
Funds 
%Total 
(10076) 
Cayman Islands 3761 37.33% Saint Martin 11 0.11% 
United States 3150 31.26% Australia 8 0.08% 
Virgin Islands (British) 923 9.16% Netherlands 7 0.07% 
Bermuda 572 5.68% 
Saint Vincent And 
The Grenadines 4 0.04% 
Luxembourg 423 4.20% Singapore 4 0.04% 
Bahamas 254 2.52% Bahrain 4 0.04% 
Ireland 246 2.44% Sweden 3 0.03% 
Guernsey 224 2.22% Hong Kong 3 0.03% 
Jersey 96 0.95% Malaysia 3 0.03% 
Switzerland 72 0.71% Israel 3 0.03% 
Canada 56 0.56% Anguilla 2 0.02% 
Curacao 43 0.43% United Arab Emirates 2 0.02% 
Malta 36 0.36% Saint Kitts And Nevis 2 0.02% 
Mauritius 32 0.32% China 2 0.02% 
None 29 0.29% Gibraltar 2 0.02% 
France 26 0.26% Japan 1 0.01% 
Liechtenstein 23 0.23% Saudi Arabia 1 0.01% 
Isle of Man 17 0.17% Virgin Islands (U.S.) 1 0.01% 
United Kingdom 13 0.13% Finland 1 0.01% 
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Appendix D. Distribution of base currency of the hedge funds in top 9 categories; presented in 
percent total. In this study we eliminate non-USD funds 
There are total of 17,045 hedge funds in the TASS database. From this number, 9,648 are 
defunct funds and 7,397 are live funds. After eliminating non-USD funds, there are 3362 firms in 
the Live Funds database and 6250 in the Defunct Funds database. 
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2.12 Essay I Figures and Tables
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Figure 1: 
Time Trend of Failed Hedge Funds count  and % Failed from. 
Source: TASS Hedge Funds database 
A total of 17,202 hedge funds reported monthly returns to TASS for the years between Jan-1996 
and Jan-2012 in this database. From this number, 10,455 are defunct funds and 6,747 are live 
funds.  
For each year from 2002 to 2011, the bar chart below reports the number of hedge funds that 
failed. The trend line shows the % failed, calculated as ratio of total failed HFs over total number 
of HFs in each year. 
 
* Note that the distinction of the crisis period (as shown by the demarcation) starts from August 2007. 
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Figure 2: 
Monthly Level on S&P 500 Composite Index over the period of Jan 2000 to 2011.  
(Source: CRSP database) 
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Figure 3: 
3.A) Annual Asset Under Management (AUM) of Hedge Fund Industry over the period of 1994 to 
2010.  
(Source: Lipper TASS database) 
3.B) Hedge Funds Average Weighted Leverage over the period of 2005 to 2012 
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Figure 4: Timeline of Interval Selection for Regression Model: 
We split our time period into two sub-periods of Jan 1996 to Dec 2006 and Jan 2007 to Dec 
2010. (The set up of these sub-periods may modify based on stability tests.) The plot below 
displays this timeline. The two sub-periods form the test of stability to see whether the impact of 
the determinants changed during the crisis period.  
(Failure of the hedge funds continues well after 2009 and prolongs into 2010. Hence, a rational 
conclusion is that the effect of the financial crisis on the failure rate of the hedge funds can be 
more prominent than the effect observed during normal periods.) 
 
 
Pre-Crisis Period Crisis & Post-Crisis Period 
Perceived Regime Switch: 
Jan 1996 Dec 2011 
Aug 2007 
Bankruptcy of two Bear 
Stearns’ Hedge Funds 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics: Cross-sectional 
A total of 17,202 hedge funds reported monthly returns to TASS for the years between Jan-1996 and Dec-2011 in this database. From 
this number, 10,455 are defunct funds and 6,747 are live funds. After eliminating non-USD funds, we have 3156 Live Funds and 7076 
Defunct funds. Table below reports the comprehensive characteristics of the funds for the two sub-data sets of Live and Grave yard 
(defunct) funds. 
Significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10% is indicated as ***, **, and *, respectively. The test for difference in means is the 
independent t-test and the test for difference in median is the Wilcoxon test. The difference in mean (median) is defined as Live 
database minus Graveyard (Defunct) database. 
 
  
 
Live Funds Defunct Funds 
Test for 
difference 
in Means 
Test for 
difference 
in Medians 
  
 
Mean Median Std Dev. Mean Median 
Std 
Dev. 
t-stat z-stat 
Funds Continuous Characteristics  
 
            
 
  
Average Actual Leverage (Debt/Equity)% 
 
39.40 0.00 127.28 55.94 0.00 197.05 -21.67*** 0 
Max Leverage (Debt/Equity) % 
 
85.69 0.00 204.78 101.25 0.00 293.30 -20.10*** 0 
Management Fees  % 
 
1.45 1.50 0.74 1.45 1.50 0.66 0 0 
Incentive Fees % 
 
14.62 20.00 7.93 15.67 20.00 7.64 -51.84*** 0 
Size (AUM) 
 
17.63 17.71 1.79 17.68 18.37 1.74 -10.38*** -4.94*** 
Volatility (measured as return’s Std. Dev.) 
 
3.29 2.42 2.81 3.25 2.24 3.07 5.96*** 32.68*** 
Rate of return (% Annual) 
 
9.77 9.12 4.00 7.79 7.68 3.97 16.09*** 21.73*** 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics Continued 
        
        
 
Live Funds Defunct Funds 
 
  Yes No   Yes  No   
Funds Dichotomous Characteristics 
  
  
  
  
 Personal Capital (Do principals have 
money invested in the HF?) 27.78% 72.22%   31.43% 68.57%   
 Margin (Does the fund leverage using 
margin borrowing value?) 33.49% 66.51%   40.76% 59.24%   
 Derivatives (Does the fund leverage using 
derivatives value?) 18.87% 81.13%   19.65% 80.35%   
 Futures (Does the fund leverage using 
futures value?) 22.07% 77.93%   19.15% 80.85%   
 Leveraged (Does the fund use leverage as 
defined by Debt/Equity?) 54.13% 45.87%   56.90% 43.10%   
 HighWaterMark (Does the fund have 
High Water Mark structure? ) 66.34% 33.66%   60.37% 39.63%   
 
Off-shore (Is the fund registered off-
shore?) 66.42% 33.58%   64.05% 35.95%   
 
  
Note: The number of cross-sectional observations is 3362 firms in the Live Funds database and 6250 in the Defunct Funds database for the 
period 1996-2010. 
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Table 3  
Descriptive statistics: Time Series 
A total of 17,202 hedge funds reported monthly returns to TASS for the years between Jan-1996 and Dec-2011 in this database. From 
this number, 10,455 are defunct funds and 6,747 are live funds. For each year from 1996 to 2010, the table below reports the number 
of hedge funds that failed and the number of hedge funds that survived. It also reports the key characteristics of each group over time.  
  Live Funds Defunct Funds 
Year 
No. of 
Funds 
No. of 
Obs. 
Mean NAV 
 ($Million) 
Mean 
Annual 
Rate of 
Return 
(%) 
Median 
Annual 
Rate of 
Return 
(%) 
Std. Dev. 
Of 
Monthly 
Returns 
Number 
of Funds 
Failed 
Number 
of Obs. 
Mean NAV 
 ($Million) 
Mean 
Annual 
Rate of 
Return 
(%) 
Median 
Annual 
Rate of 
Return 
(%) 
Std. Dev. 
Of 
Monthly 
Returns 
                          
1996 284 3168 268.74 19.71 15.60 4.18 122 13740 132.48 16.38 14.64 4.41 
1997 356 3979 273.50 18.49 14.45 4.42 94 16035 261.95 16.51 13.80 4.77 
1998 437 4882 554.65 6.53 8.81 5.16 154 18424 445.96 6.36 8.65 5.47 
1999 537 6055 683.73 24.62 15.12 4.85 175 20505 238.16 20.90 13.80 5.09 
2000 660 7373 626.87 11.08 10.37 5.02 221 22518 230.72 7.99 9.12 5.45 
2001 815 9108 613.71 9.18 8.00 4.02 242 24448 93.39 5.82 6.84 4.35 
2002 988 11203 519.57 5.41 4.68 3.72 234 27324 229.97 2.34 3.96 3.65 
2003 1212 13522 534.60 19.12 12.53 3.37 246 30484 137.63 14.85 10.13 3.10 
2004 1485 16696 488.55 10.14 7.44 3.03 290 34350 124.99 7.28 6.00 2.78 
2005 1795 20084 458.78 10.96 10.08 3.07 447 36728 150.71 7.96 7.79 2.83 
2006 2091 23754 451.63 14.12 12.48 3.12 510 36873 176.00 10.94 10.32 2.86 
2007 2427 27592 484.92 14.39 12.84 3.44 755 34747 411.92 9.62 9.84 3.23 
2008 2750 31698 684.76 -15.14 -7.33 5.07 1209 27306 156.53 -15.90 -7.32 4.60 
2009 3110 35764 827.02 18.69 12.60 4.14 799 15843 167.39 7.50 4.36 3.79 
2010 3362 39470 913.65 9.46 7.99 3.59 752 8023 614.94 2.66 1.77 3.31 
 
Note: The number of cross-sectional observations is 3156 firms in the Live Funds database and 7076 in the Defunct Funds database for the period 1996-2011 
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Table 4 
Descriptive statistics: Investment Strategies 
The table below shows the characteristics for each investment strategy category. AUM (Asset under management), Returns, Size, 
Leverage and Number of funds are provided as well as main statistics for each of them. Leverage is defined as debt-to-equity ratio. 
 
   
Annual Return Size (AUM), M$ 
Average Financial 
Leverage (D/E) 
Number of Funds 
 
  Mean Median 
Std 
Dev. Mean Median Std Dev. Mean Median Std Dev. 
Live 
Database 
Defunct 
Database Total 
 
Funds Continuous 
Characteristics              
  
    
  1 Convertible Arbitrage 8.20 9.12 2.76 166.38 119.22 399.81 144.66 100.0 187.45 47 175 222 
2 Dedicated Short Bias 2.64 1.56 5.86 80.64 71.14 93.08 40.22 0.0 62.60 11 36 47 
3 Emerging Markets 13.00 12.00 5.60 245.86 22.14 3581.21 19.13 0.0 50.76 386 391 777 
4 Equity Market Neutral 7.26 6.58 2.89 689.40 103.96 10396.30 65.27 0.0 111.03 96 338 434 
5 Event Driven 9.92 9.60 3.13 380.19 124.66 3457.26 41.51 0.0 86.68 185 481 666 
6 Fixed Income Arbitrage 7.59 8.40 2.57 618.34 112.33 5149.51 302.43 3.5 770.18 52 204 256 
7 Fund of Funds 5.62 7.26 2.79 114.51 19.36 408.49 21.32 0.0 92.02 1034 1592 2626 
8 Global Macro 8.82 6.36 4.18 165.50 101.90 446.20 84.78 0.0 148.94 132 360 492 
9 Long/Short Equity 10.58 9.36 4.75 711.40 94.96 15532.47 33.83 0.0 66.48 758 1728 2486 
10 Managed Futures 8.83 6.14 5.39 430.09 110.67 3656.23 52.53 0.0 136.44 239 436 675 
11 Multi-Strategy 8.60 8.76 3.48 302.88 92.36 1818.21 62.24 0.0 116.05 258 361 619 
12 Options Strategy 8.34 7.92 3.15 109.33 115.47 75.65 58.24 0.0 86.57 16 8 24 
13 Other/Undefined 10.60 9.36 3.16 1059.54 109.52 6644.73 96.05 0.0 155.41 148 140 288 
 
TOTAL 8.60 8.28 3.98 412.44 84.44 9498.74 49.44 0.0 173.22 3156 7076 10455 
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Table 5: Correlation Matrix 
 
The table presents the pair-wise correlation coefficients. The sample includes 1996-2011 data from Lipper TASS database. Non-USD 
firms are excluded. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. Note that performance (return) and risk (volatility) are winsorized 
at 1% on each tail. * indicates statistical significance at the 95% level or higher. 
 
  Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
(1) Leverage 1 
         
(2) Margin 0.47* 1 
       
 
(3) Derivatives & Futures 0.46* 0.28* 1 
      
 
 
(4) Sizet-1 0.04* 0.05* 0.07* 1 
     
 
 
(5) Performancet-1 0.01* 0.01* 0 0.04* 1 
    
 
 
(6) Volatilityt-1 0.1* 0.04* 0.1* 0 0 1 
   
 
 
(7) Incentive fee 0.25* 0.13* 0.16* 0.15* 0.04* 0.19* 1 
  
 
 
(8) Management fee 0.08* -0.05* 0.13* -0.04* 0 0.07* 0.09* 1 
 
 
 
(9) HighWaterMark 0.06* 0 0 0.07* 0.01* -0.02* 0.37* 0 1 
 
 
(10) Offshore -0.02* 0 0 -0.33* -0.03* -0.09* -0.15* 0.09* -0.09* 
 
1 
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Table 6: Downside Correlation 
 
Correlation Analysis for monthly returns of HFs  with S&P 500 (Aggregate Market) 
The table below shows the correlation between monthly returns on each Investment Strategy 
category with the aggregate market (here, S&P500). 
The purpose is to identify the increased correlation during crisis, reflective of “downside 
correlation”. 1 
 
PrimaryCategory  
(Investment Strategy) 
Returns Correlation with S&P500 
 
  
All 
time 
Post Crisis 
2007-2010 
Pre Crisis 
1996-2006 
Post-Pre Crisis 
1 Convertible Arbitrage 0.26 0.41 0.16 0.25 
2 Dedicated Short Bias -0.50 -0.49 -0.51 0.02 
3 Emerging Markets 0.38 0.45 0.32 0.13 
4 Equity Market Neutral -0.02 -0.03 0.03 -0.06 
5 Event Driven 0.31 0.41 0.24 0.18 
6 Fixed Income Arbitrage 0.11 0.24 0.01 0.23 
7 Fund of Funds 0.27 0.28 0.23 0.05 
8 Global Macro 0.11 0.11 0.11 -0.001 
9 Long/Short Equity Hedge 0.09 0.06 0.30 -0.24 
10 Managed Futures -0.02 0.01 -0.04 0.05 
11 Multi-Strategy 0.24 0.25 0.21 0.04 
12 Options Strategy 0.06 0.03 0.17 -0.15 
      
 
 
*All correlation values were found significant at 99% or 95% confidence level, unless indicated 
otherwise. 
 
                                                          
1
 See Ang and Chen (2002) for more details. 
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Table 7: Regression of probability of failure on fund’s financial leverage for all hedge funds 
                                                  (Pr ,1,10), titieFinLeveragFailureob ti     X  
The dependent variable is the dichotomous variable “Failure” that takes values 1 and 0. The value is observed monthly, where Failure =1 for the month that the hedge fund has 
failed. Actual Financial leverage (FinLev) is the average actual leverage ratio defined as total debt over total equity for each fund.  X is a vector of control variables including 
size, prior performance, Incentive Fee, Offshore, and High water mark. Z-statistics are reported below as well as the estimated coefficients. Probit models (2) and (3) each take 
multiplicative factors into account. For complete detailed definitions of variables, refer to the Appendix A. 
Significance levels are denoted as (*) if p < 0.10,  (**) if p < 0.05, and  (***) if p < 0.01. 
Dependent Variable:  
Dichotomous for Failure 
Probit (1) Probit (2) Probit (3) 
Failure: All-Time (1996-2011) 
Estimates  Z-stat Estimates  Z-stat Estimates  Z-stat 
Financial Leverage 0.02*** 2.7 0.02** 2.2   
(FinLev)*(Deriv/Future)     
0.01 0.5 
(FinLev)*(Margin)     
0.05*** 5.1 
(Deriv/Futures)*(Margin)   
0.01 1.1 
  
Size -0.01** -2.1 -0.01** -2.2 -0.01*** -3.5 
Performance (Return t-1) -0.03*** -20.6 -0.03*** -20.6 -0.02*** -17.3 
Incentive Fee 0.01*** 8.5 0.01*** 8.5 0.01*** 8.9 
Highwatermark -0.04*** -4.6 -0.04*** -4.5 -0.09*** -8.3 
Offshore 0.02 1.6 0.02 1.6 0.01 0.9 
Management Fee -0.01 -0.2 0.00 -0.2 0.01 1.2 
Crisis 0.09*** 9.9 0.09*** 9.9 0.09*** 8.5 
Intercept -2.34*** -45.6 -2.34*** -45.5 -2.27*** -39.5 
              
Year Effects & Cluster Effects Yes   Yes   Yes   
Log pseudolikelihood  -35188   -35188   -19562   
Pseudo R
2
 0.01   0.01   0.01   
Observations 637980   637980   258504   
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Table 8: Regression of probability of failure on fund’s financial leverage for all hedge funds: Pre-Crisis vs. Post-Crisis 
                                                  (Pr ,1,10), titiegFinLeveraFailureob ti     X  
The dependent variable is the dichotomous variable “Failure” that takes values 1 and 0. The value is observed monthly, where Failure =1 for the month that the hedge fund has 
failed. Actual Financial leverage (FinLev) is the average actual leverage ratio defined as total debt over total equity for each fund.  X is a vector of control variables including 
size, prior performance, Incentive Fee, Offshore, and High water mark. Z-statistics are reported below as well as the estimated coefficients. Probit models (2) and (3) each take 
multiplicative factors into account. For more complete definitions of variables, refer to the Appendix A. 
Significance levels are denoted as (*) if p < 0.10,  (**) if p < 0.05, and  (***) if p < 0.01. 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Dichotomous for Failure 
Probit (1) Probit (2) Probit (3) Probit (1) Probit (2) Probit (3) 
Failure: Non/Pre-Crisis Failure: During/Post-Crisis 
Estimates  Z-stat Estimates  Z-stat Estimates  Z-stat Estimates  Z-stat Estimates  Z-stat Estimates  Z-stat 
Financial Leverage 0.02 1.3 0.01 0.9   
0.03** 2.5 0.03** 2.1 
  
(FinLev)*(Deriv/Future)     
0.01 0.5 
    
0.00 0.3 
(FinLev)*(Margin)     
0.04*** 2.9 
    
0.07*** 4.2 
(Deriv/Futures)*(Margin)   
0.02 0.9 
    
0.01 0.7 
  
Size -0.01** -2.1 -0.01** -2.1 -0.01*** -3.4 -0.01 -0.8 0.00 -0.9 -0.01 -1.3 
Performance (Return t-1) -0.02*** -13.8 -0.02*** -13.8 -0.02*** -11.9 -0.03*** -15.6 -0.03*** -15.6 -0.02*** -12.9 
Incentive Fee 0.01*** 7.2 0.01*** 7.2 0.01*** 7.1 0.01*** 4.6 0.00*** 4.6 0.01*** 5.4 
Highwatermark -0.02 -1.1 -0.02 -1.1 -0.05*** -3.6 -0.08*** -5.2 -0.08*** -5.2 -0.13*** -7.7 
Offshore -0.01 -0.6 -0.01 -0.7 -0.02 -1.1 0.04*** 2.9 0.04*** 2.9 0.04** 2.4 
Management Fee 0.00 0.2 0.00 0.2 0.02* 1.9 -0.01 -0.4 0.00 -0.4 0.00 -0.2 
Crisis             
Intercept -2.33*** -31.9 -2.32*** -31.8 -2.23*** -27.7 -2.27*** -29.0 -2.27*** -29.0 -2.23*** -25.5 
                          
Year Effects & Cluster Effects Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Log pseudolikelihood  -18587   -18587   -14443   -16589   -16589   -12650   
Pseudo R
2
 0.01   0.01   0.08   0.01   0.01   0.01   
Observations 372542   372542   285800   265438   265438   202359   
 
Note: The R-squared for the Probit regression is the square of the correlation between the model's predicted values and the actual values
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Table 9: Regression of probability of failure on fund’s financial leverage for Significant Styles 
                                                  1(Pr ,1,10), titieFinLeveragFailureob ti     X  
The dependent variable is the dichotomous variable “Failure” that takes values 1 and 0. The value is observed monthly, where 
Failure =1 for the month that the hedge fund has failed. Actual Financial leverage (FinLev) is the average actual leverage ratio 
defined as total debt over total equity for each fund.  X is a vector of control variables including size, prior performance, Incentive 
Fee, Management Fee, Offshore, and High water mark. Z-statistics are reported below as well as the estimated coefficients. For 
more detailed definitions of variables, refer to the Appendix A. Significance levels are denoted as (*) if p < 0.10,  (**) if p < 
0.05, and  (***) if p < 0.01. 
 
The findings of the table below show that for the style groups “Emerging Markets”, “Equity Market”, “Long/Short Equity”, 
and “Multi-Strategy”, the leverage is a significant factor for the failure of the fund during the entire time period. This can be due 
to the fact that these styles have larger values of market return component (i.e. beta) which is explained further in the paper. 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Dichotomous for Failure 
Emerging Markets 
3 
Equity Market 
Neutral 
4 
Long/Short Equity 
Hedge 
9 
Multi-Strategy 
11 
  Estimates  Z-Stat Estimates  Z-Stat Estimates  Z-Stat Estimates  Z-Stat 
Financial Leverage 0.08** 2.52 0.09*** 2.79 0.04*** 2.75 0.07** 2.03 
 
    
 
  
 
  
 
  
Size 0.00 0.37 0.01 0.88 0.00 0.13 -0.02** -2.12 
Performance (Return t-1) -0.02*** -4.46 -0.05*** -6.51 -0.02*** -10.55 -0.04*** -7.80 
Incentive Fee 0.00 0.48 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.79 0.00 -0.72 
Highwatermark -0.06* -1.71 0.01 0.17 0.00 -0.25 0.01 0.25 
Offshore -0.01 -0.21 0.06* 1.65 0.03** 2.04 -0.02 -0.46 
Management Fee 0.11*** 2.94 -0.01 -0.27 0.03* 1.76 -0.01 -0.52 
Crisis 0.07* 1.70 0.02 0.50 0.04* 1.93 0.15*** 3.85 
Intercept -2.39*** -14.12 -2.37*** -12.36 -2.25*** -25.44 -1.99*** -9.73 
                  
Year Effects & Cluster Effects Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Log pseudolikelihood  -2063   -1674   -9778   -2105   
Pseudo R
2
 0.01   0.01   0.01   0.02   
Observations 22945   18184   169988   37935   
Note: The R-squared for the Probit regression is the square of the correlation between the model's predicted values and the actual values.  
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Table 10a: Regression of probability of failure on fund’s financial leverage for Non-Significant Styles 
                                                  1(Pr ,1,10), titieFinLeveragFailureob ti     X  
The dependent variable is the dichotomous variable “Failure” that takes values 1 and 0. The value is observed monthly, where 
Failure =1 for the month that the hedge fund has failed. Actual Financial leverage (FinLev) is the average actual leverage ratio 
defined as total debt over total equity for each fund.  X is a vector of control variables including size, prior performance, Incentive 
Fee, Management Fee, Offshore, and High water mark. Z-statistics are reported below as well as the estimated coefficients. For 
more detailed definitions of variables, refer to the Appendix A. Significance levels are denoted as (*) if p < 0.10,  (**) if p < 
0.05, and  (***) if p < 0.01. 
 
The findings of table below show that for the style groups “Convertible Arbitrage”, “Dedicated Short Bias”, “Event Driven”, 
and “Fixed Income Arbitrage”, the leverage is not a significant factor for the failure of the fund throughout the entire time 
period. 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Dichotomous for Failure 
Convertible Arbitrage 
1 
Dedicated Short 
Bias 
2 
Event Driven 
5 
Fixed Income 
Arbitrage 
6 
  Estimates  Z-Stat Estimates  Z-Stat Estimates  Z-Stat Estimates  Z-Stat 
Financial Leverage -0.06 -1.14 -0.12 -1.54 0.02 0.94 -0.02 -0.4 
 
  
      Size -0.02 -1.34 -0.06 -1.54 -0.01 -1.67 0.01 0.58 
Performance (Return t-1) 
-0.07*** -5.81 0.02** 2.02 -0.04*** -6.46 -0.06*** -5.94 
Incentive Fee 0.00 -0.83 0.01 1.6 0.00 -0.79 0.00 -0.15 
Highwatermark 0.07 1.53 -0.03 -0.35 0.05* 1.78 -0.07 -1.33 
Offshore 0.01 0.15 0.10 1.3 0.02 0.86 -0.02 -0.37 
Management Fee 0.08* 1.94 0.07 0.99 0.05* 1.79 0.04 0.99 
Crisis -0.01 -0.1 0.07 0.43 0.15*** 3.96 0.32*** 5.53 
Intercept -1.77*** -5.05 -1.41* -1.86 -2.04*** -12.65 -2.40*** -8.28 
                  
Year Effects & Cluster Effects Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Log pseudolikelihood  -869   -181   -2401   -896   
Pseudo R
2
 0.03   0.02   0.02   0.04   
Observations 11623   2590   30142   11549   
Note: The R-squared for the Probit regression is the square of the correlation between the model's predicted values and the actual values.  
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Table 10b: Regression of probability of failure on fund’s financial leverage for Non-Significant Styles(Cont.) 
                                                  1(Pr ,1,10), titieFinLeveragFailureob ti     X  
The dependent variable is the dichotomous variable “Failure” that takes values 1 and 0. The value is observed monthly, where 
Failure =1 for the month that the hedge fund has failed. Actual Financial leverage (FinLev) is the average actual leverage ratio 
defined as total debt over total equity for each fund.  X is a vector of control variables including size, prior performance, Incentive 
Fee, Management Fee, Offshore, and High water mark. Z-statistics are reported below as well as the estimated coefficients. For 
more detailed definitions of variables, refer to the Appendix A. 
 
The findings of table below show that for the style groups “Fund of Funds”, “Global Macro”, “Managed Futures”, and 
“Option Strategy”, the leverage is not a significant factor for the failure of the fund when observed throughout the entire time 
period. 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Dichotomous for Failure 
Funds of Funds 
7 
Global Macro 
8 
Managed Futures 
10 
Option Strategy 
12 
  Estimates  Z-Stat Estimates  Z-Stat Estimates  Z-Stat Estimates  Z-Stat 
Financial Leverage 0.01 0.85 -0.06 -1.31 -0.01 -0.27 -0.25 -1.13 
         Size -0.01 -1.54 -0.02 -1.51 -0.02*** -2.6 0.03 0.29 
Performance (Return t-1) -0.05*** -13.13 -0.01** -2.49 -0.01*** -3.02 0.12*** 3.79 
Incentive Fee 0.00*** 4.33 0.00 0.9 0.00 0.3 0.02 0.32 
Highwatermark 0.02 1.58 0.02 0.54 -0.03 -1.07 -1.80 -1.46 
Offshore 0.01 0.77 0.02 0.52 0.05 1.64 0.24* 1.78 
Management Fee -0.05*** -4.26 0.00 0.1 -0.04*** -2.99 0.00 -0.01 
Crisis 0.13*** 6.47 0.11** 2.15 0.04 1.01 -1.00** -2.44 
Intercept -2.10*** -26.52 -1.78*** -7.53 -1.64*** -9.97 -1.29 -0.56 
                  
Year Effects & Cluster Effects Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Log pseudolikelihood  -8365   -1426   -2147   -68   
Pseudo R
2
 0.02   0.01   0.01   0.18   
Observations 105975   13834   23343   1041   
Note: The R-squared for the Probit regression is the square of the correlation between the model's predicted values and the actual values.  
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Abstract
What is the impact of default risk on equity option pricing? We study this
question in detail by empirically examining to what extent the firm-specific default
risk matters in pricing individual equity options. Since credit default swaps (CDS)
are similar to put options in that both offer a low cost and effective protection
against downside risk, we use CDS spread as credit risk proxy to investigate the
effects of default risk on put pricing. Recent financial crisis showed that for many
financial firms equity options experienced high implied volatility (IV) when the
underlying CDS spreads went up. By examining an exhaustive sample of US-listed
firms with both CDS and put options data available over the period from 2002
to 2010, and studying the primary determinants of option IVs cross-sectionally
and over time, the findings show that default risk is a significant factor in the
prices of equity options. Moreover, the impact of default risk remains significant
after controlling for firm-specific and macroeconomic factors. This study relates
to recent literature that explains how default risk can get injected from the fixed
income market to the equity options market and why default risk is important in
the pricing of equity options and implied volatility.
Keywords: Option Pricing, Default Risk, Implied Volatility, CDS Spreads,
Volatility Skew
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3.1 Introduction
Does default risk matter in equity option pricing? If underlying firm is subject
to higher default risk does that matter for option markets? In this essay we
address this question in details, by empirically examining to what extent the firm-
specific attributes and systematic variables matter in pricing individual equity
options. The existence of an association between default risk and implied volatility,
which is inverted from option prices, is a widely accepted notion. We study the
primary determinants of option IVs cross-sectionally and over time, and measure
the contribution of default risk on equity option pricing. Since credit default swaps
(CDS) are similar to out-of-the-money put options in that both offer a low cost1
and effective protection against downside risk, we use CDS spread as credit risk
proxy to investigate the effects of credit risk on put option pricing.
In addition, we analyze whether the equity option skew is explained by the
underlying firm’s default risk or not. If there exists a default risk premium in
stocks, the expected return on the stocks should include a compensation for default
risk. This has been empirically tested in previous literature.2 In other words,
higher default risk is associated with closer distance to default of the underlying
firm, and hence higher risk or implied volatility for that stock. In this paper
we study if firm’s default risk matters for option pricing: firms subject to higher
default risk have greater firm-specific volatility increasing option value. Similarly,
increase in default risk over time for a given firm can increase the delta-neutral
cost of hedging and hence higher option prices.
1The cost can be relative.
2For example see Vassalou and Xing, (2004); Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008); Gar-
lappi and Yan, (2011)
DOES DEFAULT RISK IMPACT EQUITY OPTIONS? 73
The overall objective of this study is to examine the association between default
probability and implied volatility. This relationship is well known as the ‘leverage
effect’.3 When stock prices go down the volatility goes up which increases the
leverage component, and hence the firm becomes more defaultable. We investigate
this association and study the interactions between CDS and option markets.
Incorporating firm-specific default risk may be an alternative way of capturing
additional risks. High default risk can enhance the implied volatility smiles/smirks,
and hence potentially provide an alternative explanation as to why the underlying
risk neutral distributions are skewed. 4If default risk significantly explains the
implicit variance risk premium, default risk premium may also be priced in equity
options.
Further high aggregate default risk can also imply high systematic risk that can
have a pronounced impact on option prices and IV skew.5 If default risk matters
and is not controlled for, existing pricing models could lead to pricing biases es-
pecially for OTM puts or ITM calls.6 Profits from several buy-hold and arbitrage
strategies involving individual options, straddles, put-call parity arbitrage trades
can be spurious, as they could be driven by underlying credit risk. Our study
intends to shed more light on these issues by highlighting the association between
credit risk and options values.
Why does default risk matter for option prices? Extant literature shows that
Implied volatility smiles and skews along the moneyness direction are direct results
3The term “Leverage effect” refers to the well-established relationship between stock returns
and both implied and realized volatility: volatility increases when the stock price falls
4The variance risk premium can be one indication of this.
5Negative skewness is partly related to market beta (Dennis & Mayhew, 2002) and systematic
risk is significant in the price structure of equity options (Duan & Wei, 2009).
6Previous theoretical framework has examined the pricing of vulnerable options (Johnson &
Stulz, 1987), pricing options on defaultable stocks (Bayraktar 2008; Bayraktar and Yang 2011),
and develop a robust link between deep OTM American puts on a company’s stock and a credit
insurance contract on the company’s bond (Carr & Wu, 2011).
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of conditional non-normality in the underlying stock returns under the risk-neutral
measure. The negative slope of the implied volatility skew indicates negative skew-
ness in the risk-neutral return distribution and presence of variance risk premium.
As Carr and Wu (2009) and Bayraktar and Yang (2011) show, a possible source
of such variance risk premium could be the underlying default risk of the firm.
Carr and Wu (2009) study the interaction between market risk (return vari-
ance) and credit risk (default arrival) in pricing stock options and credit default
swaps. They model default intensity is a positive function of stock return variance
(details below) . Higher variance leads to higher default arrival rate impacting
option price; the default arrival rate itself contributes positively to the option im-
plied volatility. The negative risk-neutral return skewness in their model therefore
arises from three sources: (i) positive probability of default (ii) asymmetry in the
high-frequency jump component and (iii) negative correlation between the return
and variance processes. Their results show that when a company’s credit spread
widens, its implied variance skew becomes more negatively skewed. Shocks to the
more persistent credit risk factor last longer across the term structure of options
and credit spreads.
Further studies have examined the significance of firm-specific default risk in
pricing equities (e.g. Vassalou and Xing, 2004; Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi,
2008; Garlappi and Yan, 2011). However high default risk can also influence the
risk of the underlying equity options. Variations in default risk can imply yet
another source of diversifiable risk that needs to be dynamically hedged using a
risk free bond, stock and underlying corporate bond in creating a delta-neutral
portfolio. As a result, delta-neutral portfolios with excess default risk imply higher
put option prices (or equivalently higher IVs), ceteris paribus. Existing option
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pricing literature shows that no-arbitrage portfolio consisting of stock and risk-
free T-bills alone cannot successfully span option returns, and hence additional
risk factors such as stochastic volatility and jumps are needed. 7
High default risk can enhance the IV smiles/smirks, and hence provide an alter-
native explanation as to why the underlying risk neutral distributions are skewed.
Further high aggregate default risk can also imply high systematic risk that can
have a pronounced impact on option prices and IV skew. If default risk matters
and is not controlled for, existing pricing models could lead to pricing biases es-
pecially for OTM puts or ITM calls. Profits from several buy-hold and arbitrage
strategies involving individual options, straddles, put-call parity arbitrage trades
can be spurious, as they could be driven by underlying credit risk. Our study
intends to shed more light on these issues.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first empirical study on impact of
default risk on option markets.8 Cao,Yu and Zhong (2010) investigate whether put
option implied volatility is an important determinant of CDS spreads. Using firm
level time series models of IV they find that individual firms’ put option-implied
volatility dominate historical volatility in explaining the time-series variation in
CDS spreads. Their data is the closest to our empirical approach of this research.
To better control for effects of option IV on CDS we employ instrumental variable
approach for possible endogenity. If there is a default risk premium in stocks, the
expected return includes a compensation for default risk. Higher default risk is
associated with closer distance to default of the underlying firm relative to other
peer firms, and hence higher idiosyncratic risk or implied volatility for that stock,
thereby causing option prices to go up. Such a stock could also exhibit excess
7 For example, it has been shown that deterministic volatility models are insufficient in
spanning of the pricing kernel (Burasachi & Jackwerth, 2001).
8We use CDS data to compute default measures for individual firms and measure the effect
of default risk on a comprehensive group of equity option prices.
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skew in the risk neutral distribution compared to stock issued by a similar firm,
but with lower default risk. So the additional question investigated in this paper
is: Is the equity option skew associated with the underlying default risk of the
reference firm?
Previously, there have been extensive theoretical work on modeling default risk
for the purpose of valuing corporate debt and derivative products written on it,
but little attention has been paid to the effects of default risk on equity options.
See for example Bayraktar (2008), Bayraktar and Yang (2011), and Carr and Wu
(2011).9 Can we measure this impact empirically by identifying default risk as one
of the determinants of the option-implied volatility after controlling for firm and
issuer characteristics?
We measure default risk using CDS spreads on the underlying reference firm.
We employ an exhaustive panel dataset of (a) individual equity options (Option
Metrics) and (b) CDS (Markit) for the period 2002-2010, and undertake a com-
prehensive study by addressing these key issues: (1) Does credit risk matter for
option pricing? How do credit markets influence individual option pricing? (2)
Does firm specific default risk still matter for option pricing, even after controlling
for option liquidity and aggregate default risk? (3) Does credit risk impact option
skewness?
Since CDS, like put option, is mainly used for downside risk protection, we test
our hypotheses on an extensive sample of put options. We find that after control-
ling for market variables and firm variables, the default risk is still a significant
9Bayraktar (2008) develops stock option price approximations for a model which takes both
the risk of default and the stochastic volatility into account. The model for the first time also
lets the volatility impact intensity of defaults and hence shows that an effective hazard rate from
bonds issued by a company can be used to explain the implied volatility skew of the option prices
issued by the same company.
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factor in cross section of option implied volatility. This significance is prominent
in far in-the-money and far out-of-the-money put options.10
3.2 Literature Background
This paper intersects several streams of literature on credit risk and option mar-
ket. The following literature categories are summarized below: “default Risk and
option markets”, “Default risk in equity markets”, and finally the latest studies
on “Cross-sectional Pricing in Equity Options Markets”.
3.2.1 Default Risk and Option Markets
The relationship between default risk and option prices have primarily been subject
of a number of theoretical papers.
Probably one of the first studies is by Johnson and Stulz (1987) who study
the pricing of options with third party risk, so called “vulnerable options”. Many
options and financial assets containing option-like payoffs (such as insurance con-
tracts) are sold by firms that have limited assets. Such options are subject to
default risk of the parties who sell the options.11 Johnson and Stulz show that
many of the well-established results of the option pricing literature do not hold
for vulnerable options.
Hanke (2005) develop a new model for the (closed-form) pricing of options
on leveraged equity, which allows us to study capital structure effects on equity
10The findings are also consistent with the “Leverage Effect” notion explained earlier.
11Because CDS trades OTC, there is counter party risk associated with that security so the
default risk will be confounded with counter party risk.
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option prices. Using the Leland and Toft (1996) model as an example, they show
how classical capital structure models can be extended to allow for closed-form
pricing of options on equity within these models. Their model features finite debt
maturity, exponentially increasing coupon debt, taxes, intermediate bankruptcy,
and deviations from the absolute priority rule.
Bayraktar (2008) develops stock option price models which take both the risk
of default and the stochastic volatility into account. By building default risk into
the pricing model, he shows that an effective hazard rate from bonds issued by a
company can be used to explain the implied volatility skew of the option prices
issued by the same company. This is another important finding that motivates
our empirical question of testing whether default risk priced in equity options.
Chen and Kou (2009) propose a two-sided jump model for credit risk by extend-
ing the Leland–Toft endogenous default model based on the geometric Brownian
motion. The model shows that jump risk and endogenous default can have signif-
icant impacts on credit spreads, optimal capital structure, and implied volatility
of equity options:
For example, following similar approach of incorporating both default risk and
option IV jumps, Carr and Wu (2009) propose a dynamically consistent framework
that allows joint valuation and estimation of stock options and credit default swaps
written on the same reference company. Carr and Wu assume that the stock price
is strictly positive prior to default and falls to zero upon default. Prior to default,
the stock price follows a jump-diffusion process and stochastic volatility. Further,
stock return process has a drift determined by default rate, which is controlled
by a Cox process with a stochastic arrival rate, i.e. the stock price converges to
zero at time of default. The instantaneous default rate and variance rate follow
a bivariate continuous process, with its joint dynamics specified to capture the
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observed behavior of stock option prices and credit default swap spreads. Their
model estimation result (performed on eight companies across five sectors) shows
proof for the interaction between market risk (return variance) and credit risk
(default arrival) in pricing stock options and credit default swaps.
Under Carr and Wu’s model specification, negative risk-neutral return skew-
ness arises from three sources: (i) positive probability of default (ii) asymmetry
in the high-frequency jump component and (iii) negative correlation between the
return and variance processes. In their model, default intensity is a positive func-
tion of stock return variance. Higher variance leads to higher default arrival rate
impacting option price; the default arrival rate itself contributes positively to the
option implied volatility.
Their results show that when a company’s credit spread widens, its implied
variance skew becomes more negatively skewed. Shocks to the more persistent
credit risk factor last longer across the term structure of options and credit spreads.
Their estimation highlights the interaction between market risk (return variance)
and credit risk (default arrival) in pricing stock options and credit default swaps.
Bayraktar and Yang (2011) demonstrate the importance of accounting for the
default risk and stochastic interest rate in equity option pricing. Their pricing
framework combines four building blocks i.e. a) Vasicek interest rate model, b)
fast-mean reverting stochastic volatility model, c) defaultable stock price model,
and d) multi-scale stochastic intensity model, which can be jointly calibrated to
the corporate bond term structure and equity option volatility surface of the same
company. Their purpose is to obtain explicit bond and equity option pricing
formulas that can be calibrated to find a risk neutral model that matches a set of
observed market prices. This risk neutral model can be in turn used to price more
exotic, illiquid or over-the-counter derivatives. Bayraktar and Yang (2011) extends
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Bayraktar (2008) model explained earlier, by taking the interest rate process to
be stochastic.
Strong theoretical literature covered in this section supports the investigation
of default risk impact on equity options pricing.
3.2.2 Default Risk in Equity Markets
The significance of firm-specific default risk in pricing equities has been docu-
mented in current literature. There are two major dimensions to this: First, high
default risk is associated with closer distance-to-default of the underlying firm,
and hence possible higher risk premium for that stock. The reason is that if there
exists a default risk premium in stocks, the expected return includes an additional
compensation for default risk. Empirical evidence on this issue has however been
inconclusive. (e.g. Vassalou & Xing, 2004; Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi, 2008;
Garlappi & Yan, 2011). Second, high default risk can also influence the risk of the
underlying equity options. Variations in default risk can imply yet another source
of diversifiable risk that needs to be dynamically hedged in creating a delta-neutral
portfolio. As a result, delta-neutral portfolios with excess default risk imply higher
put option prices (or equivalently higher implied volatilities-IVs), ceteris paribus.
Burasachi & Jackwerth, 2001, have shown that deterministic volatility models
are insufficient in spanning of the pricing kernel. Existing option pricing literature
also shows that no-arbitrage portfolio consisting of stock and risk-free T-bills alone
cannot successfully span option returns, and hence additional risk factors such as
stochastic volatility and jumps are needed.
According to Vassalou and Xing (2004), default risk is systematic risk and
therefore priced in cross section of returns. In their study they use Merton’s
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(1974) option pricing model for the first time to compute default measures for
individual firms and assess the effect of default risk on equity returns. They find
a risk-based interpretation for size and book to market (B/M) effects. The size
effect is a default effect, and the same analogy is mostly true for the B/M effect.
Both size and B/M effects exist only when there is high default risk. In other
words, small firms have higher returns than large firms only if they have high
default risk. Vassalou and Xing (2004) further show that the Fama French (FF)
factors SMB and HML contain some default-related information, but this is not
the main reason that the FF model can explain the cross section of equity returns.
Based on FF (1996) argument, SMB and HML proxy for default risk. Vassalou
(2003) and Li, Vassalou and Xing (2000) show that the risk based explanations for
these factors and hence default by itself is a variable beyond size and B/M effects.
This variable can be the risk premium for default risk. For example, distressed
portfolios have low average returns, but high standard deviations, market betas,
and loadings on FFs (1993) small-cap and value risk factors. These portfolios also
tend to do poorly when market wide implied volatility increases. In other words,
from the perspective of any of the leading empirical asset pricing models, these
stocks have negative alphas. Based on this result, the conjecture that the value
and size effects are proxies for a financial distress premium can be challenged.
Moreover, in standard models of rational asset pricing in which the structure of
the economy is stable and well understood by investors, this result is restricting.12
To analyze distress risk, Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008) explore the de-
terminants of corporate failure and the pricing of financially distressed stocks with
high failure probability. Analyzing data from 1981, they show that financially dis-
tressed stocks have delivered anomalously low returns, but much higher standard
12Campbell, Hilscher, Szilagyi (2008)
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deviations, market betas, and loadings on value and small-cap risk factors than
stocks with low failure risk. Their patterns are stronger for stocks with possible
informational or arbitrage-related frictions. Their findings hence are inconsistent
with the FF conjecture that the value and size effects are compensation for the
risk of financial distress. From methodology point of view, Campbell, Hilscher and
Szilagyi (2008) estimate the failure probability from a dynamic logit model using
accounting and market variables. This in essence is the same hazard model used
by Shumway (2001) and Chava and Jarrow (2004). Distance to default measure
of KMV, is used by Vassalou and Xing (2004) and Da and Gao (2010), however,
Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008) claim that their reduced form model more
accurately measures the risk of failure at short and long horizons and hence can
more accurately measure the premium that investors receive for holding distressed
stocks.
Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008) implement a reduced-form econometric
model to predict corporate bankruptcies and failures at short and long horizons.
Their model has greater explanatory power than the previous models estimated by
Shumway (2001) and Chava and Jarrow (2004), and includes more variables with
economic interpretation. They also show that failure risk cannot be adequately
summarized by earlier measures of distance to default inspired by Merton’s (1974)
pioneering structural model. While not exactly the same measure as Crosbie
and Bohn (2001) and Vassalou and Xing (2004), Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi
(2008) claim their measure, similar to Bharath and Shumway (2008), is robust to
alternative measures of distance to default.
In order to explain the risk-neutral skewness implied from option prices, Dennis
and Mayhew (2002) empirically establish a link between the risk neutral skewness
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and the systematic risk of the underlying stock. They explain the structural dif-
ference in distributions by investigating the relative importance of several firm
characteristics such as implied volatility, firm size, trading volume, leverage, and
beta. They show that risk-neutral skewness tends to be more negative for stocks
with larger betas. This is an evidence for the importance of market risk in op-
tion pricing. We ensure inclusion of systematic risk in our model by empirically
controlling for the market risk and macroeconomic risk.
So far, the findings on the relationship of default risk to equity returns are
not in consensus with the rational expectation of higher risk, higher return. A
series of later literature try to tackle this anomaly. In the working paper by
Anginer and Yldzhan (2010), they approach the same anomaly: while financial
theory suggests a positive relationship between default risk and equity returns, the
empirical papers find anomalously low returns for stocks with high probabilities
of default. How can this be explained? Anginer and Yildizhan (2010) show that
returns to distressed stocks in previous work, are in fact a combination of anomalies
associated with three stock characteristics: leverage, volatility and profitability. In
their work they use a market based measure, corporate credit spreads, to proxy for
default risk. Their distinctive approach is that as opposed to using measures that
proxy for a firm’s real-world probability of default, they use credit spreads as proxy
for a risk-adjusted (or a risk-neutral) probability of default and hence explicitly
account for the systematic component of distress risk. Their results show that
credit spreads predict corporate defaults better than previously used measures,
such as, bond ratings, accounting variables and structural model parameters.
Finally, we need to incorporate the skew in asset returns in our study. Harvey
and Siddique (2000) explore the role of systematic skewness in asset returns, by
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asking whether expected returns include premium for this risk. They form an as-
set pricing model that incorporates conditional skewness. Their results show that
conditional skewness helps explain the cross-sectional variation of expected returns
across assets and is significant even when factors based on size and book-to-market
are included. Their finding proves that systematic skewness is economically im-
portant and requires a risk premium, on average, of 3.60 percent per year. Based
on their results, the momentum effect is related to systematic skewness. In other
words, the low expected return momentum portfolios have higher skewness than
high expected return portfolios. In line with findings of Campbell, Hilscher and
Szilagyi (2008) and unlike to Vassalou and Xing (2004), Anginer and Yldzhan
(2010) do not find default risk to be significantly priced in the cross-section of
equity returns. Yet, they also find no evidence of firms with high default risk
delivering anomalously low returns.
3.2.3 Cross-sectional Pricing in Equity Options Markets
In light of the systematic risk and equity options, Duan and Wei (2009) show the
impact of systematic risk on the prices of individual equity options. They show
that option prices are characterized by the level and slope of implied volatility
curves, and the systematic risk is measured as the proportion of systematic vari-
ance in the total variance. Duan and Wei (2009) use daily option quotes on the
S&P 100 index and its 30 largest component stocks, and control for the underlying
asset’s total risk. They find that a higher amount of systematic risk leads to a
higher level of implied volatility and a steeper slope of the implied volatility curve.
Thus, systematic risk proportion can help differentiate the price structure across
individual equity options. In our paper the study goes beyond the options listed
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in the index, and is performed on a broad cross section of US firms all US-listed
firms with both options and CDS written on them.
Utilizing the theory of option market liquidity, Cao and Wei (2010) examine
option market liquidity using Ivy DB’s Option Metrics data. They empirically test
for evidence of commonality for various liquidity measures based on the bid ask
spread, volumes, and price impact. They show that commonality remains strong
even after controlling for the underlying stock markets liquidity and other liquidity
determinants such as volatility. In other words, smaller firms and firms with a
higher volatility exhibit stronger commonalities in option liquidity. They also
show some properties of the option market’s liquidity such as role of information
asymmetry vs. inventory risk, the linkage between market-wide option liquidity
and the underlying stock market’s movements and the options liquidity asymmetric
response to upward and downward market movements (calls reacting more in up
markets and puts reacting more in down markets).
The findings of Cao and Wei (2010) are important for our study and to ensure
controlling for liquidity effects we build and include a measure of options liquidity
in our study which will be explained in later sections.
Later, Chen, Lesmond and Wei (2007) find that liquidity is priced in corporate
yield spreads. They use a wide range of liquidity measures covering over 4,000
corporate bonds and spanning both investment grade and speculative categories,
and find that more illiquid bonds earn higher yield spreads. Hence an improvement
in liquidity causes a significant reduction in yield spreads. In their results they
control for common bond-specific, firm-specific, and macroeconomic variables, and
find it robust to issuers’ fixed effect and potential endogeneity bias. Their findings
are in line with the default risk literature that neither the level nor the dynamic of
yield spreads can be fully explained by current default risk determinants. Building
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on their findings, in our study we do control for liquidity on the fixed-income
market through proxy for CDS liquidity.
In their recent working paper Han, Subrahmanyam and Zhou (WP 2015) study
the link between credit and equity markets by focusing on the term structure of
credit spreads. They find significant relation between the slope of the credit term
structure and future stock returns They expect it to be mainly due to the limited
attention and arbitrage costs, since the findings are more prominent for stocks
with low institutional ownership, analyst coverage, and stock liquidity.
In this paper, we find evidence for the default risk impacting the equity option
prices. Since default risk seems to significantly impact the implicit variance risk
premium, default risk premium may be also priced in equity options.
3.3 Research Questions and Hypotheses
Recent financial crisis has shown that for many financial firms equity options
experienced high implied volatilities (IVs) and wide option bid-ask spreads, when
the underlying CDS spreads went up. Similar trends were perceived during the
short-sale ban episode of 2008, when the short sellers migrated to option and CDS
markets. Further the recent financial crisis also highlighted the predatory role of
both CDS players and short sellers and possible interactions among credit and
option markets.13
Previous literature has mainly examined how option IV and IV risk pre-
mia impact CDS pricing. These studies include Cremers, Driessen, Maenhout
13For example, according to a recent WSJ article (Nov 24, 2008) “Anatomy of the Morgan
Stanley Panic,”, the CDS traders played a critical role in precipitating bearish sentiment on
Morgan Stanley, in turn prompting traders to bet against the firm’s stock by selling it short.
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(2008a), Cremers, Driessen, Maenhout and Weinbaum (2008b), Ericsson, Jacobs
and Oviedo (2009), Cao and Wei (2010a), and Cao, Yu, and Zhong (2010b), Tang
and Hong (2010). However, few empirical studies exist on the reverse relationship.
Previous work on the impact of default risk on option pricing has been mainly the-
oretical, and has examined the pricing of vulnerable options (Johnson and Stulz,
1987), options on defaultable stocks (Bayraktar 2008; Bayraktar and Yang 2010),
and theoretical linkages between deep OTM American puts and credit insurance
contracts on a company’s debt (Carr and Wu, 2011). Carr and Wu (2009) propose
and test an internally-consistent joint valuation model for stock options and CDS
traded on the same underlying firm, using data for eight firms for the 2002-06
period.
Current research also shows that systematic risk is significantly priced in eq-
uity options (e.g. Dennis and Mayhew, 2002; Duan and Wei, 2009). Since both
options and CDS instruments help hedge downside firm risks, and hence share
put-insurance features, there could exist bi-directional information flows between
the two instruments, depending on the magnitude of aggregate shocks and relative
liquidity of both markets.
In this paper, we undertake a comprehensive study by addressing several key
issues: (1) What drives the pricing of equity options? (2) Are such option risk
premia conditional on any default risk characteristics? How do credit markets
influence individual option pricing? Does the slope of default term structure,
proxying horizon related default risk, impact option pricing? Does firm specific
default risk still matter for option pricing, even after controlling for option liquidity
and aggregate default risk? (3) Does the magnitude of default-risk impact differ
cross-sectionally (i.e. across option maturity and moneyness groups; financial vs.
non-financial firms; high- vs. low- rated firms etc.), and over time ( i.e. high- and
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low- credit and liquidity stress periods)? Default is proxied by underlying CDS
spreads. We employ an exhaustive panel dataset of (a) individual equity options
(Option Metrics) and (b) CDS (Markit) for the period 2002-2010.
From the empirical approach, Dennis & Mayhew (2002) linked Stock Market
to Options Market by showing significant connection between market beta and
negative skewness of risk-neutral distribution (RND). Vassalou & Xing (2004)
connected the FF factors (size and B/M) to the default risk in equity markets.
(Their research was focused in the equity market, with no discussion of the options
markets). Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) introduced better factors in the
hazard model for default risk. Duan & Wei (2010) found systematic risk in the
options equity market prices. The question remained untested is whether by using
a better measure of default risk (i.e. derived from CDS market as opposed to
DD14), we can better measure and explain the default risk in Options Market.
In particular asking two key questions: (a) What is the impact of default risk
on option implied volatility? (b) What is the impact of default risk on Option
skewness? To do so, we set up the following hypotheses:
First, we focus on the impact of default risk on put option prices. This can be
measured on two dimensions of cross-sectional and time series. When measured
cross-sectionally, we expect the default risk to have a higher impact for distressed
firms compared to similar firms.
H1: Firms with higher credit risk have larger implied volatility compared to
other firms controlling for other firm-specific variables.
14Merton’s Distance to Default measure
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When compared on the time-series level, we expect that for a given firm the
movement of the default risk through time can have an impact on its option price.
Hence:
H2: When default risk goes up for a given firm, it impacts underlying implied
volatility, controlling for other risks such as aggregate and market variables.
We can also empirically test whether such a distressed stock with high default
risk could also exhibit excess skew in the risk neutral distribution compared to
the stock issued by a similar firm, but with lower default risk. Hence, we have the
following additional hypothesis:
H3: When default risk goes up for a given firm, it impacts underlying option
skewness, controlling for other risks such as aggregate and market variables.
In other words, the hypotheses suggest that following the Black-Scholes (1973)
option pricing theory, option prices do not depend on how much systematic risk
(and default risk per Collin-Dufrense’s) is contained in the underlying asset as
long as its total risk is fixed. This means when the information content of the
option prices are converted into implied volatilities, they should not be related to
the default risk of the underlying stock. Therefore, we can build the following two
null hypotheses.
Null Hypothesis 1: The implied volatility level of the options is unrelated
to the default risk of the underlying asset as measured by CDS spread.
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Null Hypothesis 2: The skewness of the options is unrelated to the default
risk of the underlying asset.
As explained earlier, many empirical studies (e.g., Bates, 2000; Buraschi and
Jackwerth, 2001; Bakshi and Kapadia, 2003; and Jones, 2006) indicate the ex-
istence of other risk factors (such as jumps and volatility risk) in option prices.
These default risk factors become part of the pricing kernel, and how much they
account for the total risk will obviously impacts the characteristics of the risk-
neutral distribution. Therefore, our alternative hypotheses can be:
(i) both the level and the slope of the implied volatility curve will depend on
the default risk of the underlying asset and, (ii) the amount of default risk will
differentiate the price structures of individual equity options.
In addition to the hypotheses above, CDS spread level and changes both can
explain changes in Option implied volatility. As such we can find the default
risk as one of the determinants of the implied volatility of the firm. So we can
augment the following robustness hypotheses to the first two hypotheses as follows:
H2: Default risk (measured by corporate bond’s CDS spread level and slope)
can significantly explain cross-sectional variances in the implied volatility of the
options written on the underlying stocks.
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3.4 Measure of Default Risk and Definitions
3.4.1 Credit Default Swap
CDS (Credit Default Swap) is a swap contract and agreement in which the credit
protection buyer pays a fee, usually called a premium, to a credit protection
provider in exchange for a payment in the event that a credit default event of
a reference asset(s) occurs. The protection buyer is the seller of default risk. The
protection seller (or provider) is a buyer of credit risk. The protection seller makes
no payment unless a credit default event occurs.15
Purchasing a CDS is buying a contingent claim with payoffs that are based
on the credit risk of a given entity. In essence, buying a CDS contract is similar
to buying insurance against default where the premium payments are determined
from the CDS spreads. See for example Das and Hanouna (2006) for detailed
description of the CDS contracts.
CDS securities have enabled trading the credit risk of debt. For example fund
managers wishing to hedge current credit risk exposures can invest in such securi-
ties. Why is CDS a good measure of default risk? In a fairly priced CDS contract,
the expected present value of premium payments by the buyer to the seller will
equal the expected present value of default loss payments from the seller to the
buyer (under the risk-neutral probability measure). Also, since CDS contracts
15Tavakoli (2008); ”Structured Finance and Collateralized Debt Obligations: New Develop-
ments in Cash and Synthetic Securitization”, 2nd Edition.
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are derivatives, pricing will be undertaken using the risk-neutral probability mea-
sure, which is then consistent with obtaining the no-arbitrage price of the security.
Further to the theoretical support of CDS as a viable measure of default risk,
there exists empirical and practical support for this choice of measure: CDS is
a more dynamic and forward-looking measure of default risk. Credit ratings (as
traditionally used by investors, regulators, and managers) are mostly criticized for
their slow response in predicting corporate defaults (e.g. cases of Enron, World-
com), accuracy of their ratings and the conflicts of interest inherent in the agencies’
business model (White (2010)). Chava, Ganduri, and Ornthanalai (WP, 2013) pro-
vide empirical evidence supporting the view that investors consider CDS markets
as a viable alternative credit risk benchmark to credit ratings.
3.4.2 Equity Option Implied Volatility and Skewness
We are interested in measuring the impact of default risk on the prices of individ-
ual equity options. From the derivatives literature, we know that the option prices
are characterized by the level and slope of implied volatility curves, and in order
to numerically measure the impact of default risk on equity options, we should
identify the change impact on the implied volatility. Moreover, the skewness will
show significant difference for firms with higher default risk.
Empirical work in the derivatives literature have documented option prices
fundamentals such as: (i) the Black-Scholes implied volatility is higher than the
historical or realized volatility and (ii) the risk-neutral negative skewness is more
pronounced than that in the physical distribution, and the index options have a
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more pronounced volatility smile/smirk than individual equity options (e.g., Jack-
werth, 2000; Dennis and Mayhew, 2002; and Bakshi, Kapadia, and Madan, 2003).
These findings demonstrate structural differences between the risk-neutral and
physical return distributions. Our research question is partly motivated by this
documented structural difference. Using cross-section of options data, we show
that a higher amount of default risk leads to a higher level of implied volatility
and a steeper slope of the implied volatility curve. Thus, default risk proportion
can help differentiate the price structure across individual equity options.
In order to correctly characterize the implied volatility curve, we follow BKM
(2003) and Duan & Wei (2009). Duan & Wei argue that assuming a constant
slope on the logarithmic scale for the curve (while simplifying the testing proce-
dures) tends to cloud the complex features of the curve. As such, in order to
uncover the expected different results for different moneyness regions, we cate-
gorize the implied volatility into four distinct moneyness buckets, i.e., K/S =
[0.8, 0.95), [0.95, 1.0), [1.0, 1.05) and [1.05, 1.2], and conduct tests within each bucket.
Throughout the empirical results, the findings are performed for each of these
groups.
We will examine the relationship between CDS spread, as a measure of default
risk, and equity option prices. In the next section I explain the data used and how
the overlap of these markets gets selected.
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3.5 Data and Summary Statistics
3.5.1 Sample Collection and Description
To perform this analysis, we employ data from several databases: Option metrics,
Markit data (CDS), COMPUSTAT, CRSP, and Datastream.
The credit default swap data is available from January 2002. As such, Option
Metrics data is employed from 2002 to 2010, in order to cover the matching time
period with the CDS data. The CDS Markit database is used as the source for CDS
data from January 2002 to December 2009. The COMPUSTAT annual files are
used to retrieve the firms variables such as “Debt in One Year” and “Long-Term
Debt” series, as well as the book value of equity information for all companies. In
addition, the daily market values for firms from the CRSP daily files are retrieved.
All fundamentals are calculated for firm-specific information.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
3.5.2 Variable Construction
Higher default risk is associated with closer distance to default of the underly-
ing firm, and hence higher risk or implied volatility for that stock. Since such
distressed stocks could also exhibit excess skew in the risk neutral distribution
compared to stock issued by a similar firm, but with lower default risk, we expect
to find that controlling for market risk, the equity option skew is impacted by the
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default risk of the the underlying reference firm.
3.5.2.1 Firm-specific Accounting-based Variables
We construct three firm-specific variables base on collected data from Compustat
and CRSP. For every firm, we define: (1) Financial Leverage: defined as total
liabilities divided by the sum of total liabilities and market capitalization. (2)
Firm’s B/M: as as a proxy for Tobin’s Q. (3) Firm’s Size: measured by Total
assets value.
3.5.2.2 Options Variables
We collect options data from OptionMetrics, which provides daily closing prices,
open interest, and trading volume on exchange-listed equity options in the United
States. From Options Metrics dataset, we use the strike price, option price (average
of bid and ask), as well as implied volatility. The implied volatility is calculated.
We calculate the maturity and moneyness for every option written on the firms in
the sample.
The implied volatility computed for each option, is calculated by taking the
option price as the settlement price, or the last traded option, or to the midpoint
of the closing bid and offer prices (in this order of availability). The underlying
price then is synchronized at best with the option price. The implied volatil-
ity is computed using industry-standard equity pricing models: Black-Scholes for
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European-style options, and Cox-Ross-Rubinstein binomial tree for American-style
options. 16
3.5.2.3 Default Risk Variables
Markit database reports the spread on the 1-year, 5-year and 10-year contracts.
For the purpose of our research and in order to be dealing with the highest liquidity,
we limit the data to 5-year spreads only. As well as the spread level, we need a
proxy for controlling for the liquidity risk of the CDS, since these contracts are
traded OTC and hence fairly illiquid. The variable “number of contributors” is
also employed to proxy for liquidity of CDS trades. To remove any inconsistency
we build a relative measure of CDS liquidity for our study in order to use this
proxy effectively.17
3.5.2.4 Other Control Variables and Time Periods
In order to control for the systematic risk in the market, we use daily VIX data
and account for the variation in market volatility. Also, return on S&P 500 index
is used as the market return control variable or Rf when needed in the models. In
addition, we use the aggregate measures such as 3-month T-bill, yield curve slope,
aggregate default spread, and TED spread in our models.
16For each strike/exercise date and for put/call options, other variables such as the interest rate
is calculated from a collection of continuously-compounded zero-coupon interest rates at various
maturities. The zero curves used for the European options are derived from BBA LIBOR rates.
For underlying paying dividents, they are estimated using a “constant divident yield” assumption
based on the most recently announced divident payment. You can see “An introduction to
OptionMetrics implied volatility data” from RiskMetrics for further details on volatility surface
17We demean the number of contributors for each firm by deducting the total average of all
firm’s number of contributors. Please see the Variables Glossary for more details.
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Special attention is given to two sub-periods of financial distress and non-
financial distress. It is argued that the recent financial distress period started in
August 2007, and ended in March 2009. One of the objectives of this study is
to empirically investigate the distinction of default risk impact on equity options
market during financial crisis and severe distress times, since the linkage between
the high default risk and systemic risk is also of great importance.
Systemic risk was greatly observed during the recent financial crisis period.
It is also important to note that the correlations between stocks and aggregate
market are much larger for downside moves, especially for extreme unexpected
downside moves, than for upside moves. This is in-line with findings of Ang and
Chen (2002) on “Asymmetric correlation”. This fact was also empirically evident
during the recent financial crisis. In this paper, we split the sample data with a
perceived regime switch and try to identify the difference in the impact and mag-
nitude of default risk in options market among these sub-samples.
Furthermore, we are also interested in the impact of industry on our findings.
We hence test the difference between financial and non-financial firms. It is im-
portant to understand how different the impact of default risk on options would
be when the underlying firm is a financial firm vs. a non-financial firm. For this
purpose, we run the tests on both sub-samples.
3.5.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics for our final sample. There are total of 550
unique firms after removing firms that are not publicly traded, as well as applying
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minimum liquidity filters for CDS and removing options. We also remove any op-
tions for which put-call parity doesn’t hold. On the 550 firms total of 67015 unique
put options have been written which are getting fully tested in our model(s). Panel
B shows the count and range of identifying variables. It is important to note that
the cross-sectional variable for the regression tests would additionally include Op-
tion IDs so that we distinguish between various option contracts written on one
firm (same issuer). We use this identification in order to control for the fixed
effects of the same option contract across observations.
Panel C of Table 1 shows the number of unique options and CDS contracts for
each firm in the final sample. The table shows the count as well as the summary
statistics for each year in the time period studied. The average implied volatility
ranges around 30%. The implied volatility (as expected) increases to double its
average value during the financial crisis period in 2008 and 2009. Similar pattern
is observed for average CDS, with the minimum average value of 0.69 in 2006 and
rising to its maximum average of 1.93 in 2009.
In order to perform additional studies we also split the sample into financial
firms and non-financial firms. In our final sample there are total of 81 financial
and 469 non-financial firms. We repeat running each specification on each of these
subgroups. Fixed effects for time and firms are also accounted for, as well as clus-
tering issues.
Panel D of Table 1 reports the distribution of the options and CDS characteris-
tics in various maturity and moneyness categories. We define three moneyness and
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three maturity groups and divide our sample into nine different bins.18 Moneyness
is defined as the ratio of spot price divided by strike price for calls, and the ratio
of strike price divided by spot price for puts. Across put options covered by Op-
tionMetrics, the distribution across moneyness and maturity appears to be fairly
uniform. We note that at-the-money options (those with moneyness between 0.95
and 1.05) are heavily traded, and short maturity has relatively larger number of
traded options.
3.6 Methodology
We explained the hypotheses to be tested and the details around the extensive
merged dataset. Our dataset is a pooled time-series and cross-section unbalanced
panel. A pooled unbalanced dataset requires extra caution when running regres-
sions because some findings can be spurious and simply capturing the unbalanced
variation of the observations. As such, we have paid extra attention to analyze
such a panel by controlling for the time and fixed effects. We control for fixed ef-
fects on two dimensions: firm level, and option level. For firm level, we use cluster
effect and for option level we use fixed effects.
Thompson (2006) and Petersen (2009), in their separate works explain this
issue and provide detailed analysis and recommendation on the performance of
various approaches. Following their suggestions we conduct several adjustments
in our regressions including adjustment for firms’ clustering, as well as controlling
18We define Short, Medium, and Long maturity buckets as “fewer than 70 days”, “between 71
and 120 days, and “greater than 121 days” respectively.
We also define OTM put options as the options with moneyness less than 0.95, ATM with
moneyness between 0.95 and 1.05, and ITM with moneyness greater than 1.05.
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for the time and fixed effect.
As a result, the baseline specification we use in our regression analysis is pro-
vided below, which tests the first and second hypotheses:
OptionImpliedV oli,t = α + β0 ×OptionImpliedV oli,t−1 + β1 × CDSi,t
+β2 × LiquidityProxyi,t + β3 ×MktV arsi,t (3.1)
+β4 × FirmV arsi,t + i,t
where OptionImpliedV oli,t is the implied volatility of the options written on the
underlying firm i at time t, CDSi,t is the level of the CDS at each point in time.
MktV ar includes market variables such as VIX, return on S&P500, Aggregate
default risk, TED spread, yield curve slope, and finally FirmV ars includes firm-
specific fundamental variables such as size, financial leverage, and B/M ratio.
In this paper, we focus on the findings for put options only. However, it would
be interesting for future studies to see whether the relationship above is different
for put and call options.
Finding positive significant coefficients for the CDS variables will support our
hypothesis that default risk impacts equity options market.19
19We are trying to report the presence of default risk and not necessarily the magnitude of the
default risk premia. Measuring the specific impact on pricing can only be established through
two pass-test Fama-French type procedures. For example, economic significance using option
strategies can be implemented by identifying firms during a credit event ( e.g. rating downgrades)
and predicting call /put prices and hence taking positions in the straddles accordingly.
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To answer the second research question of the paper which discusses the impact
of default risk on IV skew, we test the following model:
Skewi,t = α + β0 × Skewi,t−1 + β1 × CDSi,t
+β2 × LiquidityProxyi,t + β3 ×MktV arsi,t (3.2)
+β4 × FirmV arsi,t + i,t
where Skew is a measure of option implied volatility skew. At each point in
time, volatility skew is defined as the difference between average OTM implied
volatility and average ATM implied volatility for each issuer.
On Level Regressions vs. Change Regressions: As demonstrated in Eq.
3.1 and 3.2, we only perform level regressions and not changes. This is mostly
because we are interested in cross-sectional option pricing and follow existing pa-
pers with similar data framework (e.g. Cao et al 2010). In addition, the irregular
intervals or missing data for CDS observations further limits design of any change
regressions. From a statistical perspective, first differencing is appropriate if the
dependent variable and regressors are integrated, but this is difficult to determine
for our irregularly spaced data. Note also that if one accepts the unit root hypoth-
esis, differencing of the data may improve the efficiency of the resulting estimates,
but the levels regressions yield consistent point estimates. This ensures that our
findings are conservative with the levels regressions.
We also repeat the regression above for testing financial and non-financial firms.
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To do so, we repeat the same specification with interactive terms. The correspond-
ing regression hence will be:
OptionImpliedV oli,t = α + β0 ×OptionImpliedV oli,t−1 × Fin+ β1 × CDSi,t × Fin
+β2 × LiquidityProxy × Fin+ β3 ×MktV arsi,t (3.3)
+β4 × FirmV arsi,t + i,t
where we define variable Fin to have a binary value of 1 if the underlying firm
belongs to the financial industry and 0 if not. Significant results on the interactive
terms will indicate significantly different impact of default risk in option markets
for financial vs. non-financial firms. The results show that the impact of default
risk is more prominent for financial forms, with higher levels of significance. This
is consistent with the “Cascade Effect” notion in the Financial industry, where
the risk of default can be contagious among financial firms and during distress
periods.
3.7 Empirical Results
3.7.1 Correlation Analysis and Mitigating Multi-colinearity
We are interested in finding whether default risk impacts equity options or not.20
To do so we test both contemporaneous as well as lagged variables of the param-
eters we are interested in. It is also important to consider the risk of colinearity
20We focus on the existence of the impact. In order to specifically measure the pricing impact,
one should develop a more general option pricing model which nests the model devoid of such
a factor and test for the significance of the extra factor. Alternatively, we can see if using the
additional information included in CDS spreads, over and above the information incorporated in
IV, would enable market participants to earn excess returns. At this point, we are not building
a model of excess return to find the magnitude of impact.
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when the pairwise correlation of the variables are high. 21
As such, and with the colinearity effect in consideration, Table 2 displays the
pairwise correlation amongst all potential variables in the regression specification.
The first column shows the correlation values between the primary dependent
variable (Option-implied volatility) and the rest of the variables. The significant
values (both economically and statistically) are bolded. In this column the high
correlation values are no issue since we are interested in the explanatory power of
each of the independent variables for implied volatility.
It is, however, important to carefully note and care for the rest of the columns
as they show the pairwise correlation between the independent variables. Two sig-
nificant correlation coefficients of CDS spread with lagged CDS spread and lagged
implied volatility lead us to conclude that if included in a specification together
these values need further attention. As such, in the next sections, we run multiple
types of regression analyses, with lagged variables, and without lagged variables.
The lagged CDS will later be employed as the instrumental variable for CDS. The
strong correlation shows that it meets preliminary requirements.
It is also important to observe the significant correlation between S&P 500
Index return and some of the macroeconomic variables such as VIX.
An additional observation as a result of the high correlation is to perform
tests of endogeneity for two key variables of the research and the fact that the
causality relationship between CDS spread and the implied volatility can go in
both directions. This will be tested and discussed further in the robustness sections
21This is deemed to be more important when dealing with volatility and distress risk at daily
frequency since these variables can be persistent.
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due to the fact that IV and CDS can be endogenous variables, determined by a set
of common explanatory variables. The need for this test is justified by the strong
correlations of each of these variables with most of the firm level and market level
variables.
3.7.2 Regression Results
The correlation results discussed in the previous section have already shown the
existence of comovement of IV and CDS level for the underlying firms. In this sec-
tion, we control for standard expected variables and explain each of the following
tables presented for the regressions. It is important to note that we have a pooled
panel data set with essentially two dimensions of cross-sectional variables: firms,
and various options written on the same firm.
In the following subsections we continue the findings by testing for different hy-
potheses, sub-groups, stratifications, robustness (endogeneity), as well as options
liquidity and financial leverage impact. We also explain the effect of firm-level
variables included.
In order to be making comparative and consistent analysis we need to catego-
rize the options into buckets of similar moneyness and maturity. As such we create
three groups for maturity: “long”, “medium”, and “short”; and three groups for
moneyness: deep in the money, deep out of the money, and, near or at the money.
The result is nine groups on which we perform the regressions to record the special
differences or similarities. Tables 3, 4, and 5 show results for “short maturity”.
In Table 3 we present four different regression models for “short maturity, ITM”
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put options. We start with excluding the default risk variables in model (1) and
increment by adding CDS spread and CDS liquidity proxy in model (2). Then we
augment by including lagged CDS in model (3). Finally, model (4) includes lagged
IV, CDS, and CDS liquidity proxy. We shall refer to model (4) as the baseline
model which will be tested across various buckets of maturity and moneyness as
shown in hypothesis specification (3.5).
Table 3 shows that CDS is consistently a significant variable in explaining
implied volatility. We also find the CDS liquidity proxy (measured through stan-
dardization of the number of contributors), is consistently significant with negative
sign. This shows that more liquid CDS contracts signal smaller implied volatility
while IV increases with as illiquidity risk increases. Intuitively, investors need to
be compensated for the liquidity risk and hence a higher IV is expected when the
option is less liquid, consistent with the findings presented.
Table 4 repeats the previous setup of four key regressions on “short maturity”
and deep OTM put options. The interesting finding is that the explanatory power
of CDS disappears when we move to deep OTM put options. Not CDS nor CDS
liquidity can explain the IV variation based on Table 4 findings, while the aggre-
gate variables and firm level variables gain more power in the IV regression for
short deep OTM options.
Tables 5 to 7 perform the baseline regression (explained in equation 3.5) for
short, medium, and long maturity groups. In each regression table we split data
into the three moneyness groups and show the findings.
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Table 5 shows that for short maturity, CDS is only significant for ITM options
and loses significance for ATM and OTM groups. This finding is reversed for
medium and long maturity groups where CDS is more significant for ATM and
OTM groups. By looking at all the tables and focusing on the various bins tested,
we find that for deep in the money and deep out of the money options the default
risk as measured by CDS level is more economically significant.22 This is in-line
with our hypothesis that higher default risk is more significant for deep out of the
money (subject to higher default risk) and deep in the money (more liquid) equity
put options.
3.7.2.1 Default Risk and IV-Skew
We define option implied skewness besides the implied volatility measure. For
each point in time we also compute an implied volatility skewness measure, which
is the difference between the implied volatility of all out-of-the-money put option,
and the implied volatility of an at-the-money put option with a strike-to-spot ratio
closest to 1, for all contracts issued by the same firm. The implied volatility skew
is closely related to the skewness of the risk-neutral equity return distribution and
we expect it to be positively related to the CDS spread. In simple words, for our
sample of put options:
Skewi,t = AV ERAGEOTM(IVi,t)− AV ERAGEATM(IVi,t) (3.4)
Tables 8 to 10 show the results of applying the baseline regression to the IV-
Skew. The results vary based on the option bins focused on which is expected given
22Calculation of the economic significance is provided in Table 11.
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the definition of IV-Skew explained above. Among the 9 bins, skewness is best
explained for by CDS in medium and long maturity groups and most prominent for
OTM options. The signs and significance vary as well, resulting in no consistent
finding across all 9 bins. As a result, the CDS level cannot conclusively explain
the variation of skewness across all groups of moneyness and maturity; For all
put options the findings vary bin by bin, with most statistically and economically
significant values belonging to higher maturity and smaller moneyness.
3.7.2.2 Effect of Firm-level Variables
Reviewing the findings so far (for example, Table 3) we find that the firm size is
proved to be a significant variable with negative coefficients which implies the size
effect on the option implied volatility of the firm. As expected smaller firms have
higher risk of default and higher implied volatility which is consistent with the
theoretical understanding. Moreover, small firms also exhibit more volatility than
large firms so the significance of this coefficient may also reflect this stylized fact.
Leverage is also a negative significant factor in the model for short-maturity
options. However, the significance drops as the maturity increases and the results
are not conclusive for medium and long maturity groups. Once the model includes
lagged variable the significance of leverage is again dropped. To further uncover
the impact of leverage we will run additional tests in Table 14.
Market to Book ratio is consistently significant with similar level and power as
size impact which is consistent and expected. Firm’s stock return is positive and
significant in explaining IV changes in some of the bins and insignificant in the
rest. This is also consistent with the options pricing theory as higher values of IV
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expect higher return on the underlying stocks (which can be due to compensation
for the cost of higher default risk.)
3.7.2.3 Macroeconomic and Market Variables
We control for all standard macroeconomic variables and additionally include a
complete model for default risk.
In the regression tables we control for VIX, return on S&P500, Yield curve
slope, Treasury rate, Aggregate default Spread, and TED spread 23. Once all
included, market return becomes insignificant in explaining the IV. However, the
CDS remains a prominent significant factor even after controlling for all macroe-
conomic and market variables as shown in Tables 3 and 4.
We later use the macroeconomic and market variables to test for endogeneity.
Together with firm variables, they are the common set of explanatory variables
that explain both CDS and implied volatility and hence potential for endogeneity
existence.
3.7.3 Default Risk and Economic Significance
So far we showed that default risk is priced in equity options and the results are
statistically significant. The very important resulting question is how much of an
economic significance would default risk cause in the pricing of options as measured
through option-implied volatility?
23The TED spread is the difference between the interest rates on interbank loans and on short-
term U.S. government debt (T-bills). It is calculated as the difference between the three-month
LIBOR and the three-month T-bill interest rate and is an indicator of perceived credit risk in
the general economy
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To test this, we run a sigma shock test on CDS spreads and show how much of
difference would this cause in the level of IV and IV-skew. Table 11 presents the
economic significance results for the applicable models and variables. We focus
only on the bins with the significant default risk (i.e. the results shown in Tables 3,
4, and 8 as discussed in previous section). The findings show that on average the
default risk contributes to 3% change in option-implied volatility, for one sigma
shock in CDS spread. Next, we test and show that the findings are robust to
endogeneity.
3.7.4 Tests of Endogeneity
Standard linear regression models assume that errors in the dependent variable are
uncorrelated with the independent variable(s). When this is not the case (for ex-
ample, in our case the relationships between variables can be bidirectional), linear
regression using ordinary least squares (OLS) no longer provides optimal model
estimates.
Two-stage least-squares regression uses instrumental variables that are un-
correlated with the error terms to compute estimated values of the problematic
predictor(s) (the first stage), and then uses those computed values to estimate a
linear regression model of the dependent variable (the second stage). Since the
computed values are based on variables that are uncorrelated with the errors, the
results of the two-stage model are optimal.
In our study, we can identify different possible explanations for default risk:
Ideally, we should employ instrumental variables (for example, Faulkender and
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Petersen (2006)) or natural experiments (for example, Leary (2009), Sufi (2009b),
Lemmon and Roberts (2010)) to distinguish among the possible explanations
and/or to establish causality between default risk and implied volatility. How-
ever, as we discuss below, it is difficult to identify one instrumental variable that
can fully deal with endogeneity in our setting.
The instrumental variable procedure requires us to specify an instrument for
implied volatility. Past CDS spread (i, t − 1) is a natural candidate for an in-
strument, since it is correlated with true time t CDS spread (i, t) but is possibly
unrelated to the measurement error associated with CDS spread sampled one
month later. We run the two stage regressions and archive the results in Tables
12a-12c.
The strong first regression results guarantee the choice of right instrument
while the instrumental variables regressions (including control variables) shows
the 2SLS regression results. 24
In our baseline regression endogeneity arises because CDS potentially depends
on the same firm level and market level variables as IV. Hence, to model endo-
geneity, we use the original IV regression and define CDS in terms of firm level
and market level variables. In short,
CDS = f1(LaggedCDS, F irmV ars,MarketV ars)
IV = f2(CDS,CDSLiqProxy, LaggedIV, F irmV ars,MarketV ars) (3.5)
24We also perform a postestimation endogeneity test. We perform both Durbin and Wu-
Hausman tests and the results are significant.
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By introducing the common variables in the two stages above, we are now
controlling for endogeneity. Table 12 shows the result of endogeneity tests for all
moneyness, and three subgroups of ITM, ATM, and OTM.
Stage 1 (panel A) results show that lagged CDS is in fact a suitable variable
for the instrumented variable CDS. Stage 2 results (shown in panel B) and the
post-estimation tests (shown in panel C) provide two specific implications. The
first immediate inference is based on the two post-estimation endogeneity tests of
Durbin and Wu-Hausman. Based on the p-values of these tests the null hypothesis
of exogenous variables is rejected indicating that IV and CDS are endogenous
variables that are determined by a common set of explanatory variables. Hence,
the findings of second stage regression (which is after controlling for endogeneity)
is important.
The second important and incremental inference is driven from panel B re-
sults. We can see that CDS remains a significant value even after controlling for
endogeneity. The economic significance, however, is relatively decreased. So, by
showing the endogeneity tests and two stage least square regression results, we find
that the default risk is impacting equity options and the finding is robust even
after controlling for endogeneity of option implied volatility and CDS. Moreover,
the endogeneity is tested across different moneyness bins. CDS spread remains a
significant factor across bins after controlling for endogeneity.
To further explain why the results are important after controlling for endo-
geneity, note that CDS “impacts” option prices and may not necessarily “ drives“
them. So, what is added by default risk impact? The equity option prices are
determined by risk premia attributed to volatility, jumps, default events, etc. The
CDS spreads and term structure carry forward-looking default information that
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can enter option pricing through risk premia. It is however true that same infor-
mation is embedded in options too. If completely efficient, CDS should have no
information content. However, since CDS variables have significance after endo-
geneity 25, we believe that CDS measures are impacting risk premia that in turn
determine option pricing.
3.7.5 Impact of Industry: Default risk for financial and
non-financial firms
As part of the study, we are interested in observing the default risk in equity
options of financial vs. non-financial firms. To do so, we split the data sample
into financial and non-financial firms. We then repeat the main regressions in order
to measure the difference in the economic and statistical significance of the default
risk impact on options market. Table 13 shows the findings for this stratification.
Table 13A shows the results with dependent variable IV, and 13B records the
results for dependent variable Skewness. By focusing on the CDS spread coeffi-
cient, we observe a significant increase in the CDS spread coefficient for financial
firms compared to non-financials (the coefficient increases from 0.007 to 0.05).
This shows that the impact of default risk on option prices are more prominent
for financial firms than non-financial firms. The results for skewness, is reversed
with showing significance only for non-financial firms. 26
There are a few potential reasons attributed to why the impact of default risk
on implied volatility is different for financial than for non-financial firms. For
example, one reason can be the higher level of contagion effect across financial
25and later will show CDS is significant in explaining variance risk premium too
26Focusing on the characteristics of financial firms, the skewness results can partially be due to
the fact that these firms are more exposed to higher market risk, limiting the skewness variation.
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firms during distress periods. In addition, there can be a cascade effect resulting
from a default event of one financial firm to the rest of the financial industry. Both
result in stronger impact of default risk on equity options for the financial firms.
3.7.6 Impact of Financial Crisis
After the 2008 financial crisis, there is particular interest in finding the default
risk impact and its significant difference for equity options during crisis and non-
crisis periods. To do so, we split the data sample into two sub-samples of crisis
and non-crisis periods. We then repeat the main regressions in order to observe
the difference in the economic and statistical significance of the impact of default
risk. Table 15 shows the findings for this sample stratification. Table 15A shows
the results for implied volatility and Table 15B records the results for skewness.
By focusing on the CDS spread coefficient, we observe that default risk loses its
significance to explain IV during crisis period, however, it is very significant in
explaining skewness of option implied volatility during the same period of crisis.
The CDS liquidity remains significant in both periods for explaining both IV and
skewness. This shows that during the crisis period the higher the default risk of an
option the larger the skewness of the option implied volatility and hence a larger
mispricing spectrum. This also is consistent with the actual observations during
the 2008 financial crisis period.
3.7.7 Option Market Liquidity and Default Risk
One question remaining can be whether the risk observed is due to options liquid-
ity and not purely default risk. To investigate this question further, in addition
to the comprehensive regression tests performed, we run tests of options liquidity
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impact. Following the findings of Cao & Wei (JFM 2010) we investigate all the
options liquidity measures introduced and tested and choose the best measure de-
sign for our model.
We define and use the best liquidity measure for options that is available based
on our dataset. Working with daily and monthly options data, we follow Cao and
Wei’s laundry list of Options Liquidity definitions. We choose “Proportional bid-
ask spread” which is available on a daily basis for each option trade, as the measure
of Options Liquidity. It is defined as:
PBA =
Σnk=0V OL× Ask−Bid(Ask+Bid)/2
Σnk=0V OL
where PBA is the proportional bid-ask spread, and V OL is the observed vol-
ume of the option on in that date. For put options sample, we expect the PBA
to be around 0.13 with standard deviation of 0.04. We calculate the PBA and
control for the illiquidity in the second round of tests.
The results of liquidity measures are provided in Table 16. We find the statistics
on the PBA Option liquidity measure to be consistent with Cao & Wei’s values.
We next add the options liquidity measure to the baseline regression model.
The results are shown in Table 16A for IV and 16B for skewness. The findings
affirm our hypothesis. Option liquidity is a significant factor but even after inclu-
sion of option liquidity measure, the CDS spread is still a significant factor for the
implied volatility and hence providing evidence that default risk is impacting the
equity options.
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3.7.8 Implied volatility risk premium
The findings so far show the impact of CDS on IV, using credit market informa-
tion to explain the pricing of equity options. But can credit default swaps, this
recently developed and rapidly growing segment of the derivatives market, also be
measuring the deviation of option-implied volatility from realized volatility? The
significance of CDS in option-implied volatility regressions motivates this since
any mispricing in the equity options market can also be captured through the
option-implied volatility risk premium.
To test this, we measure volatility risk premium as the difference between
historical volatility and option-implied volatility and run the baseline panel re-
gression. The findings are presented in Table 17 and show that CDS spread is a
significant factor in explaining the implied volatility risk premium. The results
are also consistent with findings of Cao, Yu, and Zhong (2010) where they find
that implied volatility can explain the time-series behavior of CDS spreads both
because it forecasts future volatility better, and because it captures a volatility risk
premium. Our panel regression results show that CDS has information content
that impacts the option-implied volatility risk premium as well.
3.7.9 Tests of Nonlinearity: Log Regressions
We showed that default risk is a significant factor in a linear regression model of
implied volatility. What if the relationship observed is due to limitations of a linear
modeling of this relationship? To test this, we run the non-linear regression by
creating log variables of volatility, default risk, and return variables. The results
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provided in Table 18 show that the findings remain significant and prominent on
a log regression model.
3.8 Conclusion
The recent financial crisis once again put credit risk (default risk) and the risk of
contagion distress periods under the spotlight. This study relates to recent litera-
ture that explains how default risk can get injected from the fixed income market
to the equity options market and why it is important to account for default risk
in the pricing of equity option and implied volatility.
What is the impact of default risk on option pricing? We study this question
in detail by empirically examining to what extent the firm-specific attributes and
systematic variables matter in pricing individual equity options. This paper stud-
ies the primary determinants of option IVs cross-sectionally and over time, and
measures the contribution of default risk on equity option pricing. Since Credit
default swaps (CDS) are similar to out-of-the-money put options in that both offer
a low cost and effective protection against downside risk, we use CDS spread as
credit risk proxy to investigate the effects of credit risk on put pricing.
By merging an exhaustive dataset of CDS data (Markit), Options data (Op-
tionMetrics), and equity data we test for the significance of default risk in option-
implied volatility of the underlying firm. We find that after controlling for market
variables and firm variables, the default risk is still a significant driver of option
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implied volatility. This significance is prominent in specific maturity and money-
ness put option categories, and robust to endogeneity issues.
Furthermore, default risk significance is strongly evident in ITM bins for shorter
maturities (more liquid) and OTM bins for longer maturity (subject to higher de-
fault risk impact) put options. The results are also tested and vary for segments
of industry (larger impact for financial firms), and distress periods. We find that
during crisis and distress periods, the significance of cross-sectional default risk is
vanished, and mainly captured by the market level default risk variables. This can
relate to the effect of systematic risk during distress periods of the whole economy.
Lastly, default risk is proved to be a significant factor in explaining the volatil-
ity risk premium which shows the deviation of implied volatility from realized
volatility (here proxied by historical volatility).
These findings significantly contribute to the recent literature on options pric-
ing and credit risk by empirically showing the flow of default risk from fixed income
markets to equity options market and the need for inclusion of default risk in equity
option pricing models.
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3.9 Essay II Appendices
3.9.1 Appendix A: Complete Variables Glossary
In this section, the detailed definitions for each of the variables used in the baseline
regression(s) are provided.
• CDS spread: 5-year maturity CDS spread, daily observations from Markit.
When data is missing for one day in between two observations, it gets interpo-
lated. Any consecutive missing for more than one day, is treated as missing value
and automatically is dropped from the panel regressions.
• Option-implied volatility (IV): Put option IV, daily observations, daily ob-
servations, directly from Option Metrics. 27
•CDS Liquidity Proxy: equals to (No.ofContributors–AvgNo.ofContributors)×
CDSspread, or “Demeaned number of contributors times CDS spread”. The num-
ber of contributors are retrieved directly from Markit.
• Firm Return (%): For each underlying firm daily price is retrieved from CRSP
database. FirmRet = P1−P0
P0
.
• Historical Volatility (%): Standard deviation of a fund’s daily returns over
a rolling 6-month period.
• Market to Book Value: Tobin’s Q calculated with data from Compustat
quarterly files.
27IVs in OptionMetrics are retrieved from the Volatility Surface data file. The calculated
interpolated implied volatility for each option on each day, uses a methodology based on a kernel
smoothing algorithm. The data is first organized by the log of days to expiration and by “call-
equivalent delta” (delta for a call, one plus delta for a put). A kernel smoother is then used to
generate a smoothed volatility value at each of the specified interpolation grid points. At each
grid point on the volatility surface, the smoothed volatility is calculated as a weighted sum of
option implied volatilities. (See OptionMetrics Manual for additional details.)
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• Debt ratio: = Total Debt/Total Asset; data from Compustat quarterly files;
defined as total liabilities divided by the sum of total liabilities and market capi-
talization.
• VIX: Daily market volatility, V OLATILITY S&P500(V IX), retrieved from
CRSP, and available on OptionMetrics.
• TED Spread: The difference between the interest rates on interbank loans and
on short-term U.S. government debt (T-bills). It is calculated as the difference
between the three-month LIBOR and the three-month T-bill interest rate. Data
files for each variable retrieved from Datastream.
• IV Skew: As formulated in the paper, IV skew is defined for each observation
as “Avg OTM implied volatility – Avg ATM implied volatility”:
IV Skewi,t = AV ERAGEOTM(IVi,t)− AV ERAGEATM(IVi,t)
DOES DEFAULT RISK IMPACT EQUITY OPTIONS? 120
3.9.2 Appendix B: Merging CDS Markit and Option Met-
rics
There are total of 1833 Ticker/Comp Name combination in the Markit Database.Out
of these 1833 , 34% are private or subsidiaries (See appendix A on this clean-up
activity). Removing these , would leave a remainder of 1203 public to work with.
The next step is to limit data to firms with Options. Matching the 1203 with
Options Metric data, we are down to 1063 which both have CDS written on the
underlying bond, and options written on their underlying company. The sample
that we work with would have 1063 unique firm IDs. (see chart below)
3.9.3 Cleaning up Option Metrics Data
I downloaded all Option Metrics data from 1996 to 2011 inclusive. The Option
Prices file (under Option Metrics Data files¿¿Options) gets downloaded with all
possible variables (32 variables in total) in monthly files format from 1996 until
2010. (The average volume for every month is 1-2GB)
There are 32 listed variables downloaded, per below:
FILTERS:
1) DROP UNNECESSARY VARS (ss−flag, index−flag, exchange−d, issue−
type) keep if cp−flag == ”C” | cp−flag == ”P” keep if ss−flag == 0 (121656
observations deleted) keep if indexf lag == 0 (536045 observations deleted) drop
if exchange − d == 32768 (0 observations deleted) keep if issue − type == ”0”
(1681856 observations deleted)
2)SORT: prior to saving the final file, I ”sort secid optionid date” to organize the
data; it makes it much easier in the data matching, & give the compress command
one more time before saving the datafile.
3)LITERATURE FILTERS: Many in our sample do not have actively traded op-
tions. The choice of non-zero open interest emphasizes the information content of
options that are currently in use by market participants. We also drop all zero
volume options. I also exclude all options that violate Put-Call parity. For the
first round of the analysis, I keep only put options.
3.9.4 Compustat Fundamentals Data Collection
We collect and compute the quarterly Company Variables (i.e. Size, Book/Mar-
ket, and Leverage) for all of the in the sample. I also winsorize data and store
statistics both before and after winsorization.
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For merging with Option Metrics and CDS, we keep the pre-winsorization file.
3.9.5 Report on CDS Markit Data Clean-up for TICKERS
& COMP NAMES
Markit Look-Up Dimensions: TICKER, Company Name, Date Period(s)
Issues:
1. Tickers may get recycled and as such multiple matches available when merged
with other databases
2. Company names are in short form or miss spaces/dots in Markit so cannot
automatically be matched. Need manual review.
Solution:
Review the complete Ticker/CompName list from Markit and verify their identi-
fication (i.e. match with the unique PERMNO from CRSP).
• Use Google/Yahoo Finance search engines.
• Confirm Private/Public Companies
• Find alternative names and tickers
Manual Correction Steps
1. Look up the ticker in CRSP full database
2. If the ticker and company name match fully, there should be one unique
PERMNO. Record any alternative names.
3. If there are alternatives, provide correct match for the time period provided in
Markit.
4. If there are no matches, use Google and Yahoo finance searches. – Is the com-
pany a Private company?
Results Statistics
There are total of 1833 unique Ticker/Comp Name combination in the CDS Markit
Database. The final correction and inclusion provided final match of 1203 compa-
nies in total.
From the remaining, the provided correction notes indicate that:
a. 15 firms are subsidiaries with parent company not found before, so parent
ticker is provided.
b. Total of 100 unmatched tickers are Private firms.
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c. Total of 340 unmatched tickers are Subsidiaries with their parents present in
the database.
d. Fewer than 10 firms are result of mergers or acquisitions that are still valid for
inclusion. Details provided.
This is the result of individual scrubbing of each firm/Ticker.
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Figure 1. Default risk in Options Market - Visualization 
 
• Default/distress risk impacts debt valuation  
–  Merton model (1974): pioneering structural model Distance to Default (DD) that 
measures distress risk on corporate bankruptcy:  
High default risk = closer Distance to Default 
• Default risk also impacts equity valuation  
– Vassalou-Xing (2004): existence of default risk premium in stocks valuation, shown 
in cross section of equity returns. 
High default risk = larger equity risk premium 
• If default risk impacts firm value, the prices of corresponding (exchange traded) 
equity options too must be subject to distress shocks/default risk 
– Question: Will default risk create a premium in pricing of equity options? 
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Figure 2. Default risk and implied volatility - Comovement 
 
 
The graphs below shows the comovement of IV for put options and 5-year CDS spread 
for the same underlying firm. Two firms are shown (Lehman Brothers: LEH, Merrill 
Lynch: MER) during the period Jan 2002 to Jan 2009, for most liquid option bins. 
 
2a) Lehman Brothers (LEH) 
 
2b) Merrill Lynch (MER) 
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Figure 3. Data Visualization of count of firms at each clean-up and merging stage. 
 
 
There are total of 1834 firms with CDS from the Mark-it database. After removing 
private firms and subsidiaries* there will be 1203 unique firms in the sample. We then 
match these firms with the Options data derived from Option Metrics database. As a 
result, there are 1063 unique firms remaining. We also remove all Non-USD based 
firms by retrieving and matching equity data from CRSP. The base sample before 
applying test-based filters has 1063 unique firms. 
 
 
     *Refer to Appendix A for details on scrubbing subsidiaries.
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Table 1. Data description and Summary Statistics 
Panel A displays the basic statistics for the full sample on the observed variables to be tested. Panel B shows the unique count. In the 
final filtered sample we have 550 unique firms and 67015 unique Options written on these firms. Data ranges from Jan2002 to Dec 
2009. 
Panel A. Observed variables: 
Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
25th 
Percentile Median 
75th 
Percentile 
CDS Spread 75361 1.11 2.14 0.01 74.81 0.25 0.49 1.10 
# of Contributors 75361 9 6 2 29 4 9 13 
CDS Return 29292 0.03 0.48 -10.63 14.73 -0.04 0.00 0.24 
                  
Strike price 108120 56.09 61.89 2.50 840.00 30.00 45.00 65.00 
Volume 108120 167 728 1 63151 10 26 93 
Maturity 108120 92 45 44 177 50 80 138 
Price 108120 57.59 62.55 2.09 707 29.17 46.12 66.37 
Moneyness 108120 0.98 0.10 0.80 1.20 0.90 0.97 1.05 
                  
Implied Volatility 107201 0.38 0.18 0.01 3.79 0.26 0.33 0.43 
VIX 108120 19.28 8.92 10.42 59.89 12.96 17.00 23.01 
                  
Market to Book Value 69297 1.99 1.06 0.39 9.19 1.21 1.64 2.46 
Leverage 69238 0.27 0.17 0.00 1.34 0.15 0.24 0.35 
Size 69238 9.79 1.48 3.26 14.67 8.79 9.60 10.53 
Panel B. Identifying variables: 
Time series Variables Number of unique values Range 
Years 8 2002-2009 
Months 96 Jan2002-Dec2009 
Cross-sectional Variables Number of unique values   
Firms (permno) 550   
Options (OptionID) 67015   
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Table 1. Data description and Summary Statistics (Cont.) 
Panel C displays the basic statistics for the full sample on the observed variables to be tested on 
an annual basis. In the final filtered sample we have 550 unique firms and 67015 unique Options 
written on these firms. Data ranges from Jan2002 to Dec 2009. 
Panel D shows the distribution of average characteristics across the 9 bins. 
 
Panel C. Annual Data: 
Year No of Obs. 
No. of firms with 
both Option and 
CDS 
CDS Spread 
Mean 
Implied 
Volatility Mean 
          
2002 17451 428 1.52 0.47 
2003 20493 427 1.11 0.37 
2004 25397 449 0.97 0.32 
2005 29155 459 0.95 0.30 
2006 35666 461 0.69 0.31 
2007 41387 459 0.85 0.33 
2008 36943 444 1.85 0.51 
2009 37691 453 1.93 0.62 
 
 
Paned D. Bin distributions 
The table below shows the distribution of each key variable across 9 bins with different maturity 
and moneyness values. 
 
Maturity/ 
Moneyness Short 
 <=70d 
Medium 
70< & 
<120 
Long 
>=120 
Avg IV 
IT
M
  
>
=
1
.0
5
 0.4027 0.3596 0.3318 
Avg IV skew 0.0423 0.0425 0.0416 
Avg CDS spread 1.2874 1.2762 1.2031 
Avg CDS contributors 9.0469 9.2802 9.6075 
Avg IV 
A
T
M
  
0
.9
5
<
 &
 
<
1
.0
5
 0.3388 0.3345 0.3218 
Avg IV skew 0.0392 0.0391 0.0390 
Avg CDS spread 0.9764 0.9933 0.9642 
Avg CDS contributors 8.9628 9.2768 9.7416 
Avg IV 
O
T
M
  
=
<
0
.9
5
 0.4394 0.3842 0.3504 
Avg IV skew 0.0500 0.0426 0.0371 
Avg CDS spread 1.2066 1.1013 1.0435 
Avg CDS contributors 9.0044 9.2431 9.6926 
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Table 2a. Complete Correlation Analysis 
Table below displays all the pairwise correlation coefficients between the variables to be included in the regression specifications. 
Correlations that are both economically and statistically significant are bolded in the table below. Special attention is noted to these 
variables when running multivariate regressions so that the issues of multi-colinearity is addressed. The dependent variable is Implied 
Volatility to be tested in the following regression tables. 
  
Implied 
Volatility 
CDS 
Spread 
Lagged 
CDS 
spread 
Lagged 
Implied 
volatility Leverage M/B Size 
Firm 
Return 
Historical 
Volatility 
CDS 
Liquidity 
proxy VIX 
S&P500 
Return 
Yield 
Curve 
Slope  
Treasury 
Rate  
Agg. 
Default 
Spread 
TED 
Spread 
Implied Volatility 1.00                               
 
CDS Spread 0.61 1.00                             
 
Lagged CDS spread 0.58 0.97 1.00                           
 
Lagged Implied volatility 0.93 0.60 0.61 1.00                         
 
Leverage 0.12 0.31 0.29 0.11 1.00                       
 
Market-to-Book ratio -0.16 -0.23 -0.24 -0.16 -0.25 1.00                     
 
Size -0.15 -0.14 -0.18 -0.23 0.02 -0.17 1.00                   
 
Firm Return -0.10 -0.05 -0.01 -0.09 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 1.00                 
 
Historical Volatility 0.33 0.15 0.16 0.33 0.00 -0.06 -0.14 -0.17 1.00               
 
CDS Liquidity proxy -0.15 -0.13 -0.14 -0.17 0.04 -0.26 0.28 0.01 -0.04 1.00             
 
VIX 0.54 0.19 0.14 0.43 0.03 -0.03 0.09 -0.19 0.09 -0.17 1.00           
S&P500 Return -0.34 -0.11 -0.04 -0.15 -0.02 0.02 -0.04 0.31 -0.05 0.07 -0.65 1.00         
Yield Curve Slope  0.20 0.09 0.09 0.24 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.00 0.06 -0.18 0.35 -0.06 1.00       
Treasury Rate  -0.30 -0.14 -0.13 -0.31 -0.04 -0.01 -0.07 0.03 -0.07 0.13 -0.48 0.17 -0.90 1.00     
Agg. Default Spread 0.46 0.19 0.15 0.46 0.03 -0.04 0.08 -0.09 0.09 -0.15 0.73 -0.30 0.23 -0.45 1.00   
TED Spread 0.34 0.12 0.10 0.27 0.02 -0.04 0.06 -0.09 0.05 -0.02 0.58 -0.34 -0.17 -0.06 0.51 1.00 
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Table 2b.  Complete Univariate Regression Analysis
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
CDS spread 0.0307***
(74.72)
CDSLiqproxy 0.00940***
(22.48)
Lagged IV 0.354***
(75.40)
Lagged CDS 0.0364***
(117.0)
Leverage 0.121***
(32.63)
M/B Value Ratio -0.0152***
(-26.39)
Size -0.00709***
(-14.42)
Firm Return -0.0581***
(-27.94)
HV 0.210***
(31.36)
Size 0.00821***
(283.8)
S&P 500 Return -0.625***
(-132.5)
YieldCurveSlope 0.0370***
(81.00)
TreasuryRate -0.0290***
(-117.8)
AggDefSpread 0.114***
(151.0)
TEDSpread 0.0565***
(118.0)
OptionLiq 0.0216***
(26.36)
Constant 0.317*** 0.347*** 0.232*** 0.318*** 0.334*** 0.396*** 0.435*** 0.374*** 0.347*** 0.226*** 0.387*** 0.349*** 0.469*** 0.265*** 0.359*** 0.387***
(675.1) (1,704) (142.4) (411.4) (271.1) (300.6) (91.09) (508.7) (322.1) (292.6) (674.7) (439.9) (529.9) (267.0) (566.7) (614.7)
Observations 140,647 140,647 105,602 76,258 129,056 129,169 129,056 105,868 58,456 201,571 201,572 201,572 201,572 201,572 201,572 201,572
R-squared 0.069 0.007 0.089
Number of optionid 65,133 65,133 47,312 33,581 59,583 59,661 59,583 47,452 20,956 95,845 95,845 95,845 95,845 95,845 95,845 95,845
t-statistics in parentheses,  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3. Regression on Option Implied Volatility for “Short Maturity” and “In The Money” 
We run the pooled regression on dependent variable Option-Implied Volatility. 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Default Risk Variables 
    CDS spread 
 
0.0520*** 0.0675*** 0.0521*** 
  
(2.637) (3.211) (2.641) 
CDS Liquidity Proxy 
 
-0.0231* -0.0244** -0.0222* 
  
(-1.913) (-2.023) (-1.832) 
Lagged CDS 
  
0.0351** 
 
   
(2.589) 
 Lagged Implied Volatility 
   
-0.0928 
    
(-1.011) 
Firm-level Variables 
    Total Debt to Total Assets Ratio 0.312 0.341 0.347 0.315 
 
(1.240) (1.359) (1.396) (1.248) 
Market-to-Book Value Ratio -0.122*** -0.119*** -0.116*** -0.120*** 
 
(-3.915) (-3.831) (-3.789) (-3.853) 
Size as Total Assets -0.143* -0.135 -0.137 -0.138 
 
(-1.654) (-1.564) (-1.605) (-1.605) 
FirmRet 0.0360 0.0342 0.0114 0.0410 
 
(0.864) (0.828) (0.271) (0.979) 
HV 0.0869 0.105 0.111 0.111 
 
(0.653) (0.789) (0.839) (0.835) 
Aggregate Variables 
    VIX 0.0125*** 0.0120*** 0.0114*** 0.0122*** 
 
(8.195) (7.787) (7.344) (7.838) 
Return on the S&P 500 Index 0.146 0.168 0.0903 0.200 
 
(0.932) (1.080) (0.578) (1.262) 
Yield Curve Slope -0.00547 -0.0109 -0.0131 -0.0104 
 
(-0.225) (-0.450) (-0.547) (-0.428) 
Treasury Rate 0.0360* 0.0375* 0.0464** 0.0382* 
 
(1.707) (1.784) (2.196) (1.816) 
Agg Default Spread 0.0239 0.0194 0.0139 0.0253 
 
(0.773) (0.630) (0.455) (0.806) 
TED Spread 0.0208 0.0200 0.0211* 0.0201 
 
(1.619) (1.561) (1.652) (1.568) 
Intercept 1.559* 1.418 1.371 1.480* 
 
(1.754) (1.605) (1.561) (1.672) 
     No. of Observations 2,835 2,835 2,773 2,788 
R-squared 0.358 0.372 0.386 0.374 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4. Regression on Option Implied Volatility for “Short Maturity” and “Out of the 
Money”. We run the pooled regression on dependent variable Option-Implied Volatility. 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Default Risk Variables 
    CDS spread 
 
0.00399 0.00394 0.00230 
  
(0.403) (0.394) (0.231) 
CDS Liquidity Proxy 
 
0.000517 0.000186 -0.000327 
  
(0.151) (0.0524) (-0.0948) 
Lagged CDS 
  
0.00296 
 
   
(0.368) 
 Lagged Implied Volatility 
   
-0.0656* 
    
(-1.828) 
Firm-level Variables 
    Total Debt to Total Assets Ratio -0.0610 -0.0620 -0.0724 -0.0484 
 
(-0.721) (-0.730) (-0.847) (-0.569) 
Market-to-Book Value Ratio 0.0312** 0.0318** 0.0300** 0.0315** 
 
(2.466) (2.498) (2.341) (2.480) 
Size as Total Assets 0.0804*** 0.0817*** 0.0800*** 0.0811*** 
 
(2.849) (2.877) (2.802) (2.860) 
FirmRet 0.0101 0.00991 0.00921 0.00182 
 
(0.613) (0.603) (0.559) (0.107) 
HV -0.0333 -0.0332 -0.0389 -0.0406 
 
(-0.605) (-0.602) (-0.701) (-0.736) 
Aggregate Variables 
    VIX 0.00932*** 0.00930*** 0.00929*** 0.00930*** 
 
(13.54) (13.45) (13.33) (13.45) 
Return on the S&P 500 Index 0.107 0.109 0.103 0.119* 
 
(1.579) (1.602) (1.507) (1.744) 
Yield Curve Slope -0.0209* -0.0211* -0.0210* -0.0234* 
 
(-1.725) (-1.742) (-1.729) (-1.926) 
Treasury Rate 0.0256*** 0.0258*** 0.0263*** 0.0230** 
 
(2.609) (2.617) (2.644) (2.307) 
Agg Default Spread 0.0313** 0.0307* 0.0294* 0.0401** 
 
(2.005) (1.960) (1.832) (2.434) 
TED Spread 0.0239*** 0.0241*** 0.0242*** 0.0231*** 
 
(3.752) (3.770) (3.772) (3.599) 
Intercept -0.736** -0.752*** -0.734** -0.723** 
 
(-2.572) (-2.608) (-2.519) (-2.505) 
     No. of Observations 5,875 5,875 5,792 5,875 
R-squared 0.257 0.257 0.258 0.259 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5. Regression on Option Implied Volatility for “Short Maturity”. We run the pooled 
regression on dependent variable Option-Implied Volatility on all moneyness groups. 
 
 
ITM: Moneyness 
>=1.05 
ATM: 0.95< 
Moneyness <1.05 
OTM: Moneyness 
>0.95 
Default Risk Variables 
   CDS spread 0.0521*** 0.00683 0.00230 
 
(2.641) (0.669) (0.231) 
CDS Liquidity Proxy -0.0222* -0.00201 -0.000327 
 
(-1.832) (-0.415) (-0.0948) 
Lagged Implied Volatility -0.0928 -0.235*** -0.0656* 
 
(-1.011) (-6.948) (-1.828) 
Firm-level Variables 
   Total Debt to Total Assets Ratio 0.315 0.135 -0.0484 
 
(1.248) (1.629) (-0.569) 
Market-to-Book Value Ratio -0.120*** -0.00932 0.0315** 
 
(-3.853) (-1.002) (2.480) 
Size as Total Assets -0.138 -0.0409** 0.0811*** 
 
(-1.605) (-2.032) (2.860) 
FirmRet 0.0410 -0.00554 0.00182 
 
(0.979) (-0.392) (0.107) 
HV 0.111 0.173*** -0.0406 
 
(0.835) (4.150) (-0.736) 
Aggregate Variables 
   VIX 0.0122*** 0.00796*** 0.00930*** 
 
(7.838) (16.59) (13.45) 
Return on the S&P 500 Index 0.200 0.193*** 0.119* 
 
(1.262) (4.244) (1.744) 
Yield Curve Slope -0.0104 0.0321*** -0.0234* 
 
(-0.428) (3.752) (-1.926) 
Treasury Rate 0.0382* 0.0227*** 0.0230** 
 
(1.816) (3.294) (2.307) 
Agg Default Spread 0.0253 -0.0142 0.0401** 
 
(0.806) (-1.322) (2.434) 
TED Spread 0.0201 0.00821* 0.0231*** 
 
(1.568) (1.896) (3.599) 
Intercept 1.480* 0.518** -0.723** 
 
(1.672) (2.514) (-2.505) 
    No. of Observations 2,788 5,659 5,875 
R-squared 0.374 0.408 0.259 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6. Regression on Option Implied Volatility for “Medium Maturity”. We run the pooled 
regression on dependent variable Option-Implied Volatility on all moneyness groups. 
 
 
ITM: Moneyness 
>=1.05 
ATM: 0.95< 
Moneyness <1.05 
OTM: Moneyness 
>0.95 
Default Risk Variables 
   CDS spread 0.00201 0.0233*** 0.0127*** 
 
(0.716) (6.897) (6.413) 
CDS Liquidity Proxy 0.00300 0.00174 0.00252* 
 
(0.844) (0.936) (1.881) 
Lagged Implied Volatility 0.0376 0.0796*** 0.0652*** 
 
(0.911) (3.450) (3.496) 
Firm-level Variables 
   Total Debt to Total Assets Ratio 0.122* -0.00333 0.00224 
 
(1.914) (-0.109) (0.0975) 
Market-to-Book Value Ratio 0.00326 0.0125*** 0.0240*** 
 
(0.415) (2.756) (5.716) 
Size as Total Assets -0.0419 0.00252 0.0244*** 
 
(-1.047) (0.148) (2.671) 
FirmRet 0.000131 -0.00841 0.0143** 
 
(0.00930) (-0.980) (2.430) 
HV 0.0811** 0.00180 0.0159 
 
(2.221) (0.105) (1.067) 
Aggregate Variables 
   VIX 0.00445*** 0.00485*** 0.00540*** 
 
(11.76) (22.45) (27.71) 
Return on the S&P 500 Index -0.0763* 0.0146 0.0223 
 
(-1.696) (0.616) (1.004) 
Yield Curve Slope 0.0158 0.00376 -0.0160*** 
 
(1.600) (0.790) (-3.784) 
Treasury Rate -0.00330 -0.00682** -0.0159*** 
 
(-0.538) (-2.220) (-5.535) 
Agg Default Spread 0.00481 -0.0119* -0.0128** 
 
(0.493) (-1.743) (-2.238) 
TED Spread 0.00878* 0.00575** 0.00278 
 
(1.954) (2.337) (1.274) 
Intercept 0.598 0.143 -0.0206 
 
(1.450) (0.797) (-0.210) 
    No. of Observations 3,251 5,699 7,267 
R-squared 0.455 0.451 0.464 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7. Regression on Option Implied Volatility for “Long Maturity”. We run the pooled 
regression on dependent variable Option-Implied Volatility on all moneyness groups. 
 
 
ITM: Moneyness 
>=1.05 
ATM: 0.95< 
Moneyness <1.05 
OTM: Moneyness 
>0.95 
Default Risk Variables 
   CDS spread -0.00692*** 0.00956*** 0.0154*** 
 
(-4.201) (3.954) (13.97) 
CDS Liquidity Proxy 0.00295* -0.00120 5.51e-05 
 
(1.820) (-0.753) (0.0728) 
Lagged Implied Volatility 0.277*** 0.449*** 0.285*** 
 
(11.00) (23.69) (21.87) 
Firm-level Variables 
   Total Debt to Total Assets Ratio 0.00352 0.00828 0.000763 
 
(0.163) (0.602) (0.0567) 
Market-to-Book Value Ratio 0.0150*** 0.00982*** 0.0136*** 
 
(4.617) (3.930) (6.047) 
Size as Total Assets 0.00517 -0.00315 0.00106 
 
(0.451) (-0.533) (0.202) 
FirmRet -0.00321 -0.00854 0.00954* 
 
(-0.351) (-1.351) (1.950) 
HV 0.0316* 0.0457*** 0.0500*** 
 
(1.699) (3.959) (5.064) 
Aggregate Variables 
   VIX 0.00358*** 0.00303*** 0.00368*** 
 
(14.50) (16.71) (22.18) 
Return on the S&P 500 Index -0.0589** -0.0487** -0.0754*** 
 
(-2.275) (-2.543) (-4.538) 
Yield Curve Slope 0.00913** 0.00560** 0.00365* 
 
(2.491) (2.193) (1.679) 
Treasury Rate -0.00339* 2.76e-05 -8.04e-05 
 
(-1.679) (0.0199) (-0.0649) 
Agg Default Spread 0.00819* -0.00404 0.00173 
 
(1.854) (-1.174) (0.562) 
TED Spread -0.00925*** -0.00183 0.00661*** 
 
(-3.542) (-0.976) (3.961) 
Intercept 0.0587 0.100 0.0883 
 
(0.468) (1.510) (1.520) 
    No. of Observations 2,160 2,976 4,395 
R-squared 0.525 0.631 0.584 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8. Regression on IV Skew for “Short Maturity”. We run the pooled regression on 
dependent variable Option-Implied Volatility on all moneyness groups. We define IV-skew as 
the difference between average OTM and ATM option implied volatilities for each issuer. 
 
 
ITM: Moneyness 
>=1.05 
ATM: 0.95< 
Moneyness <1.05 
OTM: Moneyness 
>0.95 
Default Risk Variables 
   CDS spread 0.000622 -0.00644 0.0126** 
 
(0.0669) (-1.201) (2.110) 
CDS Liquidity Proxy 0.0133** 0.0117*** 0.00803*** 
 
(2.348) (3.063) (3.925) 
Lagged Implied Volatility -0.113** 0.183*** -0.137*** 
 
(-2.014) (6.890) (-6.325) 
Firm-level Variables 
   Total Debt to Total Assets Ratio 0.315 0.135 -0.0484 
 
(1.248) (1.629) (-0.569) 
Market-to-Book Value Ratio -0.120*** -0.00932 0.0315** 
 
(-3.853) (-1.002) (2.480) 
Size as Total Assets -0.138 -0.0409** 0.0811*** 
 
(-1.605) (-2.032) (2.860) 
FirmRet 0.0410 -0.00554 0.00182 
 
(0.979) (-0.392) (0.107) 
HV 0.111 0.173*** -0.0406 
 
(0.835) (4.150) (-0.736) 
Aggregate Variables 
   VIX 0.00103 -0.000729* 0.00230*** 
 
(1.064) (-1.931) (5.407) 
Return on the S&P 500 Index 0.0903 0.0621* 0.0246 
 
(0.941) (1.730) (0.591) 
Yield Curve Slope 0.0116 0.00703 -0.0234*** 
 
(0.767) (1.044) (-3.109) 
Treasury Rate 0.0261** -0.000408 0.00198 
 
(2.044) (-0.0749) (0.321) 
Agg Default Spread 0.0120 -0.0313*** 0.0173* 
 
(0.600) (-3.673) (1.714) 
TED Spread 0.0162** -0.000136 -0.00103 
 
(2.032) (-0.0398) (-0.263) 
Intercept 0.0310 0.150 0.144 
 
(0.0568) (0.925) (0.972) 
    No. of Observations 3,212 5,688 6,115 
R-squared 0.074 0.105 0.118 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 9. Regression on IV Skew for “Medium Maturity”. We run the pooled regression on 
dependent variable Option-Implied Volatility on all moneyness groups. We define IV-skew as 
the difference between average OTM and ATM option implied volatilities for each issuer. 
 
 
ITM: Moneyness 
>=1.05 
ATM: 0.95< 
Moneyness <1.05 
OTM: Moneyness 
>0.95 
Default Risk Variables 
   CDS spread -0.00830** -0.00631* 0.00863*** 
 
(-2.017) (-1.791) (4.308) 
CDS Liquidity Proxy 0.00542 0.0105*** -0.000125 
 
(1.042) (5.420) (-0.0889) 
Lagged Implied Volatility -0.139** 0.149*** -0.105*** 
 
(-2.334) (6.177) (-5.399) 
Firm-level Variables 
   Total Debt to Total Assets Ratio 0.0110 -0.0161 -0.0273 
 
(0.119) (-0.505) (-1.133) 
Market-to-Book Value Ratio 0.00721 -0.00402 0.00487 
 
(0.637) (-0.845) (1.105) 
Size as Total Assets -0.00318 -0.0375** 0.00433 
 
(-0.0553) (-2.110) (0.452) 
FirmRet 0.00657 0.0495*** -0.00824 
 
(0.320) (5.528) (-1.335) 
HV -0.0164 -0.00580 -0.0161 
 
(-0.308) (-0.324) (-1.029) 
Aggregate Variables 
   VIX -0.000231 0.000175 0.00165*** 
 
(-0.419) (0.777) (8.097) 
Return on the S&P 500 Index -0.0523 0.110*** -0.0267 
 
(-0.798) (4.442) (-1.144) 
Yield Curve Slope -0.00213 0.00222 -0.0146*** 
 
(-0.149) (0.446) (-3.291) 
Treasury Rate 0.0125 0.00397 -0.00910*** 
 
(1.404) (1.240) (-3.016) 
Agg Default Spread 0.0374*** 0.0104 0.00312 
 
(2.628) (1.454) (0.518) 
TED Spread 0.0196*** 0.00137 0.000766 
 
(3.000) (0.534) (0.335) 
Intercept 0.0275 0.366* 0.0269 
 
(0.0463) (1.959) (0.262) 
    No. of Observations 3,302 5,700 7,270 
R-squared 0.036 0.111 0.103 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 10. Regression on IV-Skew for “Long Maturity”. We run the pooled regression on 
dependent variable Option-Implied Volatility on all moneyness groups. We define IV-skew 
 as the difference between average OTM and ATM option implied volatilities for each issuer. 
 
 
ITM: Moneyness 
>=1.05 
ATM: 0.95< 
Moneyness <1.05 
OTM: Moneyness 
>0.95 
Default Risk Variables 
   CDS spread -0.00165 0.0149*** -0.00979*** 
 
(-0.708) (5.468) (-7.625) 
CDS Liquidity Proxy -0.00245 0.00286 0.00474*** 
 
(-1.067) (1.594) (5.376) 
Lagged Implied Volatility -0.0611* 0.0837*** -0.145*** 
 
(-1.711) (3.909) (-9.558) 
Firm-level Variables 
   Total Debt to Total Assets Ratio -0.0517* -0.0230 0.00814 
 
(-1.697) (-1.479) (0.518) 
Market-to-Book Value Ratio 0.00379 -0.00481* 0.00307 
 
(0.823) (-1.705) (1.166) 
Size as Total Assets 0.0290* -0.00341 -0.00107 
 
(1.821) (-0.511) (-0.174) 
FirmRet 0.0186 0.0243*** 0.0161*** 
 
(1.434) (3.411) (2.824) 
HV -0.0211 0.00475 0.00732 
 
(-0.803) (0.364) (0.635) 
Aggregate Variables 
   VIX 0.000925*** 0.000669*** 0.00122*** 
 
(2.641) (3.267) (6.310) 
Return on the S&P 500 Index -0.0197 0.0595*** -0.0508*** 
 
(-0.538) (2.755) (-2.621) 
Yield Curve Slope -0.000144 -0.00207 -0.00638** 
 
(-0.0278) (-0.718) (-2.513) 
Treasury Rate 0.00170 0.000696 -0.00482*** 
 
(0.601) (0.444) (-3.334) 
Agg Default Spread 0.0266*** -0.00229 0.00617* 
 
(4.257) (-0.590) (1.713) 
TED Spread 0.0113*** 0.00478** 0.00369* 
 
(3.052) (2.256) (1.897) 
Intercept -0.296* 0.0453 0.0785 
 
(-1.700) (0.604) (1.157) 
    No. of Observations 2,172 2,975 4,395 
R-squared 0.066 0.091 0.128 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 11. Economic Significance Comparison  
What is the economic significance of CDS change on IV? We can answer the question by 
measuring the impact of one-sigma shock of CDS on option-implied volatility. 
 
We calculate and show the economic significance of the key regression models in the following 
table. The results are based on the pooled regression of  “Short Maturity” and “In The Money” 
bins. The reference regression model for each of the following economic significance tests 
displayed in panels A and B, are provided in Tables 3 and 8, respectively. 
 
Panel A records the economic significance for the Option-Implied Volatility. The calculated 
economic significance of one sigma shock in CDS on IV, is bolded and shows an average of 3% 
deviation for implied volatility for one level of CDS sigma shock. Panel B displays the economic 
significance for Implied Volatility Skew. 
 
Panel A:  
Dependent  Variable: Implied Volatility Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Default Risk Variables  
   CDS spread  2.559% 3.322% 2.564% 
  
   
CDS Liquidity Proxy 
 
-2.380% -2.514% -2.287% 
  
   
Lagged CDS 
  
1.65% 
 
     Lagged IV    N/A 
     
Firm level and Market level variables are controlled for;  
All coefficients tested above are significant. Detailed significance levels recorded in Table 3. 
     
     
     
     
                 Short Maturity 
Panel B:  
Dependent Variable: IV Skew ITM ATM OTM  
Default Risk Variables     
CDS spread N/A N/A 0.573%  
      
CDS Liquidity Proxy   0.886%  
      
     
     
     
Firm level and Market level variables are controlled for;  
All coefficients tested above are significant. Detailed significance levels recorded in Table 8. 
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Table 12. Endogeneity Tests for Option-implied volatility and CDS spread 
 
Panel A. Two-Stage Lease Squares Estimation  
To control for the potential endogeneity problems arising from the contemporaneous 
measurement of the CDS spread, and the implied volatility, we employ a simultaneous equation 
model using two equations that represent each of the potentially endogenous variables. The 
system of equations is as follows: 
 
CDSit = β0 + β1L aggedCDSit, +β2 FirmLevelVarsi, +β3 MarketLevelVarsit+ εit 
 
IVit = β0 + β1 CDSit +β2 CDSLiquidityProxyi +β3 LaggedIVit, +β4FirmLevelVarsit, 
+β5MarketLevelVarsit+εit 
 
Panel A records the first stage regression results of CDS. The results show that the lagged CDS 
is in fact a suitable instrument for CDS spread. The adjusted R
2
 is 93.53%. 
 
 
 
Coefficient 
 
t-statistic 
 
Lagged CDS 0.9830*** 539.21  
 
CDS Liquidity Proxy 0.0821*** 23.94 
 
 
Lagged Implied Volatility -0.0901*** -3 
 
 
Total Debt to Total Assets Ratio 0.1046*** 6.84 
 
 
Market-to-Book Value Ratio -0.0026      -1.08 
 
 
Size as Total Assets -0.0040* -2.25 
 
 
HV 0.0149 0.31 
 
 
VIX 0.0067*** 9.09 
 
 
Return on the S&P 500 Index -1.5057*** -15.57 
 
 
Yield Curve Slope -0.0435*** -4.81 
 
 
Treasury Rate -0.0040 -0.83 
 
 
Agg Default Spread -0.0102 -0.85 
 
 
TED Spread -0.0105 -1.69 
 
    
Intercept 0.0097 0.29  
   
No. of Observations 39436  
Adjusted R-squared 0.9353  
   
The t-statistics are recorded in italics; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 12. (Cont.) 
Panel B. Instrumented Variable (Second Stage) regression  
 
All bins ITM bins ATM bins OTM bins 
Default Risk Variables 
    CDS spread 0.00216*** 0.00622*** 0.00250*** 0.000629** 
 
(10.98) (14.77) (8.276) (2.031) 
CDS Liquidity Proxy 0.00546*** 0.00559*** 0.00498*** 0.00712*** 
 
(14.95) (7.157) (9.065) (12.41) 
Lagged Implied Volatility 0.857*** 0.785*** 0.854*** 0.857*** 
 
(270.1) (101.3) (190.5) (173.6) 
Firm-level Variables     
Total Debt to Total Assets Ratio -0.00131 -0.00815** -0.00568** 0.00342 
 
(-0.808) (-1.982) (-2.548) (1.384) 
Market-to-Book Value Ratio -0.00261*** -0.00355*** -0.00147*** -0.00371*** 
 
(-10.38) (-5.517) (-4.250) (-9.708) 
Size as Total Assets -0.00328*** -0.00416*** -0.00210*** -0.00461*** 
 
(-17.46) (-8.868) (-8.099) (-15.98) 
FirmRet 0.0962*** 0.0994*** 0.0875*** 0.101*** 
 
(18.77) (7.239) (11.61) (13.84) 
HV -0.00131 -0.00815** -0.00568** 0.00342 
 
(-0.808) (-1.982) (-2.548) (1.384) 
Aggregate Variables 
    VIX 0.00401*** 0.00402*** 0.00376*** 0.00443*** 
 (51.74) (22.67) (34.28) (35.99) 
Return on the S&P 500 Index -0.185*** -0.223*** -0.213*** -0.176*** 
 (-18.03) (-9.026) (-14.88) (-11.15) 
Yield Curve Slope -0.0151*** -0.0230*** -0.0107*** -0.0156*** 
 (-15.75) (-9.433) (-8.080) (-10.71) 
Treasury Rate -0.00365*** -0.00755*** -0.000840 -0.00394*** 
 (-7.073) (-5.798) (-1.186) (-4.984) 
Agg Default Spread -0.0462*** -0.0450*** -0.0426*** -0.0454*** 
 (-36.30) (-15.53) (-23.85) (-22.30) 
TED Spread -0.00425*** -0.00705*** -0.00445*** -0.00290*** 
 (-6.469) (-4.507) (-4.862) (-2.841) 
Intercept 0.0849*** 0.131*** 0.0505*** 0.103*** 
 (23.78) (14.52) (10.29) (18.92) 
     No. of Observations 39,436 8,041 14,110 17,285 
R-squared 0.860 0.857 0.890 0.849 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 12. (Cont.)   
 
Panel C. As robustness, we perform two post-regression tests of Durbin and Wu-Hausman on 
the 2SLS regression model below, where CDS is instrumented. 
 
Stage 1: CDS = f1 (Lagged_CDS, firm_level_vars, market_level_vars) 
Stage 2: IV = f2 (CDS, CDSLiquidityProxy, lagged_IV, firm_level_vars, market_level_vars) 
 
Panel C records the findings and shows that the null hypothesis is rejected by both tests.* After 
controlling for endogeneity, CDS remains a significant variable in the regression model. 
 
 
 
Panel C. Post-regression Tests of endogeneity 
 
H0: variables are exogeneous 
 
All moneyness 
 
ITM bins 
 
ATM bins 
 
OTM bins 
Durbin (score) chi2(1)          542.965 67.8885 82.0269 431.386 
Wu-Hausman F(1,39421)            550.336 68.3388 82.4188 442.044 
*p-value (p = 0.00) (p = 0.00) (p = 0.00) (p = 0.00) 
 
 
*Based on the p-values of the two post-estimation tests, the null hypothesis of exogenous 
variables is rejected. Thus, IV and CDS are endogenous variables, determined by the set of 
common explanatory variables at firm level and market level.  
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Table 13. Impact of Industry.  We run the regression for two subsamples of Financial and Non-
financial firms (from total of 550 firms in this study, 469 are non-financial firms and 81 are 
financial firms). Panel A reports IV regressions and panel B reports IV-Skew regressions. 
 Panel A) Dependent: IV Panel B) Dep.: IV-Skew 
 
NonFinancial Financial NonFinancial Financial 
Default Risk Variables 
    CDS spread 0.00730*** 0.0498*** 0.00219*** 0.00167 
 
(10.46) (15.11) (3.904) (0.576) 
CDS Liquidity Proxy 0.00102* 0.00438* 0.00441*** 0.00603*** 
 
(1.954) (1.895) (10.58) (2.965) 
Lagged Implied Volatility 0.200*** 0.146*** -0.0237*** 0.0195 
 
(27.32) (6.908) (-3.912) (1.053) 
Firm-level Variables 
    Total Debt to Total Assets Ratio -0.0220** 0.0189 0.000944 -0.0351** 
 
(-2.070) (0.987) (0.106) (-2.117) 
Market-to-Book Value Ratio 0.0201*** -0.00527 -0.000277 -0.0369 
 
(14.75) (-0.189) (-0.244) (-1.517) 
Size as Total Assets 0.0587*** 0.0424*** -0.00375 0.00378 
 
(15.08) (3.428) (-1.166) (0.348) 
FirmRet 0.0255*** 0.0789*** 0.0113*** 0.0343*** 
 
(8.863) (8.489) (4.667) (4.203) 
HV 0.0615*** 0.0491** -0.00903 -0.0441** 
 
(8.941) (2.304) (-1.565) (-2.357) 
Aggregate Variables 
    VIX 0.00573*** 0.00661*** 0.000988*** 0.000350 
 
(66.02) (21.50) (13.56) (1.293) 
Return on the S&P 500 Index -0.00726 -0.124*** 0.00314 0.0149 
 
(-0.681) (-3.828) (0.352) (0.525) 
Yield Curve Slope -0.00869*** -0.00596 -0.00747*** 0.00182 
 
(-5.624) (-1.186) (-5.759) (0.414) 
Treasury Rate -0.00721*** -0.00568** -0.00274*** -3.16e-05 
 
(-8.356) (-2.063) (-3.792) (-0.0131) 
Agg Default Spread -0.0106*** -0.0211*** 0.00538*** -0.00996 
 
(-6.221) (-2.967) (3.788) (-1.594) 
TED Spread 0.00144 0.00732** 0.00188** -0.00278 
 
(1.616) (2.497) (2.520) (-1.079) 
Intercept -0.436*** -0.367** 0.0714** 0.0496 
 
(-10.83) (-2.273) (2.148) (0.350) 
     No. of Observations 35,444 4,626 36,154 4,675 
R-squared 0.454 0.516 0.038 0.021 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 14. Impact of Financial Leverage  We run the regression for two subsamples of Low 
Leverage and High Leverage firms (defined based on median leverage). Panel A reports IV 
regressions and panel B reports IV-Skew regressions. 
 Panel A) Dependent: IV Panel B) Dep.: IV-Skew 
 
Low Lev High Lev Low Lev High Lev 
Default Risk Variables 
    CDS spread 0.0201*** 0.0105*** 0.00599*** 0.00185*** 
 
(11.24) (13.44) (4.288) (2.797) 
CDS Liquidity Proxy 0.00675*** 0.00219*** 0.00137 0.00516*** 
 
(5.966) (3.659) (1.541) (10.32) 
Lagged Implied Volatility 0.193*** 0.164*** -0.0249*** -0.0196** 
 
(20.17) (16.06) (-3.306) (-2.199) 
Firm-level Variables 
    Total Debt to Total Assets Ratio -0.132*** -0.0214 -0.0491*** 0.00388 
 
(-6.942) (-1.180) (-3.280) (0.241) 
Market-to-Book Value Ratio 0.0215*** 0.0357*** -0.00208* 0.00469* 
 
(14.00) (11.44) (-1.733) (1.698) 
Size as Total Assets 0.0991*** 0.0765*** -0.00348 -0.00674 
 
(16.40) (11.27) (-0.732) (-1.124) 
FirmRet 0.0273*** 0.0330*** 0.0132*** 0.0141*** 
 
(7.617) (7.667) (4.627) (3.714) 
HV 0.0555*** 0.0786*** -0.00436 -0.0208** 
 
(6.750) (7.258) (-0.670) (-2.165) 
Aggregate Variables 
    VIX 0.00571*** 0.00598*** 0.000613*** 0.00114*** 
 
(50.79) (46.81) (6.879) (10.06) 
Return on the S&P 500 Index -0.0336** 0.0188 0.00520 0.000526 
 
(-2.470) (1.214) (0.483) (0.0383) 
Yield Curve Slope -0.00323* -0.0148*** -0.00506*** 0.00701*** 
 
(-1.688) (-6.254) (-3.342) (-3.334) 
Treasury Rate -0.00297*** -0.0110*** -0.00247*** -0.00112 
 
(-2.774) (-8.213) (-2.923) (-0.946) 
Agg Default Spread -0.00257 -0.0195*** 0.00663*** 0.00495** 
 
(-1.106) (-8.043) (3.629) (2.317) 
TED Spread 0.00553*** 0.00513*** -8.18e-05 0.00436*** 
 
(4.929) (-3.856) (-0.0925) (3.701) 
Intercept -0.892*** -0.617*** 0.0822* 0.0861 
 
(-14.11) (-8.441) (1.654) (1.333) 
     No. of Observations 20,941 19,129 21,304 19,525 
R-squared 0.491 0.411 0.022 0.044 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 15. Impact of Financial Crisis We repeat the main regression for two subsamples of 
Crisis and Non-crisis periods referring to the 2008 financial crisis (details in paper). Panel A 
reports IV regressions and panel B reports IV-Skew regressions. 
 Panel A) Dependent: IV Panel B) Dep.: IV-Skew 
 
NonCrisis Crisis NonCrisis Crisis 
Default Risk Variables 
    CDS spread 0.0146*** -0.000168 0.000269 0.00616*** 
 
(19.46) (-0.101) (0.461) (3.973) 
CDS Liquidity Proxy 0.00228*** 0.00644*** 0.00479*** 0.00330*** 
 
(4.181) (4.992) (11.44) (2.741) 
Lagged Implied Volatility 0.285*** 0.00831 -0.00895 -0.0420*** 
 
(36.76) (0.502) (-1.423) (-2.720) 
Firm-level Variables 
    Total Debt to Total Assets Ratio 0.01000 -0.285*** 2.19e-05 -0.0331 
 
(1.177) (-5.451) (0.00313) (-0.683) 
Market-to-Book Value Ratio 0.0198*** 0.0113** -0.000437 -0.00643 
 
(15.18) (2.181) (-0.410) (-1.334) 
Size as Total Assets 0.0391*** 0.161*** 0.00311 -0.0681*** 
 
(11.29) (7.211) (1.102) (-3.289) 
FirmRet 0.0272*** 0.0264*** 0.0125*** 0.0171** 
 
(10.15) (2.987) (5.631) (2.068) 
HV 0.0729*** -0.00638 -0.00364 -0.0848*** 
 
(11.64) (-0.264) (-0.702) (-3.748) 
Aggregate Variables 
    VIX 0.00428*** 0.00819*** 0.000737*** 0.00143*** 
 
(41.18) (36.49) (8.568) (6.775) 
Return on the S&P 500 Index -0.0522*** 0.179*** 0.00375 0.0526* 
 
(-5.195) (5.351) (0.451) (1.681) 
Yield Curve Slope -4.92e-05 -0.0126*** -0.00765*** -0.00300 
 
(-0.0306) (-3.105) (-5.743) (-0.787) 
Treasury Rate 0.00121 -0.0101*** -0.00471*** 0.00411* 
 
(1.220) (-4.217) (-5.747) (1.827) 
Agg Default Spread -0.0128*** -0.00881** -0.000556 0.0105*** 
 
(-4.335) (-2.310) (-0.229) (2.948) 
TED Spread 0.0130*** -0.0246*** 0.000960 -0.000176 
 
(12.70) (-11.18) (1.137) (-0.0850) 
Intercept -0.308*** -1.340*** 0.0188 0.729*** 
 
(-8.430) (-5.773) (0.629) (3.382) 
     No. of Observations 32,743 7,327 33,414 7,415 
R-squared 0.298 0.588 0.015 0.073 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 16. Impact of Option Market Liquidity We run the pooled regression on dependent 
variable Option-Implied Volatility and IV-Skew, and add the new variable Option Market 
Liquidity measured by “Proportional bid-ask spread”. (See PBA equation in paper) 
 Panel A) Dependent: IV Panel B) Dep.: IV-Skew 
Default Risk Variables 
 
 
 CDS spread 0.0117***  0.00223*** 
 
(17.70)  (4.122) 
CDS Liquidity Proxy 0.00345***  0.00446*** 
 
(6.992)  (11.16) 
Lagged Implied Volatility 0.184***  -0.0231*** 
 
(27.14)  (-4.049) 
OptionLiquidity 0.0343***  0.00407*** 
 (32.39)  (5.126) 
Firm-level Variables 
 
 
 Total Debt to Total Assets Ratio -0.0192**  -0.00665 
 
(-2.095)  (-0.858) 
Market-to-Book Value Ratio 0.0174***  -0.000783 
 
(12.99)  (-0.692) 
Size as Total Assets 0.0452***  -0.00492 
 
(12.29)  (-1.593) 
FirmRet 0.0214***  0.0123*** 
 
(7.850)  (5.302) 
HV 0.0678***  -0.0116** 
 
(10.47)  (-2.106) 
Aggregate Variables 
 
 
 VIX 0.00589***  0.000969*** 
 
(71.63)  (13.83) 
Return on the S&P 500 Index -0.0112  0.00587 
 
(-1.120)  (0.689) 
Yield Curve Slope -0.00608***  -0.00633*** 
 
(-4.159)  (-5.079) 
Treasury Rate -0.00744***  -0.00255*** 
 
(-9.138)  (-3.688) 
Agg Default Spread -0.0131***  0.00504*** 
 
(-8.057)  (3.664) 
TED Spread -0.000570  0.00155** 
 
(-0.679)  (2.170) 
Intercept -0.313***  0.0869*** 
 
(-8.035)  (2.655) 
No. of Observations 40,070  40,829 
R-squared 0.472  0.035 
Fixed Effects Yes  Yes 
t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 17. Implied Volatility Risk Premium  
We define “Volatility Risk premium = Implied volatility – Historical Volatility”. For historical volatility 
we use the 6-months rolling standard deviation. Table below test the role of CDS in explaining changes in 
option-implied volatility risk premium.  This table shows the impact including the control variables. 
Vol risk premium = f(CDS spread, control variables) 
 
Dependant Variable: Implied Vol risk premium 
 
Default Risk Variables 
 CDS spread 0.0116*** 
 
(17.24) 
CDS Liquidity Proxy 0.00355*** 
 
(7.038) 
  
Firm-level Variables 
 Total Debt to Total Assets Ratio -0.0223** 
 
(-2.394) 
Market-to-Book Value Ratio 0.0205*** 
 
(15.02) 
Size as Total Assets 0.0587*** 
 
(15.75) 
FirmRet 0.0297*** 
 
(10.72) 
 
 
Aggregate Variables 
 VIX 0.00583*** 
 
(69.59) 
Return on the S&P 500 Index -0.0145 
 
(-1.416) 
Yield Curve Slope -0.00858*** 
 
(-5.755) 
Treasury Rate -0.00717*** 
 
(-8.632) 
Agg Default Spread -0.0122*** 
 
(-7.364) 
TED Spread 0.000703 
 
(0.821) 
Intercept -0.453*** 
 
(-11.48) 
No. of Observations 40,070 
R-squared 0.602 
 
Fixed Effects Yes 
t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 18. Test of Nonlinearity (Log regressions) for IV and CDS relationship 
What if the relationship observed is due to limitations of a linear modeling of IV? To test this, we run the 
non-linear regression by creating “Log” variables of volatility, default risk, and return variables. The 
results are shown below.  
Dependant Variable: Ln (IV) or “Log implied volatility” 
Default Risk Variables 
 Ln (CDS spread) 0.0398*** 
 
(6.647) 
Ln (CDS Liquidity Proxy) 0.0244*** 
 
(5.302) 
Ln (Lagged IV) 0.447*** 
 (32.73) 
Firm-level Variables  
Total Debt to Total Assets Ratio 0.132*** 
 
(2.636) 
Market-to-Book Value Ratio 0.0895*** 
 
(11.60) 
Ln (Size) 0.848*** 
 
(5.388) 
Ln (FirmRet) 0.00859*** 
 
(7.483) 
Aggregate Variables  
Ln (VIX) 0.145*** 
 
(12.98) 
Ln (Return on the S&P 500 Index) -0.00211* 
 
(-1.863) 
Yield Curve Slope -0.00449 
 
(-0.585) 
Treasury Rate 0.00134 
 
(0.302) 
Agg Default Spread 0.00932 
 
(1.046) 
TED Spread 0.0323*** 
 
(5.838) 
Intercept -3.241*** 
 
(-8.696) 
No. of Observations 14,796 
R-squared 0.462 
 
Fixed Effects Yes 
  
t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Chapter 4
FORECASTING
OPTION-IMPLIED
VOLATILITY USING CREDIT
RISK
155
Abstract
We study the time series properties of credit default swap spread in enhancing
the forecasting power of future implied volatility and hence future option prices.
We run a series of contemporaneous and forward-looking models as encompassing
regressions and test whether we can improve the predictability power of implied
volatility by extending the forecast model that includes historical volatility (HV)
and current implied volatility (IV) to enhance credit default swap. Both in-sample
and out-of-sample estimation errors show that CDS can be a significant factor in
improving forecasting performance of implied volatility.
Keywords: CDS Spread, Implied Volatility, Encompassing Regressions, Out-
of-sample performance
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4.1 Introduction
The need for enabling users to manage credit risk has made credit derivatives one
of the most important financial innovations of the last quarter of a century. 1. The
volume of the credit default swap market skyrocketed in the last ten years after
the first CDS contract was issued by JP Morgan in mid 1990s, making it one of
the fastest growing over the counter (OTC) derivatives markets during this period.
The CDS contract is a mean of protection against bond default. The seller of the
contract is committed to remunerate the buyer with the face value of the bond
upon default of the debtor. The buyer in turn has to pay the certain amount as
an insurance premium to the seller. This insurance premium is determined as a
percentage of the bond’s face value and usually named as CDS spread.
Similar to put options, CDS is used for downside risk protection. From the
hedging point of view, the insurance and risk protection similarities of the put
options and CDS is further shown by the comovement of CDS spread and option
implied volatility (See Figure 1). Building on the results found in the previous
chapter, this study will contribute to the existing literature by investigating the
time-series properties of the CDS when augmented as an enhancement to the fu-
ture implied volatility forecast models.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
Forecasting option Implied Volatility (IV) is of interest to option market par-
ticipants, who routinely formulate volatility and option price forecasts for trading
and hedging purposes. Given that the IV is a re-parameterization of the market
1See Greenspan [2004]
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option price, forecasting IV falls within the vast literature on the predictability
of asset prices. In addition, to the extent IV yields a forward-looking measure of
firm’s total risk it has applications predicting firm’s beta, credit risk, etc.
The extant literature have explored better estimations of future implied volatil-
ity using encompassing regressions on index options. In this paper, we have the
advantage of testing forecasting power of on the cross-section of extensive set of
equity options. We combine the approach of Chan, Jha, Kalimipalli (2009) and
Cao, Yu, and Zhong (2010) by (1) testing on an extensive panel of cross-sectional
firms and options data, (2) forecasting the future implied volatility, and (3) finding
how incorporating for CDS in the time series model can improve the forecasting
performance of the implied volatility of the underlying asset, particularly out-of-
sample.
In other words, we use credit risk to forecast out-of-sample option prices. As
discussed in previous chapter, credit risk matters for option pricing as options are
valued on firms which are not free from default. So we ask that if credit risk
matters for option prices, can we develop better out-of-sample forecasts for IV
using lagged credit-risk measures?
Previous literature is mostly focused on predicting IVs at aggregate or index
level. We, however, provide a characterization of IVs forecasts at individual firm
level and use a robust measure of credit risk i.e. CDS spreads of the underlying
firm written for senior sub-ordinated debt.
We provide a first comprehensive study of role of credit risk on IV forecasting
using an exhaustive sample of cross-sectional firms.
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4.2 Literature Review
Previous literature on forecasting IV falls broadly under four main categories: (1)
Modeling IV evolution at the index level (SPX: options on S&P 500 index), where
a time series model for the changes in IV is used. (2) Modeling moments of risk
neutral distribution (RND), where variance, skewness and kurtosis of the RNDs
are modeled through time. (3) Encompassing regressions, where past historical
volatility, and IVs are used to forecast realized volatility (RV) or option IV. (4)
Implied volatility functions, where cross-sectional IV surface is defined as a polyno-
mial function of moneyness and maturity to capture the pricing biases and option
prices are obtained using numerical methods.
4.2.1 Modeling IV Evolution at the Index Level
Modeling volatility indices is an important part of IV predictability studies. Kon-
stantinidi, Skiadopoulos, and Tzagkaraki (2008) investigate whether the evolution
of of implied volatility can be forecasted by focusing on a number of European
and US implied volatility indices. They use an economic model that estimates
the change in lagged IV based on a number of lagged default risk and firm level
variables. They test for both point and interval forecasts and study the statistical
and economic significance of these forecasts. They further use principal compo-
nent, ARIMA, ARFIMA, and VAR models and assess the performance by trading
strategies in the volatility futures markets. Although they find statistical support
for predictability, they show that the findings are not economically significant.
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In our paper, we focus on cross section of the firms and are interested to be able
to forecast IV for each option ID. But how do we test the forecast performance of
the results?
Goncalves and Guidolin (2006) provide a clear framework for calculating es-
timation for options with the specification in mind that any averaging should be
performed on count of traded options only. We use their approach in designing
MSE, RMSE, and MAE.2 Motivated by empirical evidence on lack of stability
of the parameters characterizing the implied volatility surface (IVS) in option
prices, Goncalves and Guidolin (2006) investigate the predictability patterns of
IVS. They employ a two-stage model that first estimates the surface along cross-
sectional moneyness and maturity dimensions. Then in the second stage they
model the dynamics of the first-stage coefficients. They find that the movements
of the S&P 500 IVS are in fact very predictable. As a result, a set of profitable
delta-hedged trading rules can be created, however the spreads will disappear due
to higher transaction costs and on a wider sample of IVs.
Although performed at the index level, Goncalves and Guidolin’s paper is
particularly interesting as the performance measures introduced in the paper are
able to identify the predictability power of IV forecasts across different models.
We employ the same measurement errors in comparing forecast performance of our
models and show impact of CDS inclusion on the wide cross section of options.
4.2.2 Modeling Moments of Risk-neutral Distribution (RND)
A parametric approach for unveiling implied volatility is to model the moments
of the underlying RND. This can be done both on the cross-section and the index
2MSE stands for Mean Square Error, RMSE for Root Mean Square Error, and MAE for Mean
Absolute Error. The definitions of these error terms will be discussed in the regression section.
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level. By focusing on data extracted from the market prices of Standard & Poor’s
(S&P) 500 index options, Neumann and Skiadopoulos (2013) investigate whether
there are predictable patterns in the dynamics of higher-order risk-neutral mo-
ments (RNMs). They conduct a horse race among alternative forecasting models
within an out-of-sample context over various forecasting horizons (daily, weekly,
monthly). They find that higher RNMs can be statistically forecasted. However,
only the 1-day-ahead skewness forecasts can be economically exploited since the
economic significance vanishes once the transaction costs is incorporated.
Comparing the index options vs. individual equity options, and in order to
explain the risk-neutral skewness implied from option prices, the findings of Dennis
and Mayhew (2002) empirically establish a link between the risk neutral skewness
and the systematic risk of the underlying stock. They explain the structural
difference in distributions by investigating the relative importance of several firm
characteristics such as implied volatility, firm size, trading volume, leverage, and
beta. They show that risk-neutral skewness tends to be more negative for stocks
with larger betas. This is an evidence for the importance of market risk in option
pricing. Their findings show that the index options have a more pronounced
volatility smile/smirk than individual equity options.
If the moments are successfully modeled, this means the dynamics of implied
volatility surfaces can also benefit from the modeling.
In the same line of parametric approach to index level forecast, Panigirtzoglou
and Skiadopoulos (2004) try to model the dynamics of implied distributions by
obtaining a parsimonious description of the dynamics of the S&P 500 implied cu-
mulative distribution functions by applying PCA3. After identifying the factors,
3Principal Component Analysis
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they employ arbitrage-free Monte Carlo simulation methods that model the evolu-
tion of the whole distribution as a diffusion process. Traditionally, modeling only
the first two moments as diffusion processes is deemed to be sufficient to span the
whole IV. Their findings have important implications for “smile-consistent” option
pricing and for risk management, and they also test their model out-of-sample.
4.2.3 Encompassing Regressions
Encompassing regressions are an additional line of studies with the goal of better
modeling of IV and RV. In their papers Christensen and Prabhala (1998) model the
relationship between IV and RV. Chan, Jha, and Kalimipalli (2009) and Becker,
Clements, and White (2007), both use the S&P 500 implied volatility index (VIX)
when running encompassing regressions. VIX modeling through encompassing
regressions shows better out-of-sample performance. Our paper’s methods are
closely related to Chan, Jha, and Kalimipalli (2009), in that we also use the
encompassing regressions to model IV.
However, an important contribution of this paper is that we use a wide cross
section of individual options, as opposed to limiting the tests to the options index.
4.2.4 Modeling through Implied Volatility Functions and
IV Surface
Implied volatility functions are deterministic approach to modeling IV. Derman
and Kani (1994), Dupire (1994), and Rubinstein (1994) hypothesize that asset
return volatility is a deterministic function of asset price and time, and develop
a deterministic volatility function (DVF) option valuation model that has the
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potential of fitting the observed cross section of option prices exactly. Dumas,
Fleming, and Whaley (1998) use S&P 500 options from to examine the predictive
and hedging performance of the DVF option valuation model and find it that is
no better than an ad hoc procedure that merely smooths Black–Scholes (1973)
implied volatilities across exercise prices and times to expiration.
Although deterministic volatility models allow for more flexible volatility sur-
faces, these models refrain from introducing additional risk factors. This means we
need stochastic models to introduce additional risk factors, and options are then
needed for spanning of the pricing kernel. Buraschi and Jackwerth (2001) develop
a statistical test based on this difference in spanning. Again, they use index level
options data and show that both in- and out-of-the-money options are needed for
spanning which supports stochastic volatility, interest rates, or jumps models.
Throughout the four different lines of literature discussed, it is shown that
most forecasting attempts of IV have been empirically tested on index level data
or a limited selection of underlying firms, and not the cross section of options. In
our paper, we test for this by testing on an extensive collection of options data.
All tests will be run in a time series pattern and then averaged cross-sectionally.
4.3 Data and Summary Statistics
To perform this analysis, we employ cross-section and time series observations
from the following databases: Option Metrics, Markit data (CDS), and CRSP.
The credit default swap data is available from January 2002. As such, we col-
lect matching data from January 2002 to December 2009, in order to cover the
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matching time period with the CDS data.
Markit database reports the CDS spread on the 1-year, 5-year and 10-year
contracts. For the purpose of our research and in order to be dealing with the
highest liquidity, we limit the data to 5-year spreads only.
Table 1 displays the Summary statistics of the complete dataset used for the
forecasting. The three variables of interest are historical volatility, CDS, and IV
since we are focused on time-series forecast of implied volatility. Panels A and B
show the characteristics of these three variables across moneyness and maturity
bins as well as through time. Based on the distribution of observations, we can
see that across all moneyness groups, most liquid bins lie under short maturity,
and across all maturity groups, most frequent observations belong to at-the-money
and out-of-the money put options.
Panel C of Table 1 shows that during crisis and distress periods, as expected,
IV increases to high of 51% on average with the median of 45%.
Are lagged variables significant cross-sectionally? Given the purpose of this
paper is the time series analysis, we shall soon start building and performing
tests on a time series basis. However, in order to highlight the significance of the
variables chosen for the model, we run one set of univariate pooled panel regressions
on the three key lagged variables. Table 2 shows the result of univariate regression
of lagged variables on implied volatility. As indicated all three lagged variables of
CDSt−1, HVt−1, and IVt−1 are significant variables for the cross section of implied
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volatility.4 Note that the R-squared of the regressions are not very high due to
simplicity of the model at this stage. Future research will focus on improving the
liquidity as well as variables.
In the next section we design and test the time series forecast models.
4.4 Methodology
In this section we explain the methodology used, mainly the design of the fore-
casting model of future implied volatility.
4.4.1 Volatility Measures Background
By definition volatility aims to capture the strength of the (unexpected) return
variation over a given period of time. However, two distinct features importantly
differentiate the construction of all (reasonable) volatility measures. First, given
a set of actual return observations, how is the realized volatility computed? This
means that the emphasis is explicitly on “ex-post” measurement of the volatility.
Second, decision making processes often require forecasts of future return volatil-
ity. The focus this way is on “ex-ante” expected volatility.
The ex-ante concept requires a model that can effectively map the current in-
formation set into a volatility forecast. In contrast, the (ex-post) realized volatility
4Lagged CDS is the value of CDS for one period before for the same firm, i.e. last trading
day’s value. Note that this results in many missing values that have to be dropped when the
time series regressions run. No interpolation is performed for the lagged variables. Same logic
applies to lagged IV value. See Cao and Yu (2010) for a similar data approach for time series
forecast.
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may be computed (or approximated) without reference to any specific model, thus
rendering the task of volatility measurement essentially a nonparametric proce-
dure. An example is a rolling historical volatility measure.
In addition to these model classes, the implied volatility approaches are
also significantly covered in the literature. The implied volatilities are based on
a parametric volatility model for the returns, as defined above, along with an as-
set pricing model and an augmented information set consisting of options prices
and/or term structure variables.
Various design of IV and HV have been used in conjunction with default risk
studies. Campbell and Taksler (2003) used 180-day rolling standard deviation of
equity return as an explanatory variable for the credit spread. Collin-Dufresne,
Goldstein and Martin (2001) suggest the stock option implied volatility to be one
of the important determinants of the changes in CDS spreads. We chose to use
the 120 days rolling historical volatility because it corresponds to the maturity of
the put options observed in our sample.
In our research we retrieve IV from the Optionmetrics database, and hence it
is important to explain the estimation method employed. The calculated inter-
polated implied volatility for each option on each day, uses a methodology based
on a kernel smoothing algorithm. The data is first organized by the log of days
to expiration and by “call-equivalent delta” (delta for a call, one plus delta for a
put). A kernel smoother is then used to generate a smoothed volatility value at
each of the specified interpolation grid points. At each grid point on the volatility
surface, the smoothed volatility is calculated as a weighted sum of option implied
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volatilities.5
The implied volatility can also be seen as the volatility prognosis given the
information available at the current state and hence it will be state-sensitive.
Nonetheless the estimation of the implied volatility by CDS can be complicated
due to the lack of data on CDS trades on a consistent daily basis. We do deal
with missing variables which is due to the illiquidity of CDS compared to IV ob-
servations. Currently, interpolation is done for a single day missing (with trade
data available prior and after). Future research can benefit from the augmented
dataset (time period) and advanced interpolation (two or more consecutive days
missing) in order to deal with this issue.
4.4.2 Out-of-sample Evaluation background
What is the purpose of out-of-sample forecasts? Cross-validation is the process of
assessing how the results of a statistical analysis will generalize to an independent
data set. Note that IV is a reparamaterized value. If the model has been estimated
over some, but not all, of the available data, then the model using the estimated
parameters can be used to predict the held-back data. We test the performance by
measuring the out-of-sample mean squared error (MSE), also known as the mean
squared prediction error, in order to test the strength of the model in forecasting
the desired variable. In addition, we measure the mean absolute error (MAE) and
compare these statistics for each forecast model.
5See OptionMetrics Manual for additional details. Also, limited additional details provided
in Appendix.
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With the data and measures description above, we continue to build the base-
line regression model of forecasting implied volatility in the next section.
4.5 Regression Model Specification and Empiri-
cal Results
Based on the descriptions above, we can now specify the regression model to test
our hypotheses. We split the analysis into two sets of contemporaneous and lagged
models, as well as out-of-sample performance models.
Because the average maturity for the options used in our implied volatility
estimation is about four months, both historical volatility and future realized
volatility are computed over 120 trading days in this exercise in order to match
the horizon of option-implied volatility. We use daily data for the regression with
the Newey and West (1987) correction to the standard errors for autocorrelation
and heteroscedasticity.
We report two tests for each of contemporaneous and forward looking in-sample
models, one “with” and one “without” inclusion of the CDS measure. The results
can be found in Tables 3 and 4. We first explain the model and then elaborate on
the findings of these two tables.
The contemporaneous regression specification, hence, can be explained per
below:
IVt = β0 + β1HVt + t (4.1)
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IVt = β0 + β1HVt + β3CDSt + t (4.2)
Table 3 shows the results of our findings. The specification above is run on each
option ID and then averaged through all option IDs and reported. HV tend to
be an insignificant factor in determining the contemporaneous implied volatility.
CDS, on the other hand, shows to be statistically and economically significant,
and the inclusion improves the R2 of the forecast model to 27.6%.
On Forecasting Levels vs. Changes: We perform level regressions and not
changes. This is mostly because the irregular intervals or missing data for CDS
observations limits the design of any change regressions. From a statistical per-
spective, first differencing is appropriate if the dependent variable and regressors
are integrated, but this is difficult to determine for our irregularly spaced data.
The potential extension of the data set and additional interpolation techniques
will allow us to explore the change forecast in future studies.
We then move on to in-sample forecasts with 1-day ahead. Table 4 shows the
results for this forecast.
IVt = β0 + β1HVt−1 + β2IVt−1 + t (4.3)
IVt = β0 + β1HVt−1 + β2IVt−1 + β3CDSt−1 + t (4.4)
where IVt is the daily volatility on day t, HVt is the historical volatility on day
t, and CDSt is the 5-year observed CDS spread on day t.
FORECASTING OPTION IV USING CREDIT RISK 170
We estimate each of the above models for the sample period. (To report the
results, we run this time series regression on each cross-sectional firm and then
report the average betas, the cross-sectional mean of the regression coefficients,
and the Newey-West adjusted t-stats, as well average R-squared values.)
To test multiple horizons, we generate multistep forecasts on a given day for
each option. We examine 1-day-ahead (accounting for daily forecast),and 5-day-
ahead (accounting for weekly forecast). The results show that CDS is a significant
estimator of the forecasted IV.
In the next section we investigate out-of-sample performance of the designed
forecast models.
4.5.1 Out-of-sample Tests
The reasoning for looking at the out-of-sample forecasting performance in addition
to the in-sample fit comes from the objective of the analysis. In forecasting it is
not necessarily the model that provides the best in-sample fit that produces the
best out-of-sample volatility forecast, which is the main objective of the analysis;6
Hence it is common to use the out-of-sample forecast to aid the selection of which
model is best suited for the series under study;7. The out-of-sample forecast refers
to that the data used in the fitting of the model is different from the data used
for evaluating the forecasts. Typically the data in divided into two subsets, one
in which the model parameters are fitted (estimation subsample), and another
subset used to evaluate the forecasting performance of the models (forecasting
subsample).
6Shamiri and Isa (2009).
7Andersen and Bollerslev (1998), Hansen and Lunde (2001) and Brandt and Jones (2006)
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In Tables 3 and 4 we tested in-sample performance. Tables 5 and 6 investigate
out-of-sample performance for two different step sizes: Table 5 shows the result
for k = 1, which corresponds to daily forecast and Table 6 shows the results for
weekly forecast, i.e. k = 5.
To calculate the out-of-sample results we estimate each model based on a rolling
window on the sample period, and based on the number of days to maturity, then
we generate multistep out-of-sample forecasts for each day. To feed sufficient data
points, out-of-sample is not performed on the first year of the data. In summary,
we can explain the process as below:
• Consider an option with a specific option ID (that belongs to a moneyness
and maturity group). We derive the observed IV for each day from Option-
Metrics from the in-sample period.
• We use the underlying firm’s 5 year CDS spread, and the recorded historical
volatility for each day. (Note that lagged CDS only exists if there exists
a trade observation for the previous period. Otherwise, need to drop the
observation)
• We split the lifetime of the observed option into two periods: estimation
subsample (time= 0 to t) and forecasting subsample (t to T ).
• Using the fitted values until time t, we then forecast IV for T − t.
• The reported errors measure performance on the forecasting subsample only
and not the fitted values in the estimation subsample.
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For both models we calculate three error values: MSE, RMSE, and MAE values
across all option IDs. 8 Based on comparison of all three measures across bins,
we can see that: First, the model with CDS enhancement outperforms the rest
of the forecast models since the error values are lowest. Observing across each of
the bins, we can see that overall the forecasting error drops when the model is
enhanced by CDS (i.e. last row). In addition, for the complete sample, (including
all maturity and moneyness groups in one sample), the RMSE drops by 4 basis
points between the first and last models.
Second, we can also conclude that Long option bins in general have the best out-
of-sample performance of IV forecast.The forecasting error for these bins (Long
ITM, Long ATM, and Long OTM), are consistently measured lowest in their
groups.
Overall, inclusion of CDS can decrease the out-of-sample forecasting measure-
ment error. Next, we investigate whether the predictability power of CDS acts
differently during crisis periods and across industry.
4.5.2 Impact of Crisis and Industry
We further like to compare the out-of-sample performance of IV forecasting with
the enhanced CDS, on the key sub-samples. Table 7 investigates impact of fi-
nancial crisis on model’s out-of-sample performance. The results show that the
estimation error is consistently lower for non-crisis periods. The test of differences
in mean residual of the two subsamples are also statistically significant. This shows
8(i)The root mean squared prediction error in implied volatilities (RMSE) is the square root
of the average squared deviations of BS implied volatilities from the model’s forecast implied
volatilities, averaged over the number of options traded. (ii) The mean absolute prediction error
in implied volatilities (MAE) is the average of the absolute differences between the BS implied
volatility and the model’s forecast implied volatility across traded options.
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that although we can improve the out-of-sample performance of IV forecast, our
progress is somewhat restricted during crisis periods.
Finally, we like to see whether financial firms do better in out-of-sample fore-
casting or not. Following the same approach as above we can test this and see
that non-financial and financial firms do not show any “economically” significant
difference in out-of-sample performance of their IVs, despite the statistically sig-
nificant results in test of difference in mean. Table 8 shows that the values are
very similar and the difference is economically minor.
4.6 Conclusion
In previous chapter we showed how credit risk impacts option pricing. This asso-
ciation is an interesting component that can further be explored in the time series
context. Specifically, we can use the forward-looking information content of CDS
in forecasting option Implied Volatility.
In addition, forecasting option Implied Volatility (IV) is of interest to option
market participants, who routinely formulate volatility and option price forecasts
for trading and hedging purposes.
Previous literature is mostly about predicting IVs at aggregate or index level.
In this paper, however, we provide a characterization of IVs forecasts at individ-
ual firm level. We use a robust measure of credit risk i.e. CDS spreads of the
underlying firm written for senior sub-ordinated debt and therefore provide a first
comprehensive study of role of credit risk on IV forecasting using an exhaustive
sample of 550 firms for the 2002-2009 period.
FORECASTING OPTION IV USING CREDIT RISK 174
Inclusion of CDS improves the precision of implied volatility forecast, specif-
ically for out-of-sample. We further show that the forecasting error of implied
volatility will vary across moneyness and maturity indicating deep OTM and deep
ITM options can be subject to higher pricing error. Longer maturity options have
lowest estimation errors and show that
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4.8 Appendices
4.8.1 Appendix A: Complete Variables Glossary
In this section, the detailed definitions for each of the variables used in the base-
line regression(s) are provided. (Please note that the variables below are similar
to previous chapter’s glossary.)
• CDS spread: 5-year maturity CDS spread, daily observations from Markit.
When data is missing for one day in between two observations, it gets interpo-
lated. Any consecutive missing for more than one day, is treated as missing value
and automatically is dropped from the panel regressions.
• Option-implied volatility (IV): Put option IV, daily observations, daily ob-
servations, directly from Option Metrics. 9
•CDS Liquidity Proxy: equals to (No.ofContributors–AvgNo.ofContributors)×
CDSspread, or “Demeaned number of contributors times CDS spread”. The num-
ber of contributors are retrieved directly from Markit.
• Firm Return (%): For each underlying firm daily price is retrieved from CRSP
database. FirmRet = P1−P0
P0
.
• Historical Volatility (%): Standard deviation of a fund’s daily returns over
a rolling 6-month period.
• Market to Book Value: Tobin’s Q calculated with data from Compustat
quarterly files.
9IVs in OptionMetrics are retrieved from the Volatility Surface data file. The calculated
interpolated implied volatility for each option on each day, uses a methodology based on a kernel
smoothing algorithm. The data is first organized by the log of days to expiration and by “call-
equivalent delta” (delta for a call, one plus delta for a put). A kernel smoother is then used to
generate a smoothed volatility value at each of the specified interpolation grid points. At each
grid point on the volatility surface, the smoothed volatility is calculated as a weighted sum of
option implied volatilities. (See OptionMetrics Manual for additional details.)
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• Debt ratio: = Total Debt/Total Asset; data from Compustat quarterly files;
defined as total liabilities divided by the sum of total liabilities and market capi-
talization.
• VIX: Daily market volatility, V OLATILITY S&P500(V IX), retrieved from
CRSP, and available on OptionMetrics.
• TED Spread: The difference between the interest rates on interbank loans and
on short-term U.S. government debt (T-bills). It is calculated as the difference
between the three-month LIBOR and the three-month T-bill interest rate. Data
files for each variable retrieved from Datastream.
• IV Skew: As formulated in the paper, IV skew is defined for each observation
as “Avg OTM implied volatility – Avg ATM implied volatility”:
IV Skewi,t = AV ERAGEOTM(IVi,t)− AV ERAGEATM(IVi,t)
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**Note: This section of the Appendix is identical to previous essay’s data orga-
nization steps, since the underlying datasets for the last two essays are the same.**
4.8.2 Merging CDS Markit and Option Metrics
There are total of 1833 Ticker/Comp Name combination in the Markit Database.Out
of these 1833 , 34% are private or subsidiaries (See appendix A on this clean-up
activity). Removing these , would leave a remainder of 1203 public to work with.
The next step is to limit data to firms with Options. Matching the 1203 with
Options Metric data, we are down to 1063 which both have CDS written on the
underlying bond, and options written on their underlying company. The sample
that we work with would have 1063 unique firm IDs. (see chart below)
4.8.3 Cleaning up Option Metrics Data
I downloaded all Option Metrics data from 1996 to 2011 inclusive. The Option
Prices file (under Option Metrics Data files¿¿Options) gets downloaded with all
possible variables (32 variables in total) in monthly files format from 1996 until
2010. (The average volume for every month is 1-2GB)
There are 32 listed variables downloaded, per below:
FILTERS:
1) DROP UNNECESSARY VARS (ssf lag, indexf lag, exchanged, issuetype) keep
if cpf lag == ”C” | cpf lag == ”P” keep if ssf lag == 0 (121656 observations
deleted) keep if indexf lag == 0 (536045 observations deleted) drop if exchanged ==
32768 (0 observations deleted) keep if issuetype == ”0” (1681856 observations
deleted)
2)prior to saving the final file, I ”sort secid optionid date” to organize the data;
it makes it much easier in the data matching, & give the compress command one
more time before saving the datafile.
3)LITERATURE FILTERS: Many in our sample do not have actively traded op-
tions. The choice of non-zero open interest emphasizes the information content of
options that are currently in use by market participants. We also drop all zero
volume options. I also exclude all options that violate Put-Call parity. For the
first round of the analysis, I keep only put options.
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4.8.4 Compustat Fundamentals Data Collection
I collect and compute the quarterly Company Variables (i.e. Size, Book/Market,
and Leverage) for all of the in the sample. I also winsorize data and store statistics
both before and after winsorization.
For merging with Option Metrics and CDS, I keep the pre-winsorization file.
4.8.5 Report on CDS Markit Data Clean-up for TICKERS
& COMP NAMES
Markit Look-Up Dimensions: TICKER, Company Name, Date Period(s)
Issues:
1. Tickers may get recycled and as such multiple matches available when merged
with other databases
2. Company names are in short form or miss spaces/dots in Markit so cannot
automatically be matched. Need manual review.
Solution:
Review the complete Ticker/CompName list from Markit and verify their identi-
fication (i.e. match with the unique PERMNO from CRSP).
• Use Google/Yahoo Finance search engines.
• Confirm Private/Public Companies
• Find alternative names and tickers
Manual Correction Steps
1. Look up the ticker in CRSP full database
2. If the ticker and company name match fully, there should be one unique
PERMNO. Record any alternative names.
3. If there are alternatives, provide correct match for the time period provided in
Markit.
4. If there are no matches, use Google and Yahoo finance searches. – Is the com-
pany a Private company?
Results Statistics
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There are total of 1833 unique Ticker/Comp Name combination in the CDS
Markit Database. The final correction and inclusion provided final match of 1203
companies in total.
From the remaining, the provided correction notes indicate that:
a. 15 firms are subsidiaries with parent company not found before, so parent
ticker is provided.
b. Total of 100 unmatched tickers are Private firms.
c. Total of 340 unmatched tickers are Subsidiaries with their parents present in
the database.
d. Fewer than 10 firms are result of mergers or acquisitions that are still valid for
inclusion. Details provided.
This is the result of individual scrubbing of each firm/ticker.
FORECASTING OPTION IV USING CREDIT RISK 183
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Figure 1. Time-series comovement of CDS spread and implied volatility  
This chart shows the IV and CDS dynamics for Lehman Brothers (LEH) and Merrill Lynch 
(MER) over the Jan2002-Jan2009 sample. Consistent with the hypotheses of the paper on the 
forecasting power of CDS, we can see the comovement of CDS and implied volatility. Our goal 
here is to trace the time-series relationship of CDS in estimating future implied volatility and use 
it in the IV forecast model.  
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 Table 1. Summary Statistics 
Panel A reports the overall summary statistics of the time-series means of 550 sample firms for 
each of the key variables. Panel B reports the summary statistics across bins. CDS Spread is the 
five-year composite credit default swap spread; historical volatility is the 252-day historical 
volatility; implied volatility is the volatility inferred from put options with nonzero open 
interests; The sample period extends from January 2002 through 2009. 
 
Panel A: All data 
 Mean Q1 Median Q3 Std.Dev.  
CDS Spread 1.10 0.24 0.47 1.09 2.17  
Historical Volatility 0.38 0.03 0.25 0.58 0.05  
Implied Volatility 0.36 0.26 0.33 0.43 0.17  
       
Nobs 205441      
 
 
 
Panel B: Across Bins 
  Short  Medium  Long 
 
CDS Spread 
IT
M
 
 
1.28 
  
1.28 
  
1.20 
Historical Volatility 0.39  0.43  0.45 
Implied Volatility 0.40  0.36  0.33 
Percent Obs.  11.45%  7.00%  5.51% 
 
 
CDS Spread 
A
T
M
 
 
9.76 
  
0.99 
  
0.96 
Historical Volatility 0.33  0.34  0.41 
Implied Volatility 0.34  0.33  0.32 
Percent Obs.  18.75%  10.12%  6.83% 
 
 
CDS Spread 
O
T
M
 
 
1.20 
  
1.10 
  
1.04 
Historical Volatility 0.38  0.38  0.45 
Implied Volatility 0.43  0.38  0.35 
Percent Obs.  17.55%  12.96%  9.83% 
 
 
Panel C: Implied volatility across years 
  IV 
Mean 
 IV 
Median 
  
2002     0.4707201      0.428546 
2003     0.3727789     0.348667 
2004     0.3205156     0.3027075 
2005     0.2985788     0.282648 
2006     0.3101929     0.297454 
2007     0.3316317      0.312099 
2008     0.5067201      0.450139  
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Table 2. Pooled Regression of Implied volatility 
 
The table presents univariate pooled regression of Implied volatility on the set of key lagged 
variables to be employed in the forecasting model. The pooled regression is aimed to highlight 
the comovement of each with the implied volatility. 
 
Lagged CDS = previous observation day’s CDS for the issuer firm. 
Lagged IV = previous observation day’s IV for the same Option ID. 
Lagged HV = previous observation day’s HV for the issuer firm. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Var: IV 
Lagged 
IV 
Lagged 
HV 
Lagged 
CDS 
    IV 
   
    Lagged CDS 0.0118*** 
  
 
(21.08) 
  Lagged HV 
 
0.0640*** 
 
  
(7.729) 
 Lagged IV 
  
0.354*** 
   
(75.40) 
Intercept 0.327*** 0.325*** 0.232*** 
 
(585.9) (510.0) (142.4) 
    Observations 76,258 117,519 105,602 
R-squared 0.010 0.002 0.089 
t-statistics in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3. Contemporaneous regression of implied volatility (run on each option) 
 
This table estimates the following three models of variations with and without CDS: 
 
IVt = β0 + β1×HVt  
 
IVt = β0 + β2×CDSt  
 
IVt = β0 + β1×HVt +  β2×CDSt 
 
Where CDS is the observed credit default swap spread, HV is the rolling historical volatility, and 
IV is the option implied volatility. 
 
We run this time series regression on each cross-sectional firm and then report the average betas.  
Both cross-sectional mean of the regression coefficients, the (Newey-West adjusted) t-stats, as 
well as standard errors and average R-squared are presented. 
(*Italic values show the average t-stat of cross-sectional values.)  
 
  HV without CDS CDS without HV HV and CDS 
Average Beta_0 (β0) 0.3347*** 8.1225*** 0.4293*** 
 
30.27   29.09   14.09 
Average Beta_1 (β1) 0.0449258  2.577973 
 
0.51  .6215886 
Average Beta_2 (β2)  3.5876*** 4.8797*** 
 
 3.43 2.69 
    
    
    
 
   
       
N 13429 33081 9921 
Average R-squared 8.51% 18.28% 27.62% 
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Table 4. Time-series regression of implied volatility (run on each option) 
 
This table estimates the forecasting power of the CDS spreads when augmented to the IV 
forecasting model. Both regression coefficients and Newey-West adjusted t-stats are presented. 
 
This table estimates the following two models with and without CDS: 
 
IVt= β0 + β1×HVt-1 + β2×IVt-1 
 
IVt= β0 + β1×HVt-1+ β2×IVt-1+ β3×CDSt-1 
 
Where HV is the rolling historical volatility, and IV is the option implied volatility. CDS is the 
5-year maturity credit default swap for the underlying firm. We run this time series regression on 
each cross-sectional firm and then report the average betas. Both cross-sectional mean of the 
regression coefficients, the (Newey-West adjusted) t-stats, as well as average R-squared are 
presented. 
 
 
  Without CDS With CDS 
Average Beta_0 (β0) -0.0256*** -0.0873*** 
 
-4.20 -5.25 
Average Beta_1 (β1) 0.1092*** 0.0561*** 
 
12.29 11.50 
Average Beta_2 (β2) 0.3289*** 0.0750*** 
 
14.38 10.55 
Average Beta_3 (β3) 
 
0.0027*** 
  
8.30 
   
      
N 8379 6284 
Average R2 0.21 0.29 
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Table 5. Daily Out-of-sample performance of the model specifications for each of the maturity and moneyness bins (k= 1 day) 
Out-of-sample performance of the model specifications for each one of the implied volatility forecast. We do this estimation for all three 
models, and calculate the errors for nine different bins as well as all sample. The mean square error (MSE), the root mean squared 
prediction error (RMSE), and the mean absolute prediction error (MAE) are provided.  
(i)The root mean squared prediction error in implied volatilities (RMSE) is the square root of the average squared deviations of BS implied 
volatilities from the model’s forecast implied volatilities, averaged over the number of options traded. (ii) The mean absolute prediction error in 
implied volatilities (MAE) is the average of the absolute differences between the BS implied volatility and the model’s forecast implied volatility 
across traded options. 
Table 5. Out-of-sample performance of IV prediction: k= 1 day 
  
  
 
ITM  ATM 
 
OTM 
 All sample Short Medium Long Short Medium Long Short Medium Long 
Panel A: HVt-1 
           
MSE 0.0182 0.0316 0.0202 0.0142 0.0202 0.0147 0.0085 0.0246 0.0166 0.0092 
RMSE 0.1349 0.1779 0.1420 0.1192 0.1423 0.1211 0.0920 0.1568 0.1289 0.0959 
MAE 0.0182 
 
0.0316 
 
0.0202 
 
0.0142 
 
0.0202 
 
0.0147 
 
0.0085 
 
0.0246 
 
0.0166 
 
0.0092 
 
 
           
Panel B: CDSt-1 
MSE 0.0201 0.0364 0.0215 0.0122 0.0200 0.0162 0.0117 0.0285 0.0163 0.0099 
RMSE 0.1419 0.1907 0.1467 0.1105 0.1414 0.1274 0.1081 0.1688 0.1277 0.0995 
MAE 0.0972 0.1277 0.0999 0.0821 0.0994 0.0913 0.0778 0.1174 0.0871 0.0710 
 
           
Panel C: CDSt-1 and HVt-1 
MSE 0.0137 0.0250 0.0166 0.0076 0.0140 0.0116 0.0062 0.0200 0.0122 0.0065 
RMSE 0.1171 0.1582 0.1288 0.0870 0.1185 0.1077 0.0789 0.1415 0.1103 0.0803 
MAE 0.0810 0.1103 0.0878 0.0653 0.0841 0.0758 0.0606 0.1011 0.0742 0.0589 
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Table 6. Weekly Out-of-sample performance of the model specifications for each of the maturity and moneyness bins (k=5 days) 
Out-of-sample performance of the model specifications for each one of the implied volatility forecast. We do this estimation for all three 
models, and calculate the errors for nine different bins as well as all sample. The mean square error (MSE), the root mean squared 
prediction error (RMSE), and the mean absolute prediction error (MAE) are provided.  
(i)The root mean squared prediction error in implied volatilities (RMSE) is the square root of the average squared deviations of BS implied 
volatilities from the model’s forecast implied volatilities, averaged over the number of options traded. (ii) The mean absolute prediction error in 
implied volatilities (MAE) is the average of the absolute differences between the BS implied volatility and the model’s forecast implied volatility 
across traded options. 
 
Table 6. Out-of-sample performance of IV prediction: k= 5 days 
  
  
 
ITM  ATM 
 
OTM 
 
All sample Short Medium Long Short Medium Long Short Medium Long 
Panel A: HVt-1 
           
MSE 0.0122 0.0235 0.0195 0.0054 0.0208 0.0154 0.0045 0.0234 0.0135 0.0044 
RMSE 0.1104 0.1532 0.1398 0.0732 0.1443 0.1241 0.0669 0.1529 0.1160 0.0662 
MAE 0.0809 0.1215 0.1005 0.0615 0.1009 0.0914 0.0619 0.1160 0.0761 0.0600 
 
           
Panel B: CDSt-1 
MSE 0.0141 0.0242 0.0238 0.0073 0.0153 0.0148 0.0058 0.0204 0.0153 0.0052 
RMSE 0.1187 0.1555 0.1543 0.0857 0.1237 0.1215 0.0762 0.1428 0.1238 0.0721 
MAE 0.0822 0.1165 0.1019 0.0638 0.0905 0.0853 0.0605 0.1009 0.0806 0.0539 
 
           
Panel C: CDSt-1 and HVt-1 
MSE 0.0141 0.0255 0.0209 0.0064 0.0278 0.0171 0.0060 0.0258 0.0138 0.0062 
RMSE 0.1186 0.1596 0.1445 0.0797 0.1668 0.1306 0.0778 0.1607 0.1176 0.0785 
MAE 0.0752 0.1196 0.0935 0.0558 0.0971 0.0831 0.0527 0.1163 0.0745 0.0511 
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Table 7. Impact of Financial Crisis: Out-of-sample performance during crisis vs. non-crisis periods 
 
The table presents results of out-of sample performance of Implied volatility forecast for two 
subperiods of Crisis (2007-2009), and Non-crisis (2002-2006) periods, on the set of key lagged 
variables. We show the MAE (Mean Absolute Error) for each of these regressions and also test for 
the difference between the two set of residuals. 
The results show that during the crisis period the out of sample performance power consistently and 
significantly drops, as measured by a larger value of MAE. 
Also, across all four models, the model with lagged CDS, lagged IV and lagged HV, possesses the 
smallest level of MAE. 
 
Lagged CDS = previous observation day’s CDS for the issuer firm. 
Lagged IV = previous observation day’s IV for the same Option ID. 
Lagged HV = previous observation day’s HV for the issuer firm. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Forecasted Var: IV Non Crisis Crisis 
Test of 
difference 
    Model 1: IVt on { IVt-1} 
 0.0356 0.0508 0.0152*** 
    
    
Model 2: IVt on { IVt-1, HVt-1} 
 0.0300 0.0422 0.0121*** 
    
    
Model 3: IVt on { IVt-1, CDSt-1} 
 0.0328 0.0487 0.0159*** 
    
    
Model 4: IVt on { IVt-1, HVt-1, CDSt-1} 
 0.0286 0.0414 0.0129*** 
    
t-statistics in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8. Impact of Industry: Out-of-sample performance for Financial vs. NonFinancial firms 
 
The table presents results of out-of sample performance of Implied volatility forecast for two 
subsections of financial and non-financial firms, on the set of key lagged variables. We show the 
MAE (Mean Absolute Error) for each of these regressions and also test for the difference between 
the two set of residuals. 
The results show that the difference between MAEs are statistically significant for 3 out of 4 models; 
However, it is interesting to note that the economic magnitude of the difference is minor between 
financial and non-financial firms. 
Consistent with prior results, across all four models, the forecasting model that includes lagged CDS, 
lagged IV and lagged HV, possesses the smallest level of MAE and outperforms the rest of the 
models. 
 
Lagged CDS = previous observation day’s CDS for the issuer firm. 
Lagged IV = previous observation day’s IV for the same Option ID. 
Lagged HV = previous observation day’s HV for the issuer firm. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Forecasted Var: IV Non-Financial Financial 
Test of 
difference 
    Model 1: IVt on { IVt-1} 
 0.0408 0.0460 0.0052*** 
    
    
Model 2: IVt on { IVt-1, HVt-1} 
 0.0348 0.0359 0.0009 
    
    
Model 3: IVt on { IVt-1, CDSt-1} 
 0.0386 0.0431 0.0045*** 
    
    
Model 4: IVt on { IVt-1, HVt-1, CDSt-1} 
 0.0335 0.0358 0.0022*** 
    
t-statistics in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   
Chapter 5
CONTRIBUTIONS AND
CONCLUSIONS
The Bear Stearns hedge funds failure in August 2007, and later collapse of Lehman
Brothers in September 2008, one of the largest bankruptcies in U.S. history, played
a major role in the unfolding of the recent global financial crisis and magnitude
and impact of default risk in capital markets. The proliferation and popularity
of credit risk transfer instruments, create additional quality data and measures in
contemporary research in the field of default risk. This dissertation fits into the
very same framework and sheds light on some key issues surrounding default risk
in capital markets.
This dissertation covers three essays in an attempt to further investigate major
issues surrounding default risk in capital markets and the relationship with the
2008 financial crisis by focusing on important segments of capital markets including
investments portfolio (hedge funds), derivatives (equity options market), fixed
income (credit default swaps), and equity market.
The first essay “The role of Leverage in Hedge Funds Failure” investigates the
role of financial leverage, including the use of margins and derivative products, in
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the hedge funds failure during the 2008 financial crisis. Motivated by failure of the
two Bear Stearns hedge funds at the beginning of the financial crisis in 2007, this
paper examines why some hedge funds failed during and after the recent financial
crisis, and why some also survived. Leverage is defined in three ways, as (a)
debt/equity ratio, (b) the use of margins, and (c) the use of derivative products.
The research uses a 15-year panel dataset of 17,202 failed and survived hedge
funds from the Lipper TASS Hedge Fund database. The empirical analysis, us-
ing probit regression to estimate the likelihood of failure, shows that during the
financial crisis period, financial leverage is more significant in increasing the prob-
ability of failure, whereas financial leverage becomes insignificant in explaining
the probability of hedge fund failure during non-crisis periods after controlling
for fund structure, size, incentive fees, prior performance, and off-shore registra-
tion. The results are consistent with Ang et al. (2011) who analyze the cyclical
leverage for financial institutions and hedge funds and find that financial lever-
age decreases during financial crisis period because the funds sell some assets to
meet their margin requirements and that forces some funds into liquidation. Fur-
ther analysis shows that some hedge funds which follow specific styles such as
“Emerging Markets”, “Equity Market”, “Long/Short Equity Hedge”, and “Multi-
strategy”, which have higher than average betas are also more likely to fail during
the financial crisis.
The second essay “Does default risk impact Equity Options?” explores the
impact of default risk on equity option pricing. The impact is studied in detail
by empirically examining to what extent the firm-specific default risk matters in
pricing individual equity options. Since credit default swaps (CDS) are similar to
put options in that both offer a hedging tool and an effective protection against
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downside risk, we use CDS spread as credit risk proxy to investigate the effects of
default risk on put pricing.
Recent financial crisis showed that for many financial firms equity options
experienced high implied volatility (IV) when the underlying CDS spreads went
up. By examining an exhaustive sample of US-listed firms with both CDS and put
options data available over the period from 2002 to 2010, and studying the primary
determinants of option IVs cross-sectionally and over time, the findings show that
default risk is a significant factor in the prices of equity options. Moreover, the
impact of default risk remains significant after controlling for firm-specific and
macroeconomic factors. This study relates to recent literature that explains how
default risk can get injected from the fixed income market to the equity options
market and why default risk is important in the pricing of equity option and
implied volatility.
The third essay “Forecasting Option-Implied Volatility using credit risk” in-
vestigates the topic of forecasting option implied volatility which is of interest to
option market participants, who routinely formulate volatility and option price
forecasts for trading and hedging purposes. As shown in essay two, credit risk
matters for option pricing since options are valued on firms with significant trad-
ing liquidity, yet subject to default risk, similar to liquidity risk. If credit risk
matters for option prices, this essay particularly explores whether better out-of-
sample forecasts for option implied volatility (IV) can be developed using lagged
credit risk measures. Various time-series forecasts of daily, weekly, and monthly
for option implied volatility show that inclusion of default risk as measured by
credit default swap (CDS) can significantly improve out-of-sample performance,
measured through decreased mean squared error (MSE) as well as smaller root
mean squared error (RMSE).
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Overall, the three essays covered in this dissertation contribute to the current
literature by investigating recent issues of default risk and showing the findings in
each of the tested segments of capital markets.
